Chinese Concirclement of India and Standoff: Way Ahead

Major General (Dr) S B Asthana, SM,VSM,PhD

Sharing an analysis of mine on the subject, published as Chapter 2 in the BOOK “India @ 75 – Reflections on New India” edited by Dr Nivedita Das Kundu, with chapters from other strategic writers. The analysis was written last year but is equally applicable today, being a contemporary subject. The gist is shared below.

Chinese Concirclement of India and Standoff: Way Ahead

Backdrop

Currently the global attention is towards Russia-Ukraine War, wherein US led NATO projects Russian offensive against Ukraine, as breach of territorial integrity of a sovereign democratic country by a hegemon, China on the other hand hasn’t faced global ire despite incremental encroachment of territories of many sovereign democratic countries in Asian neighbourhood. Annexation of Tibet, Aksai Chin and EEZ of many countries in South China Sea are some examples.

China has a long term strategy to dislodge US as a superpower by 2049 or earlier, but regionally it wants a China centric Asia, for which containment of other regional players like India is a pre-requisite. To achieve that besides land grabbing activities by incremental encroachment, it is creating bases (String of Pearls) and corridors like China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) which amount to encircling India. The land grab by activities have often led to many standoffs, including the current one in Eastern Ladakh, which seems to be vanishing from global memory amidst fresh global challenges.

China, however continues to build infrastructure in encroached land like the second bridge on Pangong Tso recently, additional camps and villages along Line of Actual Control (LAC) which is a major concern for India, posing a grave challenge to resolve it, preferably without any military action in the interest of regional peace and stability. In this paper, Chinese concirclement of India is being explained with focus on ongoing Ladakh standoff along with possible options for India.    

Strategic Concirclement

Unchallenged Xi Jinping with renewed mandate by CCP, during his conversation with President Joe Biden has tried to create an impression of bipolar world order in existence, although the rest of the world amidst Covid-19 pandemic continues its rebalancing between unipolar, bipolar and multipolar global order as per their perception. If Beijing has its way, it will use all instruments of power (ethical and unethical) to be sole superpower at global stage and have China centric Asia at regional stage, at the earliest, for which sub-ordination of India is considered essential. To achieve that the containment plus encirclement (concirclement) of India is a strategic necessity to be able to coerce it to China centric alignment, preferably without undertaking contact warfare.

Chanakya wisdom that a neighbour with unsettled border can never be a friend, seems to have been realised by New Delhi, which has been consistently involved in talkathon with China for decades hoping to have friendly neighbour. India needs to work out options in all domains, in fragile international environment, to undertake China challenge to avoid concirclement, preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity, besides continuing its own march towards becoming a strong pole in global order.   

Multidimensional Concirclement of India by China

In absence of any border treaty between Independent India and China and non-demarcated LAC, the standoffs will continue. The present one in Eastern Ladakh seems to have run into stalemate, to India’s disadvantage, especially due to shortage of leverages, although India refuses to be coerced to resume business as usual side-lining border/LAC issue and insists on further pull back of PLA from all friction points to lead to de-escalation. China wants to avoid further pull back as it continues building additional infrastructure to upgrade its encroachment into areas, which it was not supposed to occupy as per Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), as permanent settlements. Chinese aim is to label it as settlement of border issue, somewhat in consonance with its 1959/60 claim line in strategically important areas. With occasional intrusions in other areas along LAC, China is trying to increase the economic cost of deployment for India by LOCisation of LAC and stretching out Indian Military to seek Sino-centric solution.  

The ‘Containment Strategy’ of China includes planned construction of 628 dual use, border defence villages along its own perception of LAC to provide permanency to its claim, enhance its ISR capabilities (some of which have already been made), providing it infrastructure like fibre optic connection, akin to outposts. China can claim that its Land Borders Law passed recently by National People’s Congress is applicable to all countries, but the timing suggests it to be part of containment of India. The law improves coordination between agencies and power to defend increasingly claimed land under garb of national integrity. China’s recent MOU with Bhutan for resolving border issues bilaterally, and allurement of Nepal are also steps towards containment of India. A possible Chinese gain at Doklam through a land swap with Bhutan from other areas can be a serious concern for India due to its proximity to Siliguri Corridor. China has also encroached to make villages in both these countries.

