The Iran War & Global Disruption: Interview of Major General Dr. S B Asthana by FPRC, India, Issue 66.
- August 1, 2026
- Posted by: Major General (Dr) S B Asthana, SM,VSM,PhD
- Categories: India, Iran
Major General Dr. S B Asthana
Amidst these rapid escalations, the Foreign Policy Research Centre (FPRC) New Delhi released its highly anticipated FPRC Journal-66, focusing entirely on “IRAN WAR: International Perspective.”
An unaltered transcript of the interview granted to FPRC by globally acknowledged strategic and security analyst, Major General Dr. S B Asthana. In this comprehensive assessment, Gen. Asthana masterfully breaks down why tactical air superiority cannot substitute for a political end-state, how Washington is repeating the tragic miscalculations of Vietnam and Afghanistan, and why India’s calibrated caution is a realistic compulsion rather than a choice of weakness.
FPRC JOURNAL-66
Questionnaire
FPRC
Question 1. How do you look at Trump’s action in Iran: Disruptor or Reformer?
Major General Dr S B Asthana
Military
Before the war, till 28th February 2026, President Trump tried to pose his himself as a reformist for Iranian people to liberate them from atrocities of Khomeini regime, but his actions subsequently turned out to be of one of the biggest global disrupter of the modern era.
Trump’s actions on Iran are best understood as those of a disruptive power‑broker who weaponises pressure, ambiguity, and geography rather than a coherent reformer of the regional order. Yet this disruption occasionally creates space for recalibration and forced negotiations, so he is a disruptor with episodic, accidental, tactical reformist effects rather than a genuine strategic reformer.
Strategic framing: power without an end‑state
From a professional military and strategic perspective, the central weakness in Trump’s Iran policy is the absence of a clearly defined political end‑state. Air campaigns like “Epic Fury” and “Rising Lion” have showcased impressive tactical degradation of Iranian targets, but they have not produced regime collapse, strategic capitulation, or a sustainable regional security architecture. Tactical air superiority, howsoever overwhelming, cannot substitute for a viable political strategy; without it, battlefield success risks maturing into a long‑term strategic liability.
In that sense Trump behaves primarily as a disruptor: he breaks existing arrangements—such as the JCPoA—without putting in place an equally robust diplomatic or institutional framework to manage the aftermath. By withdrawing unilaterally from a multilateral agreement, Washington created a strategic vacuum that almost inevitably pushed the confrontation from “maximum pressure” to kinetic escalation. This is disruption, not any reform.
Politics(Right)
JCPOA withdrawal and “maximum pressure”
The 2018 exit from the JCPoA is the fulcrum of his Iran approach. Instead of leveraging the agreement to tighten verification and widen the coalition, Trump chose to dismantle the only functioning arms‑control framework in place, betting that sanctions and coercion would force Tehran into a “better deal.” That bet has not paid off: Iran has expanded its nuclear capabilities, hardened its domestic political consensus, and demonstrated resilience under sanctions and airstrikes.
Moreover, the stated justification of an “imminent threat” has rested on shaky intelligence, with even American insiders acknowledging that Iran did not pose an immediate ICBM threat to the US mainland. This suggests that the real objectives were broader—disrupting Chinese energy lifelines, defending the petrodollar, and reasserting US primacy in the Gulf—rather than narrowly reforming Iranian behaviour. Such structural motives again underline disruption of the wider geopolitical equation rather than reform of the specific US–Iran relationship.
Military operations: shock and awe vs Mosaic Defence
On the operational plane, the clash is between Trump’s preference for “shock and awe” and Iran’s Mosaic Defence—decentralised, resilient, and designed to function even after leadership decapitation. Weeks of high‑intensity strikes have not dismantled Iran’s underground missile infrastructure or its proxy networks; drone swarms, maritime harassment, and regional militias remain active. Without boots on the ground and accepting the political cost of an occupation, decisive victory remains elusive.
Politics(Right)
Here Trump’s actions are again disruptive: he raises the tempo of violence, changes rules of engagement, and broadens target sets, but does not fundamentally reform the balance of power on the ground. Iran has adapted by deepening asymmetric warfare, not by moderating its regional posture.
