The India-Pakistan Pulwama-Balakot Crisis Six Years On

Six years ago this month, India and Pakistan were emerging out of a deep crisis that reached its most dangerous point on 27 February 2019 when Pakistan shot down and captured an Indian pilot in a firefight across the line of control in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan’s retaliatory air attack against military targets (Krishna Ghati, Hamirpur, Gambhir, and the Narayan ammunition dump) in Indian administered Kashmir was in response to India’s limited air strike on 26 February against an alleged militant training camp at Balakot. This strike, in turn, was in response to what the Indian Government perceived as Pakistan’s orchestration twelve days earlier of a terrorist attack against Indian security forces at Pulwama inside Indian-administered Kashmir.

Indian jets scrambled to meet their Pakistani intruders on 27 February. In the ensuing dogfight, an Indian MiG-21 Bison was shot down on the Pakistani side of the LoC and the Indian pilot captured. The Pakistani Government released the pilot two days later in what Pakistan called a “gesture of peace”. Both sides were quick to claim “victory” in the crisis and each developed a narrative that claimed the crisis had ended on favourable terms for them because they had shown resolve and held firm.

These narratives are on display in the two pieces that we publish here, written by former senior military officials with great experience of crisis management and the strategic relationship between the two countries. We invited Brigadier (Retd) Dr. Zahir Kazmi psc, SI(M) and Brigadier (Retd) Dr. Arun Sahgal to write independently and respond separately to the three key questions about the crisis below. What their important contributions highlight is the different perceptions that each writer holds regarding how this crisis unfolded under the nuclear shadow; the balance between threats and reassurance in the ending of the crisis; the role of third parties; and the role played by communication at the political and military level in reducing the risk that the crisis might escalate to the nuclear level. The authors affirm that the views expressed below are solely their own and do not reflect their governments’ positions or of any affiliated institutions. Any interpretation to the contrary would be misplaced. 

The questions that we pose here will be debated and argued over in the years and decades to come, and just six years on, there remain many questions and controversies just as there are sixty-two years on from the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. Nuclear escalation was avoided by President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khrushchev because each showed restraint and responsibility when it mattered most. A similar rationality of nuclear fear has pervaded crises between India and Pakistan to date, but their 2019 encounter saw a level of force used on both sides that had not been seen in previous crises.

In the case of the Pulwama-Balakot crisis, it seems a mix of responsible statecraft, mutual deterrence, and just plain luck led to a peaceful ending of the crisis. Both of these contributions underscore the need for better crisis communications and this is one of the areas that BASIC’s Nuclear Responsibilities Programme has been seeking to make a contribution to in our work in South Asia. In our most recent report from April 2024, based on a series of Track 2/1.5 dialogues with Pakistani and Indian interlocutors, we proposed the development of a leader-to-leader hotline that can serve as a trusted channel of communication at the highest levels of India-Pakistan diplomacy. In contrast to the high level of communication between Kennedy and Khrushchev that played such a key role in de-escalating the Cuban Missile Crisis, such a channel of communication was lacking at the highest levels of Pakistani and Indian diplomacy during the 2019 crisis. If Ajay Bisaria, the then Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan’s later account is to be believed, the Pakistani leader tried to make contact with his Indian counterpart on the evening of 27 February 2019. This was the most dangerous day of the crisis, with both sides’ militaries in action. Bisaria recalled that the Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Sohail Mahmood, reached out to his Indian equivalent to say that the Pakistani Prime Minister wanted to talk to his Indian counterpart. According to Bisaria, the Indian Prime Minister’s office replied to say that the Premier “was not available at this hour” but if Pakistan had “any urgent message to convey”, it should convey it through Bisaria. It is easy to imagine how the Cuban Missile Crisis might have spiralled out of their control had either Kennedy or Khrushchev adopted this approach to communicating in the crisis. Establishing a trusted Track 1 communication channel between Indian and Pakistan leaders could be an important step in ensuring that each side continues to have confidence in the other’s restraint which is so vital to ensure that any future crises are de-escalated quickly.

Nicholas J. Wheeler is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at BASIC and Professor of International Relations at the University of Birmingham.

Biographical note

Dr Zahir Kazmi is Arms Control Advisor at the Strategic Plans Division, where he has also served as the Director General of Arms Control & Disarmament Affairs Branch.

Dr Arun Sahgal, a retired Brigadier, is the Director Forum for Strategic Initiatives. He was previously the founding Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Indian Integrated Defence Staff (IDS), Ministry of Defence.

How far was there a risk of nuclear escalation during the crisis? What kind of nuclear alerting, if any, took place?

