The Iranian Quickstep

Deepak Sinha

Despite apprehensions and my preference for the written word, I was recently in a conversation with Col J S Sodhi, the founder-editor of Global Strategic and Defence News, a forum that attempts to provide accurate analysis on geopolitical and defence issues. I have uploaded that conversation here, while this piece is a further amplification of some of the issues that emerged during the conversation.

The Quickstep, as some may know, and Google clarifies, is “the standard fast-paced ballroom dance, characterised by quick syncopated steps, little hops and quick dashes”. I imagine if events in West Asia were to be seen as a three-way Quickstep competition, the Iranian’s would win hands down. Their moves have been nothing if not synchronised grace under fire.

Quite clearly, the war of choice that the Israelis and Americans started has not proceeded quite the way they expected it would. While they may have decapitated the senior Khamenei and his merry band, both Trump and Netanyahu now find themselves facing an increasingly uncertain future and possible decapitation, figuratively speaking.

The defeat of the American-Israeli combine was preordained because they ignored two very elementary, but essential factors- historical evidence that has repeatedly shown that airpower on its own has never won a conventional war, however dominant or devastating its impact may have been.

Secondly, victory requires breaking the adversaries will, and without the requisite boots on the ground, it is simply implausible. Ground offensives require a secure and suitable firm base contiguous to the adversaries border, from where they can be launched.

Quite possibly, lacking an ally with a contiguous land border, the US envisaged utilising their bases spread across West Asia for this purpose. Something, anticipated by the Iranians and neutralised in the preliminary stages of the conflict itself.

Moreover, while in the First Gulf War, the American and Coalition Forces built up sizeable numbers of around a million to take down Iraq’s 450,000 strong military, they hoped to defeat Iran’s 450,000 strong military with a couple of Airborne and Marine brigades. An unvarnished display of incompetence and stupidity cloaked in arrogance.

Incidentally, the Chairman Joint Chiefs, General Dan Caine, who bears responsibility for this ongoing fiasco, was selected by Trump for his loyalty, and has many firsts to his name. The first retired officer to have been nominated, the first belonging to the Reserve Component and the first never to have held the rank of a four-star general prior to his nomination.

Surely, this turbulence in the selection process must have had its impact on the decision making and planning of the present campaign. Also, quite clearly, there’s an important lesson here for our political masters as well. Loyalty and subservience may be valued commodities in peace time, but it is professionalism and the ability to give advice the leadership may not want to hear and stand one’s ground that win wars.

What must have further added to their woes, was the unexpected shock of the very symbol of American supremacy and domination, its aircraft carrier groups, becoming hors de combat at the very beginning of the campaign. Being forced to deploy at maximum operational ranges, to avoid being sunk, thus not only impacting their ability to support any amphibious operations that may have been envisaged, but also putting a question mark on the Admiral Mahan’s concept of “sea control”.

It seems fair to conclude that precision technology has negatively impacted the importance and value attached to Capital Ships, if not made them partially redundant. Much the same quandary that Mechanised Forces find themselves in with regard to the proliferation of drones. Undoubtedly, ardent advocates of naval power will strongly contest such a hypothesis, but that is the nature of the beast.

Proponents of horsed cavalry continued to insist on their retention despite machine guns, introduced as far back as 1870, and tanks in 1916, having made them wholly redundant. Incidentally, the last known horsed cavalry charge with sabres was conducted in August 1942, by an Italian Cavalry Regiment against Soviet defences, while we persist with 61 CAV despite a strained defence budget. Unfortunately, Generals, Admirals and Air Marshals tend to take time to face reality, while front-line soldiers end up paying a heavy price in the interim.

Unmistakably, while the American-Israeli combine messed up, the Iranians were on point. The clarity, acumen and resolve displayed by their leadership was par excellence. They realised the critical role of technology on the battlefield and the leverage that throttling the Straits of Hormuz provided and took whatever steps were necessary to achieve their aim. They were quite cognisant of the fact that time was on their side as every hour the Strait remained closed was more pressure on the US. That they did this with a defence budget that was half that of Israel’s and one- twentieth that of the United States was just plain genius.

While many American analysts and commentators consider the present loss comparable to what they suffered in Iraq (Bush Junior’s War) and Afghanistan, the stark truth is that it is not. In fact, it is infinitely worse than the Vietnam defeat, because that did not end in a withdrawal from South East Asia.