Strait of Hormuz: geography as a geopolitical weapon
The current phase of the conflict has effectively shifted the “centre of gravity” from Iranian territory to the Strait of Hormuz. Trump’s threats and partial blockades have highlighted Hormuz as the decisive theatre, but they have also exposed the limitations of US power in confined maritime choke‑points. Narrow waterways dilute carrier‑based advantages and magnify Iran’s low‑cost Anti‑Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) tools—mines, shore‑based missiles, fast attack craft, drones, and small submarines.
Iran need not close the Strait completely; it only has to inject enough risk to global shipping to trigger an “inflation tax” on the world economy in the form of spiking oil prices, higher insurance premiums, and market volatility. Trump’s coercive signalling around Hormuz therefore ends up strengthening Tehran’s leverage as much as it demonstrates American resolve. This is a classic case where disruptive tactics fail to deliver decisive strategic reform.
Domestic cohesion and global alignments
Externally generated pressure has also produced internal consolidation in Iran. Civilian casualties—from events like the Minab school bombing—have shifted the centre of gravity towards Iranian nationalism and sovereignty, uniting diverse political currents against what is perceived as external aggression. Trump’s strategy, instead of reforming the regime’s behaviour through popular discontent, has unintentionally strengthened its domestic legitimacy in wartime conditions.
GeographicReference
At the systemic level, the conflict has accelerated trends towards a multipolar order. Russia–China–Iran alignment is deepening, and Beijing in particular is recalibrating its energy security by tightening ties with Tehran while quietly betting that American political stamina will run out first. The US focus on Iran also diverts attention and resources from the Indo‑Pacific, which has implications for India’s security calculus and the broader “Cold War 2.0” dynamics. These are structural shifts; they are not the hallmarks of a reformist stabilisation of the system but of disruptive overreach.
Impact on India and the wider region
From an Indian vantage point, Trump’s Iran gambit has increased strategic risk without offering compensating stability. India’s dependence on Gulf energy, the vulnerability of its diaspora, and its investments in projects like Chabahar and the INSTC all come under strain when Hormuz becomes a contested battlespace. Rising oil prices export the cost of US–Iran confrontation to energy‑dependent nations, effectively turning Hormuz into a global economic hostage. President Trump, therefore has caused biggest energy and economic disruption for India.
Where does “reformer” apply, if at all?
To the extent that Trump can be called a reformer, it is only in a narrow, negative sense: he forces the system to confront uncomfortable realities that incremental diplomacy tends to postpone. His abrupt actions have compelled regional actors to think harder about energy diversification, alternative routes, and the costs of over‑reliance on single chokepoints. They have also exposed the illusion that advanced airpower alone can deliver regime change or durable political outcomes.
Politics(Right)
However, meaningful reform requires building new institutions, norms, and security architectures; it needs coherent coalitions and a carefully defined end‑state. On these counts, Trump’s Iran policy scores poorly. What we see is episodic coercive diplomacy, frequent tactical pauses—the “TACO moment,” when he steps back under pressure—and an oscillation between escalation and restraint without a stable political framework. That pattern is the signature of a disruptor, not a reformer.
Final assessment
Viewed through the lens of operational art, strategic effect, and geopolitical consequence, Trump’s Iran policy is overwhelmingly disruptive—of agreements, energy markets, and regional balances—while falling short of genuine reform of either Iran’s behaviour or the regional security order. It generates tactical shock but not strategic closure; it empowers asymmetric adversaries by failing to align military means with political ends. As a soldier‑strategist, I would therefore characterise Trump in the Iran theatre as a high‑risk disruptor whose actions may catalyse reforms by others, but who himself has not yet demonstrated the discipline, coherence, and long‑term vision required of a true reformer.
FPRC
Question 2. It appears Trump has not learnt from the history. Do you agree?
Major General Dr S B Asthana
Military
I agree: Trump has not adequately learnt from history, and his Iran policy reflects a repeated American failure to respect geography, terrain friction and the limits of firepower—much as in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Speaking as I have argued earlier, he is fighting a twenty‑first‑century war with a mindset still trapped in the illusion of quick coercive victories.
The central lesson of Vietnam and Afghanistan was that superior technology and airpower cannot deliver strategic success against a determined adversary embedded in difficult terrain, fighting on home soil with ideological motivation and external depth. Iran has internalised these lessons far better than Washington: its Mosaic Defence is built precisely to deny an invader a quick, decisive victory by decentralising command, dispersing assets and turning every province into a self‑contained resistance node. Trump’s approach, both in his first and current tenure, again assumes that “shock and awe”, leadership decapitation and economic strangulation will break the adversary’s will, ignoring how similar assumptions collapsed in Kabul and Saigon.
