Understanding Operation “Sindoor”: India’s Sub-Continental War on Terror

Deepak Sinha

Despite more than a week having passed since our Military undertook “Operation Sindoor” and then hit the pause button, the average Indian, especially those unversed in military matters, have yet to probably come to terms with, or understand, the full implications of what went down. After the border towns were buzzed by Pakistani drones, clearly the average Indian, wherever he may be, suddenly knows he is no longer immune from being targeted. In these four days there were more civilian casualties than that of service personnel.

It is one thing to display faux patriotism from the confines of a studio or undertaking a yatra in Delhi, and quite another when realisation dawns that they or their loved ones may well be at the receiving end of Pakistani munitions. To suggest that the four days were scary and overwhelming for the vast majority of our people would be to state the obvious. Ofcourse, much of this heat and dust was also spawned by unschooled news anchors and their commentator cohorts with their disingenuous pedalling of misleading narratives using smoke and mirrors. In the process not only have they created panic and fear, disgraced the institution they represent but also greatly harmed our credibility as a people with the international community.

The irony that should not be lost in all of this, is that this was just a skirmish, presently on pause, that may yet degenerate, or escalate if you will, into a wider conventional shooting war with tanks, infantry et al, or something even worse, a nuclear exchange. Many would have us believe that in these times conventional war is passé, especially what with satellites monitoring every move, information warfare (IW) targeting whole populations, kamikaze loitering munitions, reconnaissance drones, and missiles of immense variety from beyond- visual- range air-to- air to ballistic ground- to- ground systems, and everything in between. While warfare has certainly been transformed by technology, Clausewitz’s dictum of “war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.” continues to remain as relevant as it was when first enunciated.

This applies equally to the basic tenets of war-fighting, which at the tactical level is termed as “fire and movement”, and at the operational and strategic level as attrition and manoeuvre warfare. Victory continues to be literally measured by the foot, even though it now more fashionable to talk of “strategic outcomes” instead. The Russians and the Ukrainians have, over the past two years, learnt this to their cost, much like the Americans did with their “forever wars” of the past two decades. More importantly, without question in confrontations between nuclear armed states, victory is nothing more than an illusion and every side pays a high price. It is only now that Pakistan is being forced to learn this lesson the hard way, now that its repeated use of nuclear blackmail has finally been called out.

One may recall that the outcome of our air strike against a terror camp at Balakot, following the Pulwama bombing in 2019, was less than satisfactory as we were unable to provide unimpeachable proof of damage, despite our claims. We were subsequently caught on the wrong foot by Pakistan’s riposte, Operation “Swift Retort”, in which we were tactically outmanoeuvred and ended up losing an aircraft, with the pilot being taken prisoner. We also faced the added embarrassment of losing a helicopter to friendly fire in Kashmir as well as falsely claiming to have shot down an F-16 fighter aircraft.

De-escalation that followed allowed both sides to claim victory. The Pakistani’s however, especially the PAF, clearly won the perception battle then. Its leadership and air crews clearly came to believe that they had a distinct qualitative edge over the IAF. They felt the induction of additional Chinese JF10s/JF 17’s and of PL-15 BVR Air-to-Air Missiles would only add to this advantage, allowing them to confront and neutralise the IAF’s numerical advantage in the future. They were, therefore, caught completely off-guard, when air and ground launched Brahmos Missiles evaded their early warning systems and caused damage to Air Defence systems and eleven airbases. While the damage to the installations may have been limited, the PAF leadership was quite aware that this was intentionally done, as a warning and any further escalation would have led to catastrophic outcomes. It has been reported their inability to initiate effective counter measures forced them to approach India to request for the suspension of hostilities that followed.

What lessons the IAF had learnt from the Balakot strike is indeed interesting. For one, at the time Mr. Modi had not only been widely criticised, but also the butt of many jokes, for his obvious ignorance about how radars worked. However, what was lost sight of at the time and not given the importance it deserved was his claim that the operation had gone ahead in bad weather at his insistence, despite reservations of the Air Force leadership. It later emerged that the limited success achieved then was primarily because of the impact of adverse weather conditions on the weapon systems and munitions used. This time around, however, Mr Modi seemed to have learnt his lesson well, and left it to the military to do its job.

Secondly, where the IAF seems to have gone wrong is having undertaken the strikes on the first day under the mistaken belief that they would surprise the PAF, as they had during Balakot. At that time the PAF had indeed been caught napping as they had never expected India capable of undertaking such a deep strike believing we would be deterred by their nuclear brinkmanship. This time around they were prepared for our response and therefore not caught out, to which we must attribute the casualties we have suffered that the IAF refuses to confirm or deny.

It has now emerged that our EAM, Mr Jaishankar, had informed the United States of our intentions prior to launching our air strikes. One wonders as to how long before the strike he did so, and as to whether the IAF leadership was aware of his actions? If they had been informed, and still went ahead without carrying out the required suppression of air defences, that would amount to a serious error of judgement. Also, this action may clearly explain reports suggesting many of the targeted sites had been vacated before our attack. However, most creditably our leadership quickly recovered from this setback and responded with a flurry of missiles that laid the PAF low, from which it could not recover, unlike their riposte following Balakot. One wonders if that aggressive response had been due to Imran Khan’s leadership, and if so, how would they have reacted if he had been the Prime Minister at this time?

All commentators are of the view that this operation will not deter the Pakistani establishment from launching another terrorist attack in the coming months and years. If that be so, it raises some questions. Why did we pause operations when we had them on the floor? While Prof Bharat Karnad’s suggestions of capturing Hajipir Pass and Skardu appear to be in the realm of wishful thinking, we should have certainly caused demonstrable damage to the Pakistan military such that the Government would have been forced to fire General Munir and his cohorts. It now seems that Operation Sindoor is our version, at the Sub-continental level, of America’s “Global War on Terror”. Look at where that line of action got America! Between September 2001 and 2024, the United States spent an estimated 8 Trillion USD and suffered a total of 60,000 casualties including over 7000 fatalities, with only a marginal improvement in their security environment, if that. Do we really want to go down this path?

We would also be making a grave mistake if we insist on treating the Pahalgam attack as a setback in our counter insurgency efforts, and take actions to further strengthen the counter insurgency grid, as many have suggested. Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir is well nigh dead and has no takers. The population there is completely focused on development and the Government must step in to ensure that developmental channels, other than only tourism, are strengthened on priority to ensure economic and social progress continues to retain momentum.

The only way we can tackle such terror attacks is to vastly improve our intelligence networks, including holding those to account who have messed up, and by moving our Rashtriya Rifles from the hinterland into the counter- infiltration role along the LOC. Let the Jammu and Kashmir Police, along with elements of the CAPF, take full control of law and order, as well as protection of our lines of communications, thereby allowing the Army to focus solely on controlling infiltration and dominating the LOC. Let us follow the Punjab model that successfully stifled and destroyed Khalistani terror there.

Finally, one has to accept the unfortunate fact that right wing Hindutva elements have been playing Pakistan’s game by creating communal divisions here, examples abound. It is now incumbent on our Government to take action against such radical elements, otherwise as in Pakistan, it will lose control of the state. We will end up with our citizenry being held hostage by such radical elements. Becoming another Pakistan is not something we aspire to, and that is certainly not what our military has been fighting and sacrificing for.