Syed Ata Hasnain | Kyiv counter-offensive: A possible last stand?

By: Syed Ata Hasnain

I usually get the maximum public response whenever I address issues of a pure military nature related to the ongoing war in Ukraine. That confirms how much military knowledge appeals to people, especially explanations of ongoing conflict situations. The last time I wrote on the military aspects of the Ukraine war it was about the first so-called “counter offensives” that Ukraine had launched on August 29, 2022. It’s important to understand why and when are counter-offensives launched. The “why” is easy to answer because it’s a question of gaining territory, such that your objectives lie deep in adversary territory; the destruction of maximum adversary forces is also the intent. “When” is a little more difficult to answer. These usually take place when sufficient forces are available at the onset of hostilities, but the initiative for initiation has been taken by the adversary, or have been generated and are reasonably well-equipped to carry the offensive to a logical conclusion. The situation on the battlefront is also important. Ideally, when the adversary is still unstable is the time to launch a counter-offensive after using deception to draw away forces from the intended objective area.

A counter-offensive always aims deep and is designed to unhinge the adversary’s defenses and force him to fight on the ground of your choosing. Quite dissimilar to a counter-offensive is a “riposte”. The scope and size of the operation is much more limited with the intent of targeting the bases from where the adversary’s offensives have emanated, thus forcing him to retract. From all indicators in the media reports that I read in September 2022, there wasn’t any counter- offensive that Ukraine launched; they were all “ripostes”. It’s not a question of splitting hairs over terminologies, but one cannot expect that with the available size of forces, their state of equipment and logistics, and the probable motivation and morale in both armies, there can be anything called a counter-offensive which if successful would have the scope to comprehensively defeat the other side.

The battle of Bakhmut fought over 10 months with “meat grinder” results was a positional defensive battle — something which has characterised conventional operations thus far. There has been very little mobile warfare, and now with the Russians having dug in and created defensive obstacles and systems, it’s going to be very difficult to get past these. In Bakhmut, both sides had large-scale casualties but the Russians mainly lost men from the Wagner group; their regulars may be comparatively intact. In terms of resources, it is reported that Ukraine has mustered nine brigades freshly trained from the West (Nato) and another six to eight brigades have been mustered from the forces in battle, making it a total of about 15 brigades; that is slightly less than two corps-size formations. With surprise and deception, fresh troops can have a decided advantage over fatigued ones, but it does not appear that the Ukrainians are optimally equipped and armed. Their re-mustered formations in particular would be the ones rotated frequently through the siege of Bakhmut.

How and where can the Ukrainian formations be applied? The bursting of the Nova Kakhovka dam has flooded about 500 sq. km. on both sides of the river. Therefore, an offensive into Kherson to cut off the Crimea from the mainland may not be possible any longer. It is the central sector which assumes importance, with thrusts possible from Zaporizhia to Melitopol, Berdyansk and Mariupol in the central portion of the northern coast of the Sea of Azov. Ukraine is trying to regain access to the Sea of Azov, splitting the occupying Russian forces in the region into two detached groupings. From the Russian angle, this area is also the most anticipated area for a riposte; the defensive posture hence will be strong and backed by lots of artillery and drones. Intelligence reports from the West indicate that Russia is fortifying almost the entire front line on Ukrainian territory, some 800 km long. These strips, according to media reports, consist of several lines of anti-tank trenches, barbed wire, obstacles and all sorts of fortified firing points.

An offensive from Ukraine towards Donetsk in the Donbas is already being reported. If all these areas have been addressed, then the Ukraine Army has spread itself thin in the hope of gains all along the front. However, it will run short of reserves for exploitation if an operational-strategic breakthrough is achieved at any of the points of application. Initial reports are revealing that some villages have been occupied across the dividing line, but it appears these may have been abandoned and perhaps not occupied, or only lightly occupied by the Russians with early warning elements. Once pitched battles begin the Russians will resort to large-scale employment of artillery, according to Russian doctrine. With the Russians well embedded in defensive positions, it is the Ukrainians who will suffer heavy casualties whether mounted in combat vehicles, marching or assaulting.

It is difficult to verify the competing claims by both sides. However, the delay in the launch of operations by Kyiv does signal that it preferred to optimise its forces rather than risk an early launch. The Russians may not simply resist and fight defensive battles; they could choose to bring some forces from the two flanks of the Ukrainian offensive. This could put the Ukrainians in a spot, but the feasibility of this happening is contingent upon the availability of reserves with the Russian Army. They could risk conducting their defensive battles with minimal strength and choose to go on offensives from the flanks, which too could be classified as ripostes. It does not seem possible that both sides have the means, especially the logistics, to slug it out endlessly. There will be tactical breaks in battle and lots of misreporting from the front lines. What is certain are two aspects. First, unless there is a quick breakthrough by the Ukrainians, success is likely to be elusive. Second, and more important, a failure by the Ukrainians is likely to result in the West getting convinced about the impossibility of the task and simply settling for what can be held militarily. For the Russians, successful resistance to the Ukrainian offensive operations is likely to bolster confidence, with all possibility of President Vladimir Putin looking at the reinforcement of whatever the Russians can gain for the moment. A few Russian ripostes would then be expected. The war does not seem to be heading towards an early end.

The writer, a retired lieutenant-general, is a former GOC of the Srinagar-based 15 (“Chinar”) Corps

ABOUT THE AUTHORSyed Ata Hasnain

Syed Ata Hasnain, a retired lieutenant-general, is a former commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps. He is also associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation and the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.