In Afghanistan, the US underestimated sanctuary, terrain and local political complexity; it entered without a clear, realistic end‑state and exited under pressure, leaving behind a strategic vacuum. In Iran, Trump is repeating the same pattern: he escalated to major air operations without a credible political roadmap—no defined regime‑change plan, no viable post‑conflict architecture, no clear answer to who governs and stabilises Iran if the current system is shattered. History shows that in such conditions tactical victories become strategic liabilities, yet his team again confuses destruction of targets with achievement of durable outcomes.
GeographicReference
Geography and friction compound this error. Iran is not a small battlefield; it is a vast, mountainous, urbanised country with depth, hardened sites and multiple lines of external support. Terrain, chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz and the spread of proxy fronts from Lebanon to the Gulf all ensure that any conflict will be long, dispersed and politically costly. Instead of respecting this, Trump has repeatedly brandished threats of “obliteration” and rapid punishment, only to discover that Iran can retaliate asymmetrically and stretch the war horizontally rather than vertically.
His “TACO” pattern—escalate rhetorically, then delay, dilute or reframe—underscores that he has not internalised the long‑war logic of Afghanistan and Vietnam. In both earlier theatres, American credibility eroded because Washington over‑promised militarily and under‑delivered politically; today, every missed deadline and extended ceasefire in Iran sends the same signal of strategic confusion rather than calculated statecraft. Iran, by contrast, openly states that it has studied US failures to its east and west and shaped its doctrine accordingly; the asymmetry of learning is striking.
Finally, history teaches that wars fought without a realistic exit strategy end up being decided by the weaker party’s resilience, not the stronger party’s firepower. Trump’s Iran policy, like earlier American campaigns, still lacks a clearly articulated, achievable political end‑state; there is pressure, punishment and posture—but no coherent plan for a stable day after. As a soldier‑strategist, I therefore maintain that he has not learnt the essential historical lesson: that geography, terrain friction and human will can outlast even the most advanced military machine when strategy is unmoored from political realism.
Politics(Right)
FPRC
Question 3. What are the stakes for Israel in its war with Iran?
Major General Dr S B Asthana
For Israel, the war with Iran is existential in nature: it is fighting to prevent a hostile, ideologically driven regional rival from achieving nuclear and strategic parity, while trying not to lose US support in the process. The outcome will shape not only Israel’s security environment for decades but also its political standing, economy and internal cohesion.
Survival and the nuclear question
At the core lies Israel’s long‑standing objective: to block Iran from emerging as a nuclear‑threshold state capable of threatening Israel’s very existence. From Jerusalem’s perspective, an Iranian nuclear deterrent would erode Israel’s qualitative military edge and embolden Tehran and its proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas and others—to escalate under a perceived nuclear umbrella. The war is thus seen as a last opportunity to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, missile forces and command system enough to delay or derail that outcome.
Yet the stakes are double‑edged. Failure to inflict lasting damage, or only partial setbacks, could still leave Iran on course to a threshold capability while more motivated and legitimised in the eyes of its own public and regional supporters. In such a scenario, Israel would have paid a heavy price—in lives, legitimacy and economic disruption—without eliminating the strategic threat.
GeographicReference
Regional dominance and deterrence credibility
Beyond the nuclear file, Israel is fighting for its regional deterrence and freedom of action. For years, it has pursued a “campaign between wars” targeting Iranian assets in Syria, Lebanon and beyond, designed to keep adversaries weak and fragmented. A visible failure against Iran’s direct strikes or an inability to stem rocket, missile and drone salvos would puncture the aura of invincibility that underpins Israeli deterrence.
Conversely, a successful demonstration of integrated air and missile defence, offensive cyber and precision strikes strengthens Israel’s hand vis‑à‑vis Hezbollah, Hamas and other militias, signalling that any escalation will invite punishing costs. The stakes therefore include the entire “resistance axis” built around Iran: if Israel appears weakened, those fronts may ignite in concert; if it appears strengthened, some may recalibrate or seek accommodation.
