The Dilemma of Future Capability Development of Indian Armed Forces

Lt Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & BAR (Retd.) – Distinguished Fellow, VIF

Introduction

1. The success achieved during the recent four-day India-Pakistan conflict, Operation Sindoor (07-10 May 2025), has brought the specter of drone-centric warfare of Nagorno-Karabakh; ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) -EW (Electronic Warfare) – and drone-intensive operations of Russia-Ukraine; and AI-driven targeting in Gaza by Israel, to the subcontinent. It was the first non-contact kinetic warfare in which the Indian military achieved the desired political aim without mobilising its military formations or physically crossing the borders.
2. Beginning with the sole aim of hitting terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POK), India graduated to delivering retaliatory strikes on Pakistan military targets, including strategic air bases like Sargodha, Noor Khan (Rawalpindi), Jacobabad, Sukkur… hitherto perceived to be in secure depth.
3. Indian Politico-military objectives were achieved at the least economic and human cost to the nation, without nuclear brinkmanship. Despite the vast geographic spread and spectrum of targets engaged, the `escalation control’ could also be maintained.
4. Also being analysed concurrently are the operations of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF), which leveraged the integration of Chinese-supplied platforms, sensors, and missiles into an integrated combat system. This included the networking of radars, fighters, and AWACS over secure data links, mirroring advanced Western concepts like the CJADC2 (Combined Joint All-Domain Command and Control) system, thereby creating a unified command and control network across land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.^[1] to achieve kills at unprecedented ranges.
5. The success/ perceived success believed to have been achieved by both sides adopting an `innovative’ pattern of operations has triggered varied ideas on future force structuring and capability development of the Indian armed forces. The objectives range from preparing for `all out,’ `limited,’ `short and intense wars’ (from the perspective of geographic spread and duration); to `contact’ or `non-contact’ (from the perspective of mobilisation and physical employment of troops); to `kinetic’ or `non-kinetic,’ and use of `manned’ or `un-manned’ platforms (from the perspective of weapons to be used). There seems an overwhelming (public) narrative for the armed forces to focus on UAVs not fighters or tanks.’^[2] In the same (generic) context, the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) speaking at a workshop recently (July 16, 2025), at Delhi, said that, “We can’t win today’s warfare with yesterday’s weapon systems;” and that “today’s warfare has to be fought with tomorrow’s technology.”^[3]
6. Finding the right blend of these ideas to create appropriate military capability for achieving various national objectives, present and future, is a complex proposition. The complexity is compounded by challenges of access to technologies and affordability, for a growing economy like ours.
7. During Op Sindoor, the offensive operations entailed extensive use of a wide range of commercial and military drones, employed in stand-alone mode and swarms; loiter munitions of varying ranges and payloads; long range vectors like Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles; SCALP (or Storm Shadow) air launched guided long-range cruise missiles; Meteor BVRAAM (Beyond Visual Range Air to Air Missile); HAMMER (Highly Agile Modular Munition Extended Range) precision glide bombs and the like. These were used by the Indian Air Force and Army to effectively engage designated targets.
8. Defensive operations entailed the use of a range of classic Air Defence (AD) weapon systems – from legacy L-70, Schilka and ZU-23 guns to a variety of short and medium range Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs), including the indigenous Akash, to the Advanced air Defence systems like S-400. These were complemented by a variety of newly inducted counter-UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems) like Indigenous Integrated Drone Detection and Interdiction System (IDD&IS), DRDO developed laser counter-UAS systems, Kamikaze drone-based and micro munition-based anti-swarm drone systems, RF jammer guns, etc. These were all integrated through the Integrated Air Command and Control system (IACCS), manned by the Air Force and the Army Air Defence Control and Reporting (AD C&R) system – `Akashteer.’ Also employed extensively were a range of electronic warfare systems like `Samyukta’ and `Himshakti’, and the Command Cyber Operations Support Wings (CCOSWs) for cyber warfare. Space-based indigenous assets (9-11 military satellites) and foreign satellite data were also used for imagery, sat-com (satellite communication) and PNT (positioning, navigation, and timing).
9. These weapon systems were employed skillfully to counter Chinese-supplied equipment used by Pakistan and to degrade their HQ- 9 Air Defence systems and radar networks for effective penetration by own drones and missiles.