Brigadier Kazmi: 

The Pulwama-Balakot crisis carried significant risks of escalation, given the reduced firebreak between conventional and nuclear thresholds. While no formal nuclear threats were issued publicly, both Pakistan and India elevated their military alert levels in response to Indian brinkmanship.

India’s willingness to cross new thresholds was evident in its decision to conduct airstrikes inside Pakistan for the first time since the 1971 War. This was an act of historic recklessness, as no nuclear powers had previously conducted airstrikes inside the territory of another nuclear weapons state. This shift significantly altered strategic calculations. Pakistan’s Quid-Pro-Quo Plus response on 27 February not only neutralised the threat but also captured an Indian pilot, creating an off-ramp for de-escalation that India had not anticipated.

Pakistan’s strategic signalling, including heightened alert levels, crisis messaging, and deliberate restraint played a vital role in preventing further escalation. On 21 April, during an election rally in Gujarat, Prime Minister Narendra Modi claimed that India had prepared for a “Qatal ki Raat” (night of murder) on 27 February, implying that India had conveyed a serious military threat to Pakistan through undisclosed diplomatic channels. In response, Pakistan made it clear through reciprocal channels that for every Indian missile prepared, three Pakistani missiles were ready – demonstrating the credibility of its deterrent posture .

Independent experts criticized India’s decision to mobilize a nuclear ballistic missile submarine, calling it an act of escalation rather than responsible nuclear stewardship.[1] On 5 March 2019, the Pakistan Navy detected an Indian submarine near its waters but chose not to engage, demonstrating strategic restraint. This stark contrast between India’s brinkmanship and Pakistan’s measured response underscores how future crises could spiral out of control.

The crisis reaffirmed Pakistan’s unwavering commitment to deterrence stability. While India has sought space for limited conventional and hybrid warfare under the nuclear overhang, Pakistan has consistently denied it. The risks of escalation remain ever-present as long as India continues to push these limits.

[1] “The major combat units of the Indian Navy including the Carrier Battle Group with INS Vikramaditya, nuclear submarines and scores of other ships, submarines and aircraft swiftly transited from exercise to operational deployment mode as tensions between India and Pakistan escalated,” Navy Spokesperson Captain D. K. Sharma, 17 March 2019.

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Brigadier Sahgal:

The Balakot crisis involved a three-step escalation. The first step was the Pakistan-sponsored terror attack, second India’s response in targeting a Jaish e Mohammed terror camp at Balakot, the group responsible for the Pulwama attack. This was followed by Pakistani air action that resulted in loss of aircraft on both sides and capture of an Indian pilot.

While the crisis was managed by the early return of the Indian pilot, an important lesson is that had the pilot not been returned, it could have led to further military escalation, which to be credible, will have had to be of a higher magnitude, running the risk of inadvertent escalation with the possibility of bringing nuclear weapons into the equation. It is against this backdrop that the Pulwama-Balakot crisis offers lessons for escalation management and deterrence stability in an India-Pakistan standoff. 

In answer to the specific question as to whether there was a risk of nuclear escalation during the crisis, the answer is that despite its management, the propensity of nuclear escalation played at the margins of the crisis throughout.

Pakistan resorted to nuclear sabre rattling at the very beginning of the crisis. The holding of a National Command Authority (NCA) meeting on 27 February 2019 and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations ISPR spokesman’s remarks regarding Pakistan’s intent was a deliberate attempt to remind that the crisis was playing out against a nuclear backdrop. Whilst India was reasonably sure this was a case of Pakistani brinkmanship, Pakistan’s posture of strategic ambiguity ensured that such pre-emptive moves could not be ignored.

The second nuclear escalatory factor was Pakistan’s accusation that India had deployed nine missiles in a threatening posture, pointed at Pakistan together with the claimed aggressive actions of the Indian navy in deploying the nuclear SLBM submarine Arihant. There is no independent corroborative evidence of either the missiles having been deployed or movement of Arihant close to the Pakistani coast. The whole narrative was conjured to bring third party pressure on India.

Sadly, these claims got unexpected traction by uncorroborated and dramatic claims by former US Secretary of State Pompeo, who in his autobiography claims that an Indian minister rang him up in the middle of the night to claim that Pakistan, presumably reacting to the above accusations, had deployed its nuclear weapons which could result in nuclear escalation. and that the conflict could escalate into a nuclear one.

PM Modi’s later statement at an election rally that had the Indian pilot not been returned, there would have been a “night of bloodshed” has been misconstrued as a nuclear threat within the Pakistani security establishment for obvious reasons. What the Indian Prime Minister was conveying was that delay in return of the pilot could lead to escalation, including potentially major retaliation. There was no mention or nuancing of nuclear weapons.

The standoff has some important lessons for India-Pakistan crisis management.