US alignment and international legitimacy
GeographicReference
Israel also risks straining its strategic compact with the United States. Washington’s objectives—containing Iran, keeping Hormuz open, managing oil prices and avoiding a long war—do not fully overlap with maximalist Israeli aims of crippling the Iranian regime’s power projection. If Israel is seen to drag the US into an open‑ended conflict or to resist de‑escalation when Washington seeks a negotiated outcome, fissures could emerge in the partnership at a politically sensitive moment for President Trump.
Internationally, Israel already faces scrutiny over its conduct in other theatres. A prolonged, high‑casualty campaign in Gaza, Iran or Lebanon risks compounding criticism at the UN, in European capitals and across the Global South, with potential diplomatic and legal consequences. Preserving a critical mass of legitimacy while pursuing hard security interests is therefore a key stake.
Economic and maritime vulnerabilities
Although Israel is not an energy exporter, it is deeply exposed to the war’s economic aftershocks, especially around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian threats and disruptions in this chokepoint have already contributed to oil price spikes and insurance hikes, fuelling global uncertainty and raising costs for Israel’s own economy and its allies. Any perception that Israeli actions are driving a global energy crisis risks diplomatic blowback and pressure for restraint.
At the same time, Israeli strikes on energy infrastructure—such as Iranian gas fields—are calibrated both to weaken Tehran’s fiscal capacity and to signal that Iran’s own economic arteries are vulnerable. Miscalculation in this domain could, however, invite asymmetric retaliation against Israeli shipping, ports, offshore gas platforms or critical infrastructure via cyber and drones.
GeographicReference
Domestic politics and societal resilience
Finally, the war is a test of Israeli domestic cohesion and political leadership. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces pressure from hawks to “finish the job” and from others worried about overreach, casualties and economic strain. Israeli actions are also seen as an effort by Netanyahu to avoid corruption trials and remain in power. Civilian deaths from Iranian and proxy missile attacks, mobilisation of reserves and prolonged disruption to daily life all carry political consequences; a war perceived as inconclusive or avoidable could deepen internal divisions.
In sum, for Israel the stakes in its war with Iran span survival, regional primacy, alliance management, economic stability and internal legitimacy—all under the shadow of a nuclear clock and a potent missile threat, that can turn tactical moves into strategic turning points.
FPRC
Question 4. It’s difficult to treat Israel and Iran differently on their nuclear ambitions and advanced missile programs. Do you agree?
Major General Dr S B Asthana
I agree: it is intellectually and morally difficult to justify treating Israel and Iran by two completely different yardsticks on nuclear ambitions and advanced missile programmes, even if their political systems and regional roles differ. The pattern of US and wider Western policy reflects strategic selectivity, not a consistent application of non‑proliferation norms.
Politics
Double standards in nuclear policy
Israel is widely assessed to hold between roughly 80 and 200 nuclear warheads, developed outside the NPT framework, under a longstanding policy of “nuclear opacity.” It has never signed the NPT, never opened its facilities to IAEA safeguards, and yet faces no sanctions or serious coercive diplomacy on this account—in fact, Washington has shielded it from scrutiny for decades. Iran, by contrast, is an NPT signatory, subject to intrusive IAEA inspections and detailed reporting, and has repeatedly claimed its programme is for peaceful purposes, even staying within the JCPOA after the US walked out in 2018. To then sanction and bomb Iran over a monitored, non‑weaponised programme while accepting an undeclared Israeli arsenal exposes a clear policy contradiction.
Security arguments and their limits
The standard Western argument is that Israel, surrounded by hostile neighbours and having fought multiple wars, “needs” a nuclear deterrent to survive, whereas Iran is portrayed as an aggressive revolutionary power whose nuclear threshold status would destabilise the region. But if security environment is the metric, Iran too faces US forces on multiple flanks, hostile Gulf rivals and repeated covert and overt attacks on its territory and scientists, giving Tehran its own self‑defence rationale. In my view, you cannot normatively legitimise one state’s deterrence needs while denying another any right even to enrich under safeguards; that is politics, not principle.
GeographicReference
Pakistan illustrates this selectivity even more starkly. Despite being home to or associated with multiple terrorist entities, and despite the A.Q. Khan proliferation network, Pakistan’s nuclear status is tolerated because it became a frontline ally in the US “war on terror.” Washington placed some groups on terror lists, but it did not seriously move to roll back Islamabad’s arsenal once it was a useful security partner. If a terrorism‑linked state like Pakistan can be accommodated, the argument that Iran’s ideology alone makes any nuclear latency absolutely unacceptable clearly reflects double standards.