With most of their bases in West Asia now untenable, it is clear that they will have no utility in any future conflict scenario, making US military presence in the region redundant. More importantly, given the vulnerability such bases face, their viability and role during conflicts is an issue that needs serious reconsideration.

Given our security and budgetary challenges, there are some very important lessons we can draw on from Iran’s handling of the present crisis and implement on an emergency footing. Planning and preparing for a head-to-head conventional conflict against our main adversary, China, has got us nowhere till now.

Until the Taiwan issue is suitably resolved in their favour, the PLA has no interest in picking a major fight with us. Our pouring in resources, in terms of manpower, infrastructure and logistics, especially our resorting to forward deployment along the LAC, suits the PLA as it only further burdens our economy and increases the gap between both nations.

This is further aggravated with constant demands from our military for capability enhancement- demand for more guns, ships, aircraft and infrastructure in our efforts not to get caught out. Simply put, our perceptions of, and attitudes towards, China emanate from our inability to get over the fear psychosis that our 1962 defeat instilled in our political and bureaucratic establishment and in the higher ranks of the military.

Their rapid infrastructural developments within the TAR have only further added to our insecurities. In fact, our trepidation and fear of escalation, following the PLA’s unprovoked actions in Eastern Ladakh, are palpable as seen from our tepid response and the urgency to come to an agreement, however disadvantageous.

Macroeconomic historian, Angus Maddison has pointed out that Indian and Chinese economies collectively accounted for approximately 50% of the world’s GDP for the majority of recorded history, between the 1^stCentury CE and the early 19^th Century (around 1820). Lacking contiguous borders, they were never involved in a conflict or confrontation with each other during this period, apart from some proxy clashes over Central Asian trade routes in 86 CE.

We have failed to realise that the solution to our Chinese puzzle has been staring us in the face for decades. Because we have been so lacking in determination, focus and self-confidence we have simply ignored the fact that geography is our biggest ally in any confrontation with China. The Chinese get this, which is why, apart from routinely scaring us with the threat of escalation, they have generally avoided any major confrontation with us.

For them, there is no getting away from the fact that Tibet is located approximately 2000 Kms away from the Chinese Mainland and connected with it through some of the harshest terrain on the planet. Whatever measures the Chinese may envisage and implement, it is a critical vulnerability they can never overcome. Add to that the personnel, equipment and logistics challenges of operating in a high- altitude desert, especially the difficulty in inducting and maintain large number of troops over extended periods of time.

The nightmare scenario that must keep the Chinese leadership up at night would be a repeat of Iran’s West Asia playbook—in Tibet. A simultaneous mass attack on Chinese bases, logistic nodes, ammunition depots, airbases troop concentrations and their extended lines of communications using thousands of ballistic missiles and lakhs of drones would simply push the PLA on the horns of a dilemma. What it would do for the oppressed Tibetans is fairly clear as well.

Much like the fact that the only manner in which the United States could have ensured that Iran not block the Hormuz was by simply not going to war with it, something earlier Presidents appreciated, we must be able to make clear to the Chinese leadership the consequences they would be confronted with if they continue with their hostility, attempts at isolation and hamper our progress, thus pushing us against the wall.

We do not need conventional force enhancements or establishment of Theatre Commands or even a major base in the Andamans to put the PLA in Tibet through the meat- grinder. Just an unwavering focus and resolve on the development of a coordinated capability, similar to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, without the ideological baggage, that is tasked with conducting unconventional asymmetric operations.

This would be best undertaken by a Tri-Services Command, with Special Operations Forces at its core supported by air, ground and naval assets trained and equipped to undertake non-contact operations at a mammoth scale. The Brahmos and an array of drones would be sufficient capability in addition to what we already possess.

There is an old adage that don’t point a gun at somebody unless you are prepared to use it. When it comes to China, we have always lacked the will to pull the trigger, which is why conventional deterrence has not worked effectively. We have no choice but to think out of the box and put in place a new paradigm of conventional deterrence.

If the Chinese are denied the use of Tibet as a firm base against us, we are back to an era of no contiguous borders, and therefore, no cause for conflict. One is hopeful that if we actually are able to establish a strike force of the envisaged magnitude, the Chinese leadership would prefer to come to the table and resolve all issues. If not, it’s their funeral.