Tanks in the Ukrainian conflict: Chronology of a premature obituary

By: Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh

Most analysts want to talk about the demise of the tank. The prediction has been made earlier too, but has been proved wrong.

Some of the most striking images of the Ukrainian conflict have been the large number of Russian tanks that have been destroyed, abandoned or broken down. The toll seems to be horrific. Tanks have been the centrepiece of most militaries for decades, their domination has been paramount right since their inception in the battlefield of Somme in 1916. But now their centrality is being questioned. In fact, while condemning the brutality of the war in Ukraine, Pope Francis in an interview with the Italian newspaper, Corriere Della Sera, said Russians are discovering that their “tanks are useless”.

During the past few weeks, the internet has been flooded with videos of Russian tanks bursting into flames. The Ukrainian military is destroying tanks with a variety of weapons, including land mines, Stugna-P guided missiles, and shoulder-fired missiles like Javelins and NLAWs (next generation light armoured weapon). During the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict it was the unmanned Turkish drones that were inflicting the damage. The question is whether the conflict is proving that advances in guided missiles are making it much easier for combatants, even inexperienced volunteers, to destroy tanks and have Javelins become the iconic weapon of this war. Are we now at the ‘tipping point’?

Local residents pass by a damaged Russian tank in a town east of Kyiv. AP

The Javelin is a portable anti-tank missile system that can be carried and launched by a single person. With a range of 2,500m, it traces its target’s thermal picture and is useful against tanks because it can strike from the top. Javelin is a fire-and-forget missile with lock-on before launch and automatic self-guidance. The system takes a top-attack flight profile against armoured vehicles, attacking the usually thinner top armour, but can also make a direct attack, for use against buildings, targets too close for top attack. It is equipped with an imaging infrared seeker. The tandem warhead is fitted with two shaped charges: a precursor warhead to detonate any explosive reactive armour and a primary warhead to penetrate base armour. The Javelin was first deployed in 1996.

In this image released by Ukrainian Defense Ministry Press Service, Ukrainian soldiers use a launcher with US Javelin missiles during military exercises in Donetsk region, Ukraine, 23 December, 2021. AP

The NLAW is a man-portable, soft-launch, and confined-spaces system, allowing the missile to be fired from almost anywhere. The missile is first shot out of the launcher with a low-powered ignition system, after which its main rocket ignites and propels it to the target. Guidance uses a predicted line of sight (PLOS) system. For a moving target, the operator maintains tracking for at least 2-3 seconds, the software embedded in the missile’s INS system makes a record of the operator’s aiming movement, and computes the flight path which will intercept the target. After launch, the missile flies autonomously along the pre-programmed flight path, controlled by an inertial guidance system.

A Ukrainian Territorial Defence Forces member holds an NLAW anti-tank weapon, in the outskirts of Kyiv, Ukraine, 9 March, 2022. AP

Against tanks and other armoured vehicles, the overfly top attack (OTA) mode is used; the missile flies about one metre above the line of sight, detonating the warhead above the target’s weaker top armour via proximity fuse and magnetic sensors. It was inducted into service in 2009. The point is whether these two weapon systems of the US and the UK origin are so effective that they have rendered the tank ‘useless’.

In fact, there are images of Russian tanks fitted with a semi-cage-like canopy welded over the turret. This suggests an overall increase in its silhouette. Some analysts have labelled them ‘cope cages’ that cater to the psychological fear of tank crews to top attack threats as they felt the ERA panels needed to be augmented. However, data of their efficacy remains doubtful, particularly against the newer generation of anti-tank weapons which use thermal or optical homing and trigger the shaped charges.

A man rides his bicycle next to a destroyed Russian tank in Chernihiv, Ukraine, on 21 April, 2022. AP

The decision to fit these cages could be ascribed to combat experiences in Syria, and even Chechnya, where the anti-tank grenade launcher was aimed from windows of buildings onto tank turrets. There is, however, no doubt that the significant threat posed by handheld anti-tank weapons and loitering munitions means that any armoured vehicle entering the direct fire zone will need some form of active protection to survive.