10. Pakistan’s claims of success, including shooting down of `some’ Indian aircraft and drones, are based on the capability created with Chinese support. It manifested in the form of sale of advanced weapons, including the likely provision of BVR PL- 15 (besides PL 15 E) missiles for long stand-off engagements, augmenting Pakistan ISR capability, adjusting satellites coverage to provide real-time intelligence and imagery, aiding target acquisition, provision of AWACS (ZDK-03), enhancing EW capability, and more.
11. Irrespective of the veracity of these claims, the salient deduction is of the emergence of unprecedented levels of battlefield transparency, extensive use of unmanned piloted and autonomous systems, long-range stand-off and precision capability, enhanced vulnerability of conventional military platforms, and high level of net centricity and multidomain, command and control capability.
12. With changing pattern of operations, the biggest dilemma for Indian Defence planners is to decide what India should spend its limited Defence budget on.
13. Buying and sustaining `modern versions’(including better survivability features) of conventional weapon systems like tanks, Infantry combat vehicles, conventional artillery guns, manned 5th/6th generation fighter aircraft to make-up 42-squadron strength, manned surface ships and conventional/ nuclear powered submarines, OR direct resources to inducting emerging technologies and technology-enabled unmanned and autonomous platforms, loiter and precision munitions, net worked systems for multi domain operations? OR, focus largely on non-conventional domains of space, cyber, electronic, and cognitive warfare? Can the use of technologies (alone) help achieve the desired politico-military objectives, decisive and lasting results on the battlefield, and deterrence beyond that?
14. The recent imaginative employment of cheap, short range one – way drones, by Ukraine, against Russia, in Operation Spiderweb (01 June 2025), which resulted in the destruction of approximately 11 Russian strategic bombers; Operation Rising Lion launched by Israel against Iran (13 June 2025), destroying the latter’s Air Defence, as also the extensive use of small armed and unarmed drones by India and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, suggest increased drone inductions in the future military inventories. So also, is the case for induction of a range of precision and loiter munition systems. India extensively used the Sky Striker,^[4] Nagastra, Harop and Harpy loiter munitions during the recent operations.
15. But then, looking at it from another perspective, to have a lasting impact, Operation Rising Lion, had to be followed up by the US launching Operation Midnight Hammer (22 June, 2025) to attack Iranian nuclear sites, employing 125 aircraft, including seven B-2 Spirit Bombers, dropping 14 GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrators of 30,000 lbs. each, and 30 Tomahawk Attack Missiles fired from nuclear submarines.^[5]
16. Despite that, with no `boots having been put on ground,’ some intelligence reports suggest that enriched uranium was moved out of the Iranian nuclear sites before the US strikes. While not undermining the relevance of stand-off engagements, it merits appreciation that some roles can only be performed by physical presence on the ground.
17. This aspect has particular reference to the Indian context, where it has disputed borders with China, Pakistan, (and Nepal). Parliament resolution of November 14, 1962 pledged to get back the territory occupied by the Chinese to the last inch.^[6] Likewise, in the context of Pakistan, on February 22, 1994, both Houses of the Indian Parliament passed a resolution unanimously, stating that Pakistan has been occupying areas of India in Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian Government is committed to taking back the occupied areas.^[7] Irrespective of when this resolve is implemented, force structuring needs to be oriented to create/maintain this potential.
18. Another significant aspect to be considered for technology-enabled capability development is the factor of `affordability.’ The perceptions about the cost of these hi-tech systems vary. Viewed in the context of the millions of dollars’ worth of platforms (aircraft, tanks, guns, ships) that these few hundred / thousand-dollar (cheap) drones and munitions can destroy, these would be perceived as cheap. However, viewed in the context of lethality and payload that can be delivered for causing lasting destruction, these would be hugely expensive, on the yardstick of `lethality-cost’ index. For instance, the Sky Striker loiter munitions, with warheads weighing approximately 5 to 10 Kg, or an Excalibur 155mm precision round of M 777 ULH could cost over a hundred times (or more) the conventional munitions like 155mm High Explosive (HE) Artillery shells weighing 40-45 Kg. Of course, this exorbitant cost is for delivering these munitions speedily, accurately, on an unsuspecting enemy, in depth, at much longer ranges. Also available are the intermediate options, of converting dumb munitions to intelligent and precise long-range weapons by retrofit kits. Options of affordable Course Correction fuses (CCF) for precision Artillery, JDAM (Joint Direct Attack Munitions), SPICE, HAMMER, etc. These are being explored by the services already.
