By: Ajay Singh

It has been a white Christmas in the frontlines. The snow has fallen on the Russian-Ukrainian lines, but the guns still roar and missiles still rain down. The Russian offensive towards Bakhmut grinds on. And the last week of the year brought attacks of renewed ferocity, with a barrage of 64 missiles hitting Kyiv in the New Year. A Ukrainian HIMARS strike struck a barrack housing Russian soldiers (inexplicably close to an ammunition dump) in the city of Makiivka in Donetsk, killing 89 and injuring scores others in one of the deadliest attacks of the war. As the New Year began, the eleven-month long war continued unabated.

Yet in the carnage, Putin ordered a unilateral ceasefire for 36 hours from 6-7 January for the Russian Orthodox Christmas holiday, to allow both sides to pray and celebrate the holy day. It was the first time that such a truce—which extended all along the 1,100-kilometre front—was announced since the war began, and offers a glimmer of hope.

Ukraine has shrugged off the ceasefire, dismissing it as a ploy to gain time, which will enable Russia to regroup, replenish and relaunch its attacks. As it states—Russia wants a pause, not a peace. And they could be right there.
But then, both sides have made the first tentative proposals for peace negotiations. Putin spoke to the Turkish President Recep Erdogan, who stated that he was ready to mediate a “lasting peace.” Putin also stated that Russia was ready to negotiate with Kyiv, but that “Western backers have refused to engage.” Zelenskyy too has softened his earlier stance where he flatly refused to have any dealings with the present Russian regime, unless they faced a war-crimes tribunal first, and expressed a willingness to come to the negotiating table. In fact, he even presented a ten-point formula to end the war.

Zelenskyy’s proposal includes a complete withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukrainian soil and a complete cessation of hostilities. The Ukrainian territory includes all the area that Russia has occupied in this war, and Crimea, which it annexed in 2014. Other demands include the release of all prisoners and deportees, including the 1.6 million Ukrainians forcibly deported to Russia from its occupied territories. While a POW swap may be feasible, the return of deportees could prove a prickly issue. Ukraine has also documented over 34,000 war crimes committed by Russian soldiers, for which it insists Russia must face a war tribunal, and also claims reparation of damages (estimated at over $500 billion)—clauses that are bound to be ignored. Other demands include assurances that Ukraine would be able to export its grain through the Black Sea ports uninterruptedly; guarantees that Ukraine’s energy infrastructure would not be targeted; Zaporizhzhia, and other nuclear plants, occupied by the Russians, be demilitarised and handed back to Ukraine. Significantly, Ukraine seems to have realised the futility of seeking NATO membership—the key cause of the war—and has indicated that rather than embrace the alliance, it would merely seek security guarantees to prevent further Russian aggression.

While Russia has announced its willingness to negotiate, it sticks to its main demand—that the four regions of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk and Donetsk, which Russia annexed and then amalgamated through its “referendum”—be accepted as being “wholly Russian.” Else, as their Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov threatened, “the Russian army will deal with the issue.” The hard line on holding on to the occupied territories is unlikely to be diluted. With the vacation of these areas being the prime Ukrainian demand, there seems to be little common ground, where the two sides can even begin to talk.

As per some assessments, Putin is merely seeking to divert attention and gain time to strengthen his position. Russia seems to be preparing for a fresh offensive in the coming months—one which could perhaps target Kyiv, while keeping Ukraine tied down with limited offensives in the south and the east. The 200,000 new recruits, who were hurriedly conscripted, have begun beefing up the frontlines and additional troops have been inducted into Belarus for “exercises.” Talking of peace while gearing up for war could give him time for preparations.

Ukraine too seeks to strengthen its own position through battlefield gains. The success of its northeastern and southern offensives in October-November has placed it in a much stronger position. With newly inducted western equipment, and invaluable US intelligence, it is imposing even greater costs on the Russians. The New Year’s eve strike that killed 89 Russian soldiers is an indicator of their reach and willingness to take the fight deep into enemy territory. They too seem to be planning a resumption of their offensive—perhaps directed from Zaporizhzhia towards Mariupol, which will cut off the Russian positions along the coast and make it impossible to hold on to the south. They have been beefed up with a fresh infusion of western aid, including the recent $1.84 billion by the United States along with Patriot missile air defense systems, and its recruits are being rapidly trained on western soil. Ukraine’s recent battlefield successes have led to a growing realization that the Russian army can be pushed back to its pre-February boundaries. Thus, neither Ukraine, nor the western powers are likely to accept the Russian terms of keeping the occupied territories in return for a negotiated peace. Rather they will seek greater battlefield successes, to force Russia to accept peace on their terms. Ukraine insists that it will not accept a “peace at any cost” formula or compromise on its territorial integrity—and rightly so.
But in a way, the military actions could be a prelude to paving the grounds for a negotiated solution. It is significant that both Zelenskyy and Putin have been in touch with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, with Zelenskyy stating that he “counts on India’s participation” for a peace formula summit—based on his ten points—which is likely to be held in February. India, as the President of the G-20, is now ideally placed to play the role of an honest broker, and represent the Global South to help bring an end to the war, which has brought so much global disruption. India has maintained good relations with both Russia and Ukraine, and Modi’s personal equations with the leaders could help bring both parties to the table. That may not put an end to the fighting, but could help bring about a ceasefire or truce, in which a negotiated settlement could be hammered out while the guns are silent.
Eleven months of war, over 60,000 casualties each (dead, wounded, missing) and an estimated cost of over $350 billion for both sides have taken a toll. Ukraine is considerably the worse off, with the loss of over $500 billion worth of infrastructure and over 100,000 civilian casualties. Both sides are looking for a way out now, but Ukraine first needs to regain its territorial integrity, and safeguard itself against future aggression. Putin too, seems to have realised that his gamble has not paid off, and needs a face-saving exit that will enable him to justify his needless war—especially now that public anger is building up against it within Russia itself. So, while both sides hope for a cessation of hostilities, there is no common ground for a lasting peace. Seeing the way Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, the West is keen to ensure that the occupied territories are not usurped the same way. That would only embolden it further. Nor will Ukraine accept any further loss of its territory. The one acceptable solution would be of Russia agreeing to withdraw its troops to the pre-February boundaries, but is allowed to keep Crimea. Ukraine forswears NATO membership (but could be admitted in the EU) but is offered security guarantees, to prevent future attacks. Even if these two clauses are agreed to by both sides, there could be some meeting ground to set the stage for peace initiatives. Else the stalemate of the war could continue from this winter on to the next.

Ajay Singh’s latest book is “Russia-Ukraine War: The Conflict and its Global Impact”.