Consequences of selective non‑proliferation
Such unequal treatment corrodes the legitimacy of the global non‑proliferation regime. Analysts note that opacity around Israel and tolerance for Pakistan encourage other regional actors to question why they should remain permanently non‑nuclear if security guarantees are unreliable and rules are applied selectively. Iran’s leaders have repeatedly cited these double standards at the IAEA and UN, arguing that Western objections are less about law and more about power and alignment. When some states are effectively told “nuclear weapons for your security are fine” while others are punished even for civilian enrichment, the system incentivises hedging and covert pursuit rather than transparency.
A balanced position
As I see it, the logical position is either to accept a universal norm—no new nuclear powers and progressive movement toward regional disarmament—or to acknowledge openly that non‑proliferation has become a tool of great‑power politics rather than an impartial rulebook. Singling out Iran while giving Israel and Pakistan a pass is difficult to defend on legal or ethical grounds; it is explained only by alliance politics and domestic lobbies in Western capitals, not by any consistent strategic doctrine.
Politics
Therefore, in my opinion, it is difficult to treat Israel and Iran differently on their nuclear ambitions and missile programmes in any principled way—current policy reflects geopolitical convenience, not a fair or sustainable global nuclear order.
FPRC
Question 5. India’s silence on Iran war was woefully weak choice, especially for a country that commands attention on the global stage. How far do you agree?
Major General Dr S B Asthana
Instead of agreeing or disagreeing on India’s perceived silence, my take is that India does not have much choice or leverage to act in any other way. In my assessment, New Delhi’s calibrated caution was a realistic compulsion, even if its signalling could have been sharper. For a country whose energy lifelines, diaspora and security interests are so deeply enmeshed with both the Gulf and Iran, megaphone diplomacy could have been worse than perceived silence.
India today sources the bulk of its crude through the Strait of Hormuz and has millions of citizens and tens of billions of dollars in remittances and investments spread across West Asia. When Hormuz is effectively being held hostage by the US–Israel–Iran confrontation, our first duty is to insulate our tankers, protect Indian lives and stabilize our own economy, not to posture as an extra actor in someone else’s escalation. That explains why New Delhi relied heavily on its navy to secure shipping, quietly engaged all sides and issued a carefully worded MEA statement urging restraint and respect for sovereignty, instead of choosing an overtly accusatory line against any one party.
GeographicReference
Critics are right that India initially appeared hesitant and reactive, and that our moral voice on issues like the Minab school bombing was less audible than it could have been. As I have argued elsewhere, a country that aspires to leadership of the Global South cannot forever outsource the language of international law and civilian protection to others while speaking only the language of “national interest” for itself. The perception that New Delhi rushed to condole partners in the Gulf while staying conspicuously quiet on Iranian civilian casualties did create doubts about the balance in our approach and about whether we were drifting closer to a US–Israel axis by default.
That said, we must distinguish between weak rhetoric and weak policy. On the ground, India maintained working channels with Tehran, continued limited economic engagement where sanctions allowed, and avoided getting locked into maximum‑pressure theatrics that have already failed to deliver strategic results for Washington. For a developing country, still deeply dependent on external energy and technology, the wiser course was to husband leverage, keep options open and be available as a credible interlocutor when all the parties to the conflict are tired of escalation and collectively ask India to mediate. Till then even mediation is not recommended, because the opposite positions are so diverse that mediation is likely to fail.
In my opinion, therefore, India’s public posture may have been overly cautious and normatively under‑articulated, but the basic choice to avoid taking sides in a high‑risk war at our doorstep was not weakness; it was a sober recognition of geography, vulnerability, realities and the limits of Indian influence in a conflict we did not start.
War& Conflict
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Major General (Dr) S B Asthana,SM,VSM,PhD(Veteran)
(The views expressed are personal views of the author, who retains the copy right. The author is a Globally acknowledged Strategic and Security Analyst, He can be reached at Facebook and LinkedIn as Shashi Asthana, @asthana_shashi on twitter, and personnel site https://asthanawrites.org/ email shashiasthana29@gmail.com LinkedIn Profile www.linkedin.com/in/shashi-asthana-4b3801a6. Youtube link https://www.youtube.com/@GenAsthanaAnalyses
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