Squaring the circle

By: Deepak Sinha

A veteran paratrooper and consultant with the Observer Research Foundation, Deepak writes on matters of military and broader security concerns. His blog Para Phrase will seek to unravel issues in the security domain without fear or favour, mainly from a military perspective.

John Paul Rathbone, writing in the Financial Times, on the United Kingdom’s efforts to transform its military amid public spending constraints and growing strategic challenges, puts it extremely well when he wonders as to how its military will “square the circle of being everything, everywhere, all at once.” 

This, however, is not just a problem that afflicts the UK or its European and NATO Allies, but the rest of the international community as well. The impact of the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict, in what increasingly appears to be an unwinnable war, is restricted not only to the geo-political or and national security spheres but also calls for a clear understanding of how future conflicts will play out and what kind of a military capability is essential if that country is to remain relevant in the changing global order.

In our context, the challenges are far more complex and greater as we face two hostile neighbours, both nuclear armed, and unwilling to give any quarter. Indeed, it is quite ironic that while China poses the greater threat to our aspirations, ambitions and future prosperity, it is the dysfunctional and dystopian Pakistan, that threatens us with Armageddon, looking to take us down with it, as it seems intent on committing hara-kiri. 

Fortunately for us, its symbiotic embrace of China, in many ways, curtails its ability to play too fast or too loose. The last thing China wishes for, is to be dragged down by an immature and delinquent partner on an infantile quest for revenge. It is high time we looked for ways in which the inherent vulnerabilities of this awkward and one-sided partnership can be used to our benefit.

It bears emphasis that the danger for us is even greater as we, and rightly so, appear to have chosen the road less travelled; of giving primacy to protecting our national interests above all else. This may seem an obvious choice and what most nations do, but it is not something we have always focused on as unfortunately our leadership, has more often than not, tended to conflate their own personal interests as that of the nation. Matter of fact, to some extent we see that happening now as well with our ongoing presidency of the G-20. 

Thus, our relationships with our allies will at best be transactional in nature, wherein our assistance to them in the region will be solely governed by what is in it for us. This makes those supping at the top table inherently uncomfortable, to say the least, as they are not used to others following in their footsteps. Which explains why the likes of Ashley Tellis, one of America’s foremost policy wonks, have questioned the United States Administration’s ‘bet’ on India. 

He writes in Foreign Affairs that “treating India as a key partner will help the United States in its geopolitical rivalry against China.” But he goes on to add that “New Delhi will never involve itself in any U.S. confrontation with Beijing that does not directly threaten its own security. India values cooperation with Washington for the tangible benefits it brings, but does not believe it must, in turn, materially support the United States in any crisis-even one involving a common threat such as China”. 

One cannot but agree with such logic, though it goes without saying that the U.S. response will be no different if the boot were on the other foot, as we have seen on many occasions. Moreover, Henry Kissinger’s words, “to be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal,” carry weight, and should be given due consideration. Thus, it may be best if we make haste slowly in our dealings with them, especially given the existing polarisation that exists within their political establishment. Be that as it may, it goes without saying that for us to be able to pursue an independent and robust foreign policy requires it is essential that it is supported by a strong military that the political leadership is willing to utilise. 

Unfortunately, that is certainly not the case with us at the present time. It is no secret that our political establishment has, since Independence, felt threatened by the military and the possibility, however remote, of being overshadowed by them. This has resulted in the military being neglected, a state now further exacerbated by this Government’s meddling with its internal functioning. As a result, we have ended up with a military leadership that is supine, increasingly politicised and lacking credibility. 

Ironically, in an environment where the political leadership makes it obvious that conformity, blind obedience and personal loyalty are the key to career progression, it also tends to have less faith or trust in the abilities of that leadership. This is natural, as the last thing they would wish for is to be “Putined”, or find themselves in a deep ditch they can’t climb out of, as President Putin finds himself, thanks to the rank incompetence of his generals! In such circumstances can this government consider taking proactive steps against the Chinese to break the existing stalemate, especially if such a step may lead to escalation?

The second, equally important aspect, pertains to our inability to enhance reserve stocks necessary to fight a prolonged war, something akin to the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict, a possibility not envisaged till now. There is also an urgent necessity to replace obsolete weapons and equipment as well as fill up existing voids. This has partly not happened due to lack of budgetary support and convoluted procurement procedures and partly because of delays as the Atmanirbhar initiative has not paid the expected dividends. 

Interestingly, in the Official History of the 1962 Conflict Dr. S N Prasad, the Chief Editor, writes  that Pandit Nehru and Mr. Krishna Menon saw the military as a “close- knit professional body, deliberately isolated from the citizen. Its predominant motive force remained espirit de corps and not identification with the people. Someday it may even act like the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire. The Indian Army trained and fought like the British Army, unimaginative, elephantine, rule-bound and road bound…. Perhaps he wanted to model it after the People’s Liberation Army of China, more egalitarian, flexible, closer to the people………Such basic changes required a committed, or at least a pliant, band of army officers in key positions. So mediocre Thapar was selected instead of the doughty Thorat as Army Chief, and Bijji Kaul was made CGS……. To carry out this transformation of the national defence set up, a decade of peace was absolutely essential. For establishing indigenous weapons manufacture, money had to be found by cutting arms imports. The armed forces would be short of equipment and stores for several years till the new arms factories started producing. The officer cadre was a house divided within itself, till the new breed fully took over. A period of transition was inevitable, during which the fighting machine would not be fully efficient and would be vulnerable………Therein seems to lie the basic cause of the debacle of 1962. India failed to avoid a war during the transition period. Lulled by faulty political assessment and wrong intelligence forecasts, the country got caught in a war when it was least prepared.”

The similarity in the circumstances prevailing then and now are indeed difficult to miss. Karl Marx famously said “history repeats itself, first as tragedy, second as farce.” One wonders what exactly is in store for us and will we be able to square the circle?