19. What is implied by this analogy is that such munitions are `special’ and need to be employed selectively, more for special impact than for their lethality (degradation or destruction) per se. These, therefore, cannot become the standard issue for war fighting, due to constraints of employability and affordability. But yes, in an India-Pakistan context, a USD 4 trillion economy can afford these better than a nearly USD 370 billion economy.
20. In making decisions for the future force structuring, the following fundamental aspects need to be considered:
    1. A clear distinction is required to be made between, one, the technologies necessary to `shape and manage’ the battlefield – irrespective of the pattern of operations sought to be adopted, and two, the weapon systems/ platforms required for `actual warfighting’ based on the overall option selected.
    2. For shaping and managing the battlefield, it is imperative to develop capabilities related to ISR, underwater domain awareness, intelligence and decision support systems, communication and integrated data networks, navigation systems, etc. With increasing drones and missiles threat, including in depth areas, creation of layered and integrated Air, UAS and Missile Defence is also an essential component of `shaping’ the battlefield.
    3. The variable for which the choices need to be made is the type of conflict envisaged: contact or non-contact, kinetic or non-kinetic, and the level of degradation and destruction desired to be achieved. This would ultimately be a function of politico-military objectives selected, and the level of deterrence or Compellence sought to be imposed.
21. As the experience of Op Sindoor, Op Spider Web, and Op Rising Lion suggests, the non-contact kinetic warfare, by itself, seems more suited to achieving `demonstrative and symbolic’ results. It would not be the preferred option for causing lasting degradation or destruction of the adversary’s combat potential, breaking his `Will,’ or for settling territorial disputes conclusively.
22. These judgements, though, are not simplistic and have to be nuanced, as would be evident from the course adopted during Op Sindoor. The non-contact, kinetic operations enabled India to deliver desired strategic messaging by carving maximum space for conventional operations below the nuclear overhang. Some are calling it India’s `controlled violence’ as a tool of `compellence.’ Even Pakistan was able to create an impression of having responded resolutely, but still having exercised `restraint’ by not exercising its full spectrum deterrence. For both sides, this was possible only due to the nature of the (modest) tech-oriented `force-construct’ that they had created for themselves, in addition to the largely conventional force structure.
23. In this context, an article published in Foreign Affairs, “What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield”^[8] It suggests creation of what is called ‘Precise mass’ capability. This entails investing in and developing the capacity to deploy large numbers of cheap but accurate uncrewed systems. These could then be grouped with existing legacy systems and employed in creative ways. This does seem to be a pragmatic approach, even in the Indian context.
24. Besides the basic considerations given above, each service would need to work out its specific approach to capability development. A special reference, however, is in order concerning Air and drones’ capability development due to their prominent role in the current conflicts, and with revolutionary changes taking place in this domain.
25. Aerial platforms have proved their relevance in delivering long-range, stand-off strikes to depth areas. There is, however, a growing challenge to their survivability. The future force – structuring calls for examining suitable alternatives (to manned aircraft) for achieving `Control of Air’ during operations.
26. For `offensive counter air operations,’ inherent in the `Control of Air, ‘ the feasibility of laying greater reliance on long-range missiles (e.g., Brahmos or other similar systems) merits examining. Likewise, the induction of additional advanced Air Defence Systems for `Air Defence operations,’ including for use against drones and missiles, needs to be considered, rather than continuing to rely on fighter aircraft for the AD role. Creation of these capabilities, concurrent with expeditious building up of the desired force levels (42 Squadrons), would create the desired capability for future conflicts. The Air Force would need to prioritise these acquisitions, alongside manned aircraft, to balance aspects of threat mitigation, survivability, and availability of resources.
27. Also, conceptually, greater emphasis is required on the employment of unmanned/ manned-unmanned systems. The ongoing US Air Force, ‘Collaborative Combat Aircraft Programme (CCA)^[9] and Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) `CATS Warrior’^[10] merit closer examination, for induction as well as for developing operational doctrine.
28. Increasing relevance of drones, even in the Indian context, is undeniable. The induction, thus far, however, has largely been ad hoc, under the emergency procurement powers (except the larger MALE variety of drones with the three services). Future inductions need to be streamlined, in the interest of the services and industry. A clear distinction needs to be made between the requirement of ruggedised, ECM (Electronic Counter Measures)-resistant (but expensive) mil-grade or inexpensive, expendable COTS (Commercial Off the Shelf) drones. Acquisitions also need to be related to the envisaged roles, selecting armed, surveillance or other payloads, necessity of interface with centralised surveillance system (Battlefield Surveillance Systems), requirement of being able to direct Arty fire, etc. There is also an urgent need to transition from piloted drones to autonomous systems incorporating AI.