The aggressiveness in  ‘Encirclement Strategy’ is evident from China delivering – most advanced frigates/warships to Pakistan. Labelled as gift, India must take it as cover plan for deployment of its PLAN combat ships in Pakistan territorial water/Arabian sea, perhaps under Pakistan flag, adding another pearl to its ongoing ‘String of Pearl Strategy’. Gwadar port as part of CPEC, CMEC leading to Bay of Bengal and foothold in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh are part of overall encirclement plan of India.

The most worrying part for India is Chinese encroachment in non-contact warfare domain. Chinese increasing economic, technological and digital offensive against India and other countries have made them so dependent on China, denting their self-reliance, so that the responses to Chinese unethical encroachment get muted. Chinese strategy of ‘Three Warfare’ namely employing media or public opinion, psychological warfare, and legal warfare seems to be finding some traction in politically active democracies, election oriented segments of population in India to settle their political scores.      

Ladakh Standoff

The 15^th round of Corps Commander level talks between India and China ending with no concrete results, was not a surprise to anyone analysing Chinese activities, posture and signaling prior to the talks. The talks were preceded by the incidents of intrusions by Chinese troops in the Barahoti sector of Uttarakhand, the Tawang sector of Arunachal Pradesh, heavy concentration of troops and modern arsenal along LAC, exercises and building permanent structures in areas which China had encroached in mid 2020, vacation of which been the main agenda/purpose of the talks. It is amply evident that China is in no mood to concede anything and continues the talks for optics of ongoing talkathon. Post disengagement of troops in Eastern Ladakh from North and South of Pangong Tso, some disengagement in Gogra, no disengagement has taken place in other areas to include Depsang plains, Patrolling Point 15 in Hot Spring area, Demchok, and no de-escalation, is a forgone conclusion, in view of activities mentioned earlier.

The Chinese intention to coerce India to resume business as usual, sidelining border/LAC issue and not insist on further pull back was refuted by the Indian Foreign Ministry by conveying that disengagement at all friction points leading to de-escalation, peace and tranquility on borders are pre-requisites to progressing smooth bilateral ties. This rightful Indian stance to get back to pre-April 2020 positions stands adversely affected by Chinese obnoxious allegation of India pushing for unreasonable and unrealistic demands, which is creating difficulties in negotiations, which indirectly conveys no more pulling back. Last year almost 80 percent of Chinese top leaders including President Xi Jinping have visited Tibet/Xinjiang. Massive infrastructure development in terms of airstrips, rail, road network to border towns like Nyngchi, accommodation and other activities are worth monitoring for India to work out its responses. 

Aim and Strategies of China and India in Standoff so far!

Chinese political aim was and continues to be China centric Asia and forcing Indian subordination, a necessity to achieve it. This aim could not be achieved despite prolonged standoff in Ladakh so far, but will remain unchanged, even in future. Chinese strategic aim to control Eastern Ladakh was to provide depth to its National Highway G-219, Karakoram Pass, redraw Line of Actual Control (LAC) as per its perception (1959-60) and negotiate border on its terms thereafter. China can claim to have partially achieved it, with continued presence in extra kilometrage in Depsang plains, Hot Spring, Demchok areas, where disengagement hasn’t taken place. Having developed its infrastructure in areas as per its perception of LAC, it aims to deny the same to India has not been so successful as India continues to develop its infrastructure at unprecedented speed to catch up.

The Indian aim has been to get Chinese back to pre-standoff positions as of April 2020 in all friction points, not to concede unilateral change of LAC, and pursue talks towards its demarcation, hoping to lead to border resolution. With current disengagement, status quo stands achieved in areas north and south of Pangong Tso, albeit at the cost of losing the crucial leverage of giving up occupation of certain heights on Kailash range and north of Pangong Tso, prior to Chinese vacation of ‘Other Areas’. Pursuing disengagement and de-escalation in remaining areas will be an uphill task due to shortage of leverages, given Chinese past track record and recent activities.