1. First, it appears to have given Pakistan misplaced confidence that in any such scenario of kinetic force being used against Pakistan it has the capability to respond in kind to India.
2. There is a further belief that such a response will create a major dilemma for India, in terms of either to escalate further or defuse the situation. Any attempt at de-escalation would be seen as tacitly accepting the limitation of its punitive response options. Thus, providing a propaganda victory for Pakistan, putting India on the defensive, politically and internationally. Thus, to retain the credibility of its ‘punitive response doctrine’, India will be forced to escalate to a higher magnitude.
3. Another conclusion can be that given the inevitability of the nuclear overhang, the possible change in nuclear posture as part of prudent management and protection of assets from a decapitating strike could become necessary. Such actions are prone to misperception and miscalculation, leading to a heightened alert status.
4. Lastly, as part of its “full spectrum deterrence”, Pakistan posits the use of low yield nuclear weapons within its conventional security continuum. They claim it is necessary given the ever-increasing conventional asymmetry.

The above underscores, whereas the risk of nuclear escalation can be managed through rational behaviour, the possibility of conventional deterrence breakdown remains in the backdrop.

What role, if any, did the existing hotlines between the two countries play in de-escalating the crisis? Were there any other channels that contributed to crisis de-escalation?

Brigadier Kazmi:

The crisis exposed serious limitations in existing crisis communication mechanisms, particularly the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) hotline. While intended as a tool for de-escalation, India’s reluctance to utilise it in a timely manner increased the risks of miscalculation. Some accounts suggest that the hotline was either delayed or underutilised in the critical hours following the Balakot strikes, raising concerns about India’s crisis management capabilities.

This pattern of delayed or unreliable crisis communication was not unique to the 2019 crisis. In March 2022, India launched a nuclear-capable BrahMos cruise missile into Pakistan. Instead of immediately acknowledging the event and engaging through crisis communication channels, India remained silent for nearly 48 hours before belatedly attributing it to an accidental launch. The lack of timely communication and the nature of the launch broke another nuclear taboo, reinforcing concerns about India’s crisis stability mechanisms.

Despite these systemic flaws, backchannel diplomacy and direct leadership communication played a crucial role in de-escalation. External actors initially aligned with India due to geopolitical interests, but changed their position only after Pakistan’s Swift Retort Operation on 27 February demonstrated that further escalation would be futile.

Pakistan’s strategic maturity and measured escalation management ensured that deterrence stability remained intact. However, crisis management alone cannot substitute for dispute settlement, particularly Kashmir, according to UN resolutions. Until existing territorial disputes are addressed, crisis communication mechanisms will remain inadequate in preventing future conflicts.

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Brigadier Sahgal:

From the available accounts, it appears that the DGMO hotline was the principal means of communication between the two militaries. News about the air strike on 26 February was shared on the DGMO hotline. Being Tuesday, the designated day of call between the two DGMO’s, the hotline was active. Thereafter, the Indian side manned the hotline at a senior level throughout the crisis with calls being scheduled as required. It needs to be noted that they only discussed military issues, political messages were not conveyed. No other channels were active, particularly the Foreign Secretary hotline. Equally there is nothing in the open domain to suggest existence of any other back channel.

On 27 February PM Imran Khan tried to get through to PM Modi, but owing to his non availability, the call did not go through. He was asked to pass any message for the Indian leadership through the Indian High Commissioner, who was present in Delhi at that time. The call was not returned. It is understood (p.419 in Ajay Bisaria’s, book Anger Management) that Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, also tried to get through to his counterpart to discuss the situation who was also unavailable. From the various accounts, it appears third parties (especially the Ambassadors of the United States, United Kingdom, and France in Pakistan and India) played a role in scaling down the crisis and facilitating the return of the Indian pilot by highlighting the consequences of escalation to their Pakistani interlocutors.

To the best of my knowledge and inputs there was no existing back channel for passing messages. Importantly, the two high commissions remained very active in conveying the respective positions of their governments. The issue of activation of the LoC through cross border firing was also taken up and demarches issued.

How important was the release of the Indian pilot on 1 March 2019 in providing an “off-ramp” to end the crisis?

Brigadier Kazmi:

The return of Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman on 1 March was a deliberate de-escalatory move, not a concession. Pakistan’s decision was driven by strategic pragmatism, offering India a face-saving exit while reinforcing deterrence stability. It was not dictated by nuclear threats but rather reflected Pakistan’s confidence, crisis management approach, and military tradition of treating captured personnel with dignity.

Pakistan’s response to India’s aggression was a strategic necessity, not a mere reaction. The capture of the Indian pilot created a diplomatic advantage that Islamabad leveraged to control the crisis timeline. By returning the pilot, Pakistan provided India with a face-saving exit while maintaining the credibility of its deterrent posture.