29. Most technology-enabled weapons and munitions that have been used during the recent conflict were procured through various tranches of `Emergency Procurements (EP),’ under the financial powers delegated to the Services. To recoup the stocks expended, the government has yet again sanctioned another tranche of EP, of Rs 40,000 Crores. In the first procurements finalised under this, on June 24, 2025, the Ministry of Defence concluded thirteen contracts amounting to nearly Rs 2,000 crores for the Indian Army.^[11] These include Integrated Drone Detection and Interdiction Systems (IDDIS), Low Level Lightweight Radars (LLLR) (for detection of very small cross section drones), Very Short-Range Air Defence Systems (VSHORADS) – launchers and missiles, Remotely Piloted Aerial Vehicles (RPAVs), Loitering Munitions, including Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) systems, various categories of smaller drones, and other operational equipment. Similar acquisitions will also be carried out by other services.
30. This process (EP) was initially instituted to address the emergent operational needs that had emerged in Eastern Ladakh/Northern Borders. Though a welcome step to meet immediate requirements, such ad hoc procurement procedures do not lend themselves to planned, long-term capability development. Even in the immediate, it restricts recoupment through regular capital acquisition route and establishment of a formal system of sustenance and support. Also, the sporadic availability in limited numbers inhibits across-the-board change of doctrines of employment.
31. A hybrid force structuring, as suggested above, entails a shift in the overall approach to planning defence acquisitions. The Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP), which forms the basis for all acquisitions, lays down the operational capabilities desired to be created. In practice, however, the actual procurements tend to be largely `platform centric’ (focussed on acquiring specific equipment – aircraft, ships, submarines, tanks, guns, ICVs, etc.) than being `integrated operational capability development focused.’ This needs to be corrected. Desired capability development may entail acquisition of a mix of legacy and contemporary tech-enabled systems across the services. The related budget allocations should also be made towards creating identified and prioritised capabilities, rather than spending on fragmented procurements for considerations of budget utilisation during the financial year.
32. In the current security environment, the visualised capability development priorities are as follows:
    1. Building robust integrated ISR capability, including underwater domain awareness, space-based surveillance and targeting capability (over and above the SBS-3 capabilities planned, which do not include targeting and communications).^[12]
    2. Layered and integrated Air Defence to include Counter–UAS and missile defence capabilities (including for depth areas).
    3. Integrated Command and control networks extending across multiple domains.
    4. Long-range precision strike capability using entire range of missiles, loiter and precision munitions as well as conventional multi barrel rocket launcher systems (MLRS), like improved versions of Pinaka etc.
    5. Cyber, Electronic Warfare and Cognitive Warfare Capability.
    6. Development of AI capabilities related to target recognition, decision support, and autonomy.
33. The much-desired `transformation’ of the Indian armed forces to a `technology–enabled force’ cannot be carried out without sustained and well-planned financial investment. This entails allocations for sustenance and continued acquisition of certain conventional platforms, alongside the induction of emerging technologies. The new generation capabilities will need to be progressively integrated with existing legacy systems, till new employment doctrines are evolved and the tech–intensive platforms get inducted in adequate numbers.
34. Immediate investments, however, are required for exponentially enhancing the Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities, developing Defence captive LLMs for AI applications for armed forces, acquiring and developing appropriate cyber tools, and enhancing Space-based capability. The long-range vectors cannot continue to rely on GPS and GLONASS, for which further strengthening of the NavIC satellite navigation system is urgently required. The requirements would be of the magnitude of a few thousand crores, spread over, say, 3-5 years.
35. These capabilities cannot be created out of the yearly Capital budget allocations (of two Lakh odd Crores), which would continue to be required for acquisitions and modernisation of the existing conventional force. The capability development of the military in these fields will have to be in conjunction with National AI, Semiconductor, Quantum, and Space missions. Armed forces cannot sustain this transformation alone!
36. It would thus be evident that the future force structure needs to be a mix of high-technology new-generation systems and existing legacy military platforms, blended optimally for what could be termed as a `moderately hi-tech battlefield with boots on the ground.’ The ratios of these two `baskets’ would vary based on the appreciated pattern of operations of the adversary, own war fighting objectives, doctrine, availability of technology, and affordability.