China, marched in areas, where it was not supposed to be, junking all CBMs, as part of overall ‘Incremental Encroachment Strategy’, exploiting first mover advantage, making unfair use of Indian engagement in combating COVID-19 pandemic. China soon  found  itself handicapped by strong Indian response, resistance and resolve, with proactive actions resulting newly created vulnerabilities to Maldo Garrison and its launch pad, South of Pangong Tso. Despite disengagement in Pangong Tso area, Chinese discomfort due to Indian dispositions in Sub Sector North including DBO, infrastructure development including DSDBO road, as a threat to crucial Tibet-Xinjiang-Pakistan connectivity remains. Except few proactive actions at tactical/operational level like Pangong Tso heights, Nathu La, and Doklam, by and large, the Indian national strategy against China has been reactive in last seven decades.   

A tale of Two Narratives to justify Partial Disengagement!

Its fact that none of the countries wanted a conflict; hence both agreed for disengagement. Both countries justify their stance and disengagement process carried out so far favourable to them, although future of disengagement at remaining friction points is uncertain. The Chinese narrative to its population has been that it has got Indians down from heights north and south of Pangong Tso and ensured no Indian presence from Finger 4 to Finger 8 and Gogra, no patrolling by declaring it as buffer zone, while retaining its presence in Depsang plains, Hot Spring and Demchok areas. It can, therefore, claim to have edged forward 1959/60 claim line. The explainers of Chinese narrative will find it difficult to explain their gain by moving forward from Finger 8 to Finger 4 and then speedily withdrawing back to the same location, indicating weakness of PLA in high altitude area, besides making Maldo Garrison vulnerable and risking war, had Indians not obliged by pulling back from heights in Pangong Tso area. 

The Indian narrative to its critiques is that it has been able to successfully push Chinese back to status quo ante positions as existed pre standoff in Pangong Tso area, the stance which India maintained throughout. Amongst rest areas, like Hot Spring and Demchok, its work in progress to disengage and restore patrolling rights. Depsang is a legacy issue of decades, where patrolling points to limit ITBP/ Army patrols were designated to avoid confrontation. Willy-nilly, nearly two-thirds of Depsang Plateau remained outside the purview of physical domination by us, which allowed PLA to establish intensive infrastructure and habitat in the area. Depsang will therefore, require separate discussion. India can also draw solace from the fact that, while it is being denied patrolling  to the patrol points on Depsang Plateau East of the area Bottleneck inside the Raki Nallah, it has also denied PLA patrols movement West of Bottleneck, to Chinese claimed area close to Burtse.

The explainers of Indian narrative will continue to find it difficult to explain why disengagement was not sequenced on ‘first in and first out basis’, meaning thereby that India should have vacated Kailash Range heights only after China had vacated the areas, where it advanced in Depsang plains, Gogra, Hot Spring and Demchok areas, since April 2020. It is reasonable to believe that it has left India at a disadvantage, due to shortage of worthwhile leverages. Notwithstanding the political debates over legacy of Depsang issue, it remains strategically important and a threat to DBO and DS-DBO Road; hence a concern for military professionals.

What can India do?

A serious push in capacity building and infrastructure build up along towards LAC to take on China challenge in recent past is encouraging. The responses have to be in all domains to include contact and non-contact warfare. India needs a change in mindset from reactive to proactive, with additional offensive capability created to demonstrate capacity to encroach into sensitive areas of China, and inflict punitive cost, as China has assumed freedom to encroach anywhere, at will. The asymmetry in CNP between China and India is often cited as an excuse for muting proactive responses, but similar asymmetry exists between Pakistan and India, which doesn’t hesitate in adopting unethical proactive proxy war against India under nuclear hangover. India also has nuclear triad, hence this excuse needs to be revisited. To express the intent, India could make ‘One China Policy’ conditional to One India Policy as Sushma Swaraj mentioned in past.

India needs to have part of its National Security Strategy (NSS), in open domain to steer capacity building to take on China’s challenge in synergised manner. The classified part of NSS can be kept secret by all countries and should remain so. It is essential to prioritise its challenges and task required by various agencies to develop capacities avoiding different ministries working with different priorities, in silos. It’s frustrating to see PILs against broadening of strategic roads or railways dragging feet to construct strategic railway lines in Arunachal due to lack of commercial viability. Surely part of NSS in open domain may improve sensitivity of all agencies to national security needs, once specified. India should also pass equivalent of Chinese Border Defence Law in some form, like strategic infrastructure along border to have different yardstick for speedy clearance by local, regional and central authorities to avoid incidents like environment ministry obstructing many such constructions in past.