India’s claim of downing a Pakistani F-16 remains unverified and has been dismissed–even by pro-India analysts–as politically motivated.[2] The stringent U.S. Foreign Military Sales audits confirmed that no Pakistani F-16 was missing.

The broader strategic context is critical here. The crisis was not just a military confrontation but a reflection of India’s political motivations, particularly in the lead-up to the 2019 general elections. The timing of the Pulwama attack and the inconsistencies in India’s official narrative reinforced Pakistan’s assessment that the crisis was an engineered provocation aimed at serving domestic political interests.

India consistently claims victimhood in the global narrative, presenting itself as a target of terrorism while simultaneously being complicit in sponsoring destabilisation efforts within Pakistan. One glaring example is the case of Kulbhushan Yadav, a serving Indian Navy officer and operative of RAW, who was caught in Pakistan and admitted to organising terrorism on behalf of the Indian state. While Pakistan presented undeniable evidence of India’s covert activities, geopolitical considerations have shielded India from accountability, allowing it to cover its tracks while deflecting attention to Pakistan.

Additionally, the role of Indian media in fuelling war hysteria cannot be ignored. Sensationalist coverage fuelled war hysteria and complicated de-escalation efforts—reminiscent of its role in the 2001 Agra Summit, where inflammatory rhetoric derailed diplomatic engagement.

Ultimately, while the release of the Indian pilot was an important off-ramp, the decisive factor in crisis resolution was Pakistan’s strategic maturity and crisis management. Unlike previous crises where external actors played a passive role, Pakistan itself was the key stabilising force in preventing full-scale war.

The fundamental takeaway is that crisis resolution must go beyond de-escalatory measures. The unresolved Kashmir dispute remains the primary trigger for recurring crises. Until this is addressed, South Asia will continue to face cycles of instability and nuclear risk. Pakistan remains steadfast in its commitment to Kashmir’s just resolution.

While nuclear deterrence and backchannel diplomacy contributed to crisis resolution, Pakistan’s strategic restraint and controlled escalation management were the decisive factors in averting full-scale war. Unlike previous crises, where major powers took an active role in mediation, they only changed their bias and stepped in after Pakistan demonstrated its ability to impose costs on further escalation.

India has repeatedly behaved sans restraint, inter alia first by conducting airstrikes inside the territory of a nuclear weapons state and later by launching a nuclear-capable missile into Pakistan. These actions raise serious concerns about the standards of prudence and crisis management expected from a nuclear power, as well as the risks of inadvertent escalation.

Crisis management is not a substitute for dispute settlement, particularly Kashmir. Pakistan has consistently denied India space for limited war, but lasting strategic stability requires more than deterrence alone. The international community, if genuinely committed to preventing future crises, must inter alia shift from reactive crisis intervention to addressing the root causes of instability. Until that happens, the risks of future escalations will remain a dangerous reality in the Subcontinent.

[2] [Christine Fair], however, questioned the IAF’s narrative about the incident, saying that it is not based on an empirical body of facts but dictated more by “things deployed by politicians to win elections…. The world outside of India does not see things the way they were said here today. Though, I wish they were true.”… Fair also questioned India’s claim of extensive damage to the terror camp at Balakot based on images from open sources, saying that from an international point of view, these have not been accepted. “They are refuted by many scholars who are actually India’s friends.”

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Brigadier Sahgal:

Post the anger venting Pakistani air strike, India took up with Pakistan directly and through third parties that the return of India’s Air Force pilot who was in Pakistan’s custody was central to the de-escalation of the crisis. While these discussions were underway, on the evening of 27 February, the Pakistani Foreign Office conveyed to the Indian High Commission in Islamabad that their intelligence had picked up nine Indian missiles pointed towards Pakistan ready to be launched anytime that day. Message was also conveyed to the three active diplomats (US, UK and France) who conveyed this to their governments and to New Delhi, resulting in a flurry of diplomatic activity.

India described these claims as preposterous, maintaining it as an attempt to draw attention away from the core issue of the return of the Indian pilot’s return. India’s stand was clear, that delay or attempting to leverage his custody to score brownie points was unacceptable. India’s unambiguous two-point stand; of return of pilot and dismantling of terror network was conveyed to both the international interlocutors as well as Pakistan.

As a consequence, PM Imran Khan in a televised address from the Parliament announced that the Indian pilot would be released as a peace gesture. Pakistan also announced that it was ready to talk on terrorism and examine India’s dossier on JeM activities. In the Indian view, concerted military coercion, backed by diplomacy and international pressure, had helped defuse a crisis that if not handled sensitively had the potential to escalate.