37. The first step to resolving these decision dilemmas is to evolve the National Security and National Defence Strategy to meet contemporary challenges. The politico-military leadership, through close dialogue during peacetime, need to arrive at various options through which the national security objectives can be achieved. Emerging technologies, which have already appeared on the battlefield, offer much wider operational options today, as experienced during Op Sindoor. The defence planners would then be able to orient capability development of forces appropriately.
38. There is an urgent need to initiate a national-level project to identify the contours of future force structuring and capability development and to financially support transformation. EP Powers delegated to the services, though a well-intended initiative, is only an ad hoc measure to maintain combat potential. It is neither suited to planned transformation of the armed forces nor to the long-term development of a defence industrial base.
39. This paper endeavours to present some thoughts on planning capability development of the armed forces, optimally utilising scarce resources to meet enormous security challenges before the nation today.

End Notes

^[1] The Asia Live News Service. Pakistan’s Precision Strike Network: How a Coordinated Kill Chain Took Down an Indian Fighter Jet. June 20, 2025. https://theasialive.com/pakistans-precision-strike-network-how-a-coordinated-kill-chain-took-down-an-indian-fighter-jet/2025/06/20/. Accessed July 22, 2025.
^[2] KJ Alphons. ‘Preparing for Future War: India should Focus on UAVs, not Fighters or Tanks.” The Indian Express, July 12, 2025. Pg 13. https://epaper.indianexpress.com/4032244/Delhi/July-12-2025#page/13/1
^[3] Aniruddha Dhar. ‘Can’t win today’s warfare with yesterday’s weapons’, says CDS Anil Chauhan as he cites ‘Operation Sindoor.’ Hindustan Times. July 16, 2025. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/cant-win-today-s-warfare-with-yesterday-s-weapons-says-cds-anil-chauhan-as-he-cites-operation-sindoor-101752640935672.html. Accessed July 18, 2025.
^[4] What are Sky Strikers, Bengaluru-made autonomous drones, likely deployed in Operation Sindoor? Money Control. May 08, 2025. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/india/stealthy-undetectable-what-are-skystrikers-bengaluru-made-autonomous-drones-likely-deployed-in-operation-sindoor-13016647.html. Accessed July 10, 2025.
^[5] Heather Mongilio and Sam LaGrone. Operation Midnight Hammer Drops 14 Bunker Busters in Record B-2 Strike Against Iranian Nuclear Sites. USNI News. https://news.usni.org/2025/06/21/u-s-strikes-3-iranian-nuclear-sites-using-b-2s-sub-launched-tomahawks. Accessed July 10, 2025.
^[6] Bharatpedia. 1962 Indian parliamentary resolution on China. https://en.bharatpedia.org/wiki/1962_Indian_parliamentary_resolution_on_China. Accessed July 23, 2025.
^[7] Nidhi Bahuguna. Sankalp Diwas: Resolve to reclaim Pak Occupied Jammu & Kashmir. Organiser. February 22, 2023. https://organiser.org/2023/02/22/113294/bharat/sankalp-diwas-resolve-to-reclaim-pak-occupied-jammu-kashmir/. Accessed July 23, 2025.
^[8] Michael C. Horowitz, Lauren A. Kahn, and Joshua A. Schwartz. What Drones Can—and Cannot—Do on the Battlefield. Foreign Affairs. July 04, 2025. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/what-drones-can-and-cannot-do-battlefield. Accessed July 10, 2025.
^[9] U.S. Air Force Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA). CRS PRODUCT (LIBRARY OF CONGRESS). January 22, 2025, https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12740. Accessed July 11, 2025.
^[10] Prasad Gore. Decoding the HAL CATS Program. Defence XP. February 6, 2021. https://www.defencexp.com/decoding-hal-cats-program/. Accessed July 11, 2025.
^[11] Ministry of Defence – Press Information Bureau (PIB). MINISTRY OF DEFENCE CONCLUDES EMERGENCY PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS WORTH NEARLY ₹2,000 CRORE TO ENHANCE COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY.
June 24 2025. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2139102. Accessed July 08, 2025.
^[12] Rimjhim Singh. 52 satellites for border, ocean watch: India ramps up defence surveillance. Business Standard. June 30, 2025. https://www.business-standard.com/external-affairs-defence-security/news/india-defence-satellites-sbs3-surveillance-isro-china-pakistan-iok-125063000690_1.html. Accessed July 10, 2025.