Through Ukraine, US is pursuing unilateralism

By: Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd)

Post the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, which signalled US decline, the US administration is using the Ukraine conflict as a means for power consolidation.

For the second time in recent history, a proxy contest between the United States and Russia has unravelled through the ongoing Ukraine-Russia conflict. The contest characterises US attempts to retain its unipolarity in terms of global power and influence, versus emerging power structures defined by the China-Russia axis and developing powers India, Brazil, Japan, and others.
The competition is for dominance and influence over the interconnected global space defined by the Euro-Atlantic maritime domination, Eurasia, the Central Asian heartland, the Asian Rimland, the Middle East and Africa.
The US policies and activities are driven by a strengthened determination to maintain itself as an indispensable global power, with unchallenged primacy, to prevent the emergence of any peer competitor which can challenge its dominance. US perception, as outlined in the Biden Administration’s National Security Strategy is that the global balance is being upset by China’s rise and the coming together of Russia and China and through their attempts at creating an alternative sphere of influence, most predominantly in continental Eurasia and Asia as also the Indo-Pacific rimland through power assertion.
Post the disastrous US withdrawal from Afghanistan, which signalled US decline, a discerning American administration, reading the emerging contours, is using the Ukraine conflict as a means for power consolidation through a bolstered NATO and is reasserting its unilateral control over global multilateral institutions. The intent is to weaken Russia militarily and undermine its economy as an essential first step to contend with the combined China-Russia challenge. The invocation of democracy, rules-based order, etc., are tools intended to subdue challengers and maintain US predominance.
Once the aim of militarily undermining Russia is achieved, the focus will shift to the containment of China, which is militarily and technologically too powerful, with its strong salience in SE Asia and South China Sea to be directly challenged. Xi Jinping’s authoritarian streak, unilateral assertions and disastrous policies have helped the US and its allies to consolidate regional nations in a collective China-restraining architecture.
Simultaneously, the Taiwan threat is being hyped up for two reasons—to keep China under pressure/force it to miscalculate over Taiwan by use of force. Perpetuating the China challenge is also useful to consolidate allies and partners. AUKUS, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Indonesia are all being drawn into this orbit of consolidated containment.
As part of the containment strategy, China will be contested politically and militarily in Asia, while restraining its economic and mercantilist aspirations by decoupling China from global supply chains, reordering its markets (particularly in Europe), regaining the technological edge and undermining its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All this will be complemented by a strong regional architecture in Asia/Indo-Pacific. The aim is to constrain Beijing, rendering it weak and vulnerable to pose a long-term challenge to the US and its allies.
This, in a broad sense, is the grand strategic perspective of the war in Europe over Ukraine and its overlay in the Indo-Pacific. In this, Europe, NATO, and allies in Asia are useful tools to achieve American objectives. The consolidation of NATO and the reorientation of energy supply chains are important to create a strategic and economic bulwark in Europe, which is dependent on US offshore influence. The aim is to create within Europe a strong security architecture to contain Russia militarily.

In this game plan, Ukraine cannot fall nor its access to the Black Sea coast be undermined. Odessa, after Crimea and Mariupol, is critical, whose security must be ensured at all costs. Ukraine cannot become landlocked. Intrinsically, this underscores a distinct possibility of escalation, which could bring NATO/Europe in direct conflict with Russia. The west European powers are aware of this and question American motives but are too weak to raise their voice (e.g., on Nord Stream). Eastern Europe, bereft of financial resources and military capabilities, remains security dependent on the US. It is leveraged as a counter to western European assertions for ceasefire and conflict termination. The exploitation of East-West European fissures suits the US as it weakens the collective bargaining power of Europe.
An issue of grave importance for the Indo-Pacific is the impact that the Ukraine war has on regional dynamics. An overstretched US, a weakened NATO/Europe and a heavily bruised Russia are allowing space to an economically weak China the opportunity to consolidate its economic power and assert its coercive muscle flexing from the Himalayas to East Asia.
The fundamental question that US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific are grappling with is the US ability to sustain a two-front effort—supporting Ukraine in an apparently prolonged conflict with Russia and confronting/contesting China in the Indo-Pacific. With the NATO/European arms industry stretched in recouping weapons and munitions provided to Ukraine, and serious economic difficulties on account of mounting debt, its sustainability to support the massive war effort is suspect. The American defence ecosystem too is getting both militarily and economically stretched.
In this pursuit of a unilateralist order led by the US, there are signs of a fightback by China and Russia through political, economic and increasingly military cooperation. President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Russia post the ICJ’s warrant against President Vladimir Putin for war crimes and the two leaders affirming strong political, economic and military bonds underscore that both have decided to fight jointly the West’s assertions both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. To enhance the space for strategic cooperation, both are developing new convergences, e.g. the Middle East, in terms of the Saudi Arabia-Iran détente, a new Iran-China-Russia nexus, and enhancing trade and investments. There is also a reported possibility of China and Russia coming together to create an anti-AUKUS framework, by Russia sharing advance nuclear technology with China and at a later stage Iran.
India cannot stay immune from these developments. Thus far, India has played a deft balancing role. A resilient economy and strong political leadership, with a drive to develop credible comprehensive national power is making India an important Asian partner allowing it balancing space. A credible strategic partnership with the US and Quadrilateral, in the backdrop of the continuing China challenge and a weak Russia, is an important medium-term security construct for India. On the other hand, Russia is important too, not only in terms of critical defence and strategic relationship, but also vis-à-vis China. Thus, in the short to medium term, India will have to sustain this balancing arrangement to meet its multifarious strategic challenges. Nevertheless, there will be a price to pay. This is something that national security planners will need to take in account.
Brigadier Arun Sahgal (Retd), a former officer of the Indian Army, is Senior Fellow, Delhi Policy Group.