Ironically, the tank versus anti-tank saga dates back to the appearance of tanks on the battlefield. The 106 mm Recoilless gun, ATGMs, attack helicopter, top-attack cluster munitions, anti-tank mines, drones and now the fire and forget top-attack ATGM and electronic warfare systems have all been developed and used to deter and destroy the tank. However, with its inherent firepower, mobility and protection and its flexibility in employment for both offensive and defensive tasks over varied terrain, there is no platform that has been able to replace it and there seems to be no replacement on the horizon. It will continue to remain the pre-eminent platform to determine the outcome of a conflict.

Most analysts want to talk about the demise of the tank. The prediction has been made earlier too, but has been proved wrong. There is also a Western narrative talking about the weakness in design of the Russian tank, particularly its ammunition stowage and auto-loader that leaves the crew vulnerable to a direct hit. In fact, the Washington Post ran an article on 30 April: “How a ‘jack in the box’ flaw dooms some Russian tanks.” It’s also a paradox that while the Ukrainians want more tanks they are being given anti-tank weapons. The truth is that there will always be a fierce rivalry between anti-tank weapons and tank protection; there is no doubt that improvements in the Active Protection System (APS) are taking place.

Mechanised forces due to their mobility, fire power and shock action pre-empt, dislocate and destroy/disrupt enemy forces by manoeuvre and tempo of execution of operations. They have the ability to paralyse the enemy physically and psychologically in an unparalleled manner impacting the will of the enemy.

Land warfare defence analyst Nicholas Drummond believes there are many factors to the failings and that, in fact, the tank is still crucial in warfare and can still be used successfully. “You need to support infantry with indirect fire, artillery, but also the direct firepower that tanks offer,” he said. “And that’s why they’re so important still. And that’s why infantry need them. And if you say tanks are obsolete, you are saying that all armoured vehicles are obsolete.”

“If we are not going to use tanks, how are we going to protect our troops?” he asked. He also said: “Most NATO armies learned long before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that tanks advancing without infantry, artillery and air support pay a heavy price for not following the combined arms manoeuvre playbook. Russia’s failure does not mean tanks are redundant.”

Russian tanks roll during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow, Russia, 9 May, 2022. AP

To seize and hold ground in the plains you need a tank. The most challenging phase of warfare is the attack: Seizing and holding contested territory. The penetration of enemy defences is difficult and dangerous. It invariably requires the shock effect and brute force that only armour supported by artillery can bring. It is for this reason that the tank has endured and will continue to remain a key component in any land conflict.

There are also the questionable tactics employed by the Russians. Most pictures reveal tanks lined up one behind the other, in what is referred to as ‘line ahead’ formations vis-à-vis spreading out into other tactical formations with adequate distances. Ironically, Tukhachevsky, the driving force behind the Soviet development of the theory of deep operations, talked about combined arms, a concept that was then applied by the Germans in World War II but is not evident in the present conflict.

Training of crews is also extremely important, there is a unique skill set required to operate armoured fighting vehicles and function in an integrated manner. It not only calls for professional competence of the highest order, but also the mindset to function in an environment that is both physically and mentally extremely demanding and challenging. Faulty tactics, training and motivation of the crew is a major factor as to why Russian armour performed sub-optimally.

As per an article in RUSI dated 27 April 2022 which talks on the technical aspects of Russians tanks in Ukraine: “The war in Ukraine does not reveal anything fundamentally new about the tank. It confirms old lessons and reflects the challenges of armoured warfare.”

The real lesson we need to draw is that the combined arms concept along with joint operations synergy will lead to force optimisation and is critical for success. To quote General Ashok Shivane, a former Director General, Mechanised Forces: “Tanks as mobile protected firepower platforms lead the spearheads of the combined arms team. The need is for an inclusive force structuring and integrated joint force application, not an exclusive parochial outlook. What makes combined arms manoeuvre potent is not the collective employment of multiple arms but the cumulative, integrated and complementary effect along with integrated logistics “.

While the tank is neither dead nor dying, it needs to prevail in the future battle spaces for which it needs to adapt. This is not only as far as mitigating its threats is concerned, but also with regards to its employment by ensuring increasing inclusivity with other platforms as a combined arms team.

The author is an army veteran. Views expressed are personal.