The reactive actions of India over several decades indicate ‘Don’t annoy China Approach”, which has failed miserably as China gave no concession on displaying accommodation/goodwill so far. Not calling out Xinjiang or Hong Kong by India did not prevent China from dragging India to UNSC on Kashmir issue or not progressing CPEC on Indian sovereign territory. A change in mindset is required, from being reactive to being active with additional offensive capability to encroach into Chinese sensitive areas, in absence of which Chinese Western theatre Command has assumed no threat from India, with freedom to encroach anywhere, at will.   

In light of trust deficit, recent activities along LAC, past track record of Chinese, and un-demarcated LAC as well as border between both countries, the ride ahead is unlikely to be smooth. With no de-escalation by Chinese, India is and will continue to be ready for all contingencies with similar deployment along LAC, in coming months/years. India needs to activate entire surveillance plan on high alert, to avoid any ‘First movers advantage’ to China like 2020. The Indian forces and the country has given a befitting reply to Chinese misadventure, and will do so each time, with added confidence and experience of 2020, including creating some new leverages, if needed. 

Indian aim should be not to concede Chinese attempt to redraw LAC as LAC-2020. In light of no major breakthrough in 22^nd round of China-India border talks, I do not expect any worthwhile development on delineation, delimitation for demarcation of LAC, which, is necessary to prevent  repeated standoffs. India’s strategic goal should be to insist on a formal delimitation and demarcation of the LAC, which is difficult but achievable, pending a permanent settlement of the Sino-Indian border issue. A temporary solution/side-lining main issue is recipe for the next standoff, leading to LOC-ization of LAC further. Chinese will like to keep border unsettled, till the time the political cost of Not settling it, becomes higher than doing so, for CCP, China. Its efforts of bilateral border talks with Bhutan and Nepal including trijunctions, are to create further complications in the long term resolution of borders. China will continue to try encroaching Bhutanese land to create more space in Chumbi Valley, to threaten the Siliguri Corridor.

India must be prepared for ‘Two Front War’ as a worst case scenario, and continue capacity building in all domains, including maritime arena, where Chinese vulnerable sea lines of communications can be threatened. Besides ongoing infrastructure development along borders, in response to Chinese build-up of hundreds of new well off villages to incrementally change the ground position, it is recommended that States/UT along LAC should allot concessional land to security forces like regional SCOUTS, ITBP, SSB, and families hailing from that area (on son of soil concept), ready to settle in villages so constructed, along own perception of LAC. This will improve inclusive growth, integration, besides proof of our claims on the border, to ward off ‘Chinese Strategy of Incremental Encroachment’. The best way to fight a two front war is to convince both adversaries that we can fight it, not by words alone, but backed by appropriate capacity building and intent to use all levers of power.

In response to economic and digital encroachment, India must increasingly draw out a negative import list of all products imported from China, which have been/can be manufactured in India and increasingly ban their imports, as is being done to improve self-reliance in defence manufacturing. It may sound unpleasant to few profit making importers, but will reduce our dependencies and concerns of economic coercion to great extent in long term. It’s absurd to notice India’s trade surplus with China growing beyond its defence budget during standoff period. 

Strategic partnerships with like-minded democracies and collective naval posturing with like-minded democracies to create multifront situation for China in Indo-Pacific is essential to check Chinese expansionism challenging global order and threatening global commons with steps like China centric Coast Guard Law and Maritime Traffic Safety Law. India is rightly building series of strategic partnerships with the USA and other China-wary Asian countries, mitigate continuing Chinese military assistance and activity around India. There is a need for alternative supply chain, trade and technological eco system, independent of China for which some initial steps taken by Quad countries need to be pursued. An alternate infrastructure architecture in the form of B3W, Blue Dot Network and Friendship Highwaysare essential to save fragile economies getting into debt trap of China through BRI. The announcement of Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF) is a welcome step in this direction. Collective response against cyber, space, biological threats and nuclear expansion need to be worked out.

India needs to develop its strategic culture with professional strategists, as diplomacy driven patch ups and talkathon have not worked so far. The overall strategic approach has to be proactive at all levels, in all dimensions of warfare. The overall strategic approach has to be proactive at tactical, operational as well as strategic level. 

Major General S B Asthana