Sudan Conflict | As regional powers remain confused, paramilitary RSF knows it’s the closest opportunity to power

By: Gurjit Singh

The Rapid Support Forces in Sudan is an offshoot and conglomeration of the Janjaweed but more importantly it is from Darfur and therefore considered as rural hicks by the Khartoum elite

No sooner had External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar completed his successful tour of Africa, a challenge descended on the MEA, with a new crisis in Sudan. Upon his return, the minister was constrained to get the ministry to start yet another crisis management operation so that about 2,500 Indians in Sudan could be protected and if necessary evacuated.

Immediate efforts with the US, UK, UAE and Saudi Arabia to coordinate responses, assess the situation and their good offices to mount an expedition to evacuate Indians is underway. A suitable opportunity where a ceasefire will hold is the window in which this new operation will take place.

Why did this become necessary?

In 2019, Sudan’s long standing President Omar Bashir was ousted, a military Transitional Council took over but Sudan remained unstable. There were waves of pro-democracy agitators seeking civilian government A civilian-led government under Prime Minister Hamdok secured the confidence of many donors, saw the uplifting of sanctions and made efforts to make Sudan a normal country. However, perhaps the pace at which he was going was unacceptable to the army which then staged another coup in 2021 ousting Hamdok.

Today the same military is being challenged in a counter coup by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) which is a successor to the hardcore Janjaweed. Janjaweed – a Sudanese Arab militia group – had made Darfur and its adjoining areas a living hell in the first decade of this century. Since the Darfur crisis, the Janjaweed-turned RSF seek a place for themselves. The RSF wants a place equal to the military and equal rank for the leader Deputy President Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo.This has created the crisis which has led to renewed civil war in Khartoum.

Another area where the military led by Gen.Abdel Fattah-al-Burhan and the RSF differ is on the pace of return to civilian rule. As per an earlier roadmap, this should happen in 2023, which the army says it is ready to do. However, the RSF wants this delayed further and is not ready for a return to civilian rule, unless its own place in the structure is clearly established. It pretends to support the pro-civilian agitators. As a result, RSF has attacked the military, run amok in Khartoum, often attacking embassies as per local reports. However, when the coup occurred, most people were at home and embassies did not have many personnel in them. The raids on the embassies seem sporadic and seem to go by contiguity rather than country. The search seems to be for food, water and supplies rather than any other loot at present. The Indian Embassy also remains locked with all its personnel locked down in their homes.

Who is going to deal with this crisis?

The African Union has the unenviable task of calling for a ceasefire so that negotiations can be held. The problem is that the AU had suspended Sudan after the coup in 2021. Trying to intervene in a country already under suspension is another new challenge for the AU and its Peace and Security Council. The Arab League of whom Sudan is also a member is coordinating with the AU; both are perhaps equally unsure of what other steps they can take. The UN too seems to have no influence on the warring parties.

According to the principle of subsidiarity and recognising the role of the regional economic communities, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has decided to act in this matter. A three member presidential team which includes the new president of Kenya, William Ruto, the well established president of Djibouti Ismail Omar Guelleh, and the President of South Sudan Salva Kiir are seeking to talk to both sides and restore order and then undertake negotiations with the view to not derail the transition to civilian government completely. An unenviable task, since no planes can land at present.

The entire Horn of Africa area has competing interests from the Gulf countries and often reflects that competition in addition to its old rivalries. Egypt under General Sisi is close to the military government of Sudan, mainly because they wanted this government to be supportive of them, vis-à-vis Ethiopia with whom they differ on the issue of the Nile waters and the GERD. During the Tigray crisis, Sudan had been not friendly to Ethiopia and used the Civil War to address its own claims on the border lands. Eritrea on the other hand, which had a say in how the Tigray civil war in Ethiopia turned out, have been closer to the RSF from earlier times. Eritrean links to the RSF is of advantage to the UAE because of their close links to Eritrea for wider issues in the Horn, and in Yemen where RSF sent soldiers. Therefore, on the macro level, it appears that Egypt is backing the army and the UAE and Eritrea are backing the RSF. Ethiopia, a large country on the border, seems to be taking a quieter road.

The people of Sudan were eagerly awaiting transition to civilian rule, which was expected on 11 April. On 7 April, several people were injured when they agitated against the continuation of military rule, as there were signs that this transition would be delayed. Four years before on the same day Omar Al Bashir had been overthrown from the post of president.

On 11 April, civilian groups were further disillusioned when the military regime ignored the timeline for a transition to civilian rule. The main disagreement was on reforms of the security apparatus. The military and the RSF were the culprits since they could not agree on how to integrate the rapid support forces into the army.

On 13th April, the army warned the RSF against mobilising its cadres in cities across Sudan, and not only in Khartoum.

By 17 April, the clashes between the RSF and the military had begun.

Most countries interested in Sudan were left rotating like a weather vane, not knowing really which side to support, because the solutions do not seem clear. One of the essential problems is that traditionally Sudan has been governed by Khartoum lead elites of which the military is a part. The RSF are essentially from Darfur, the distant place where the first genocide of the 21st century took place, of which the RSF/Janjaweed were the main perpetrators. The RSF is an offshoot and conglomeration of the Janjaweed but more importantly it is from Darfur and therefore considered as rural hicks by the Khartoum elite. This creates fissures for any agreement to work together. Now that the RSF has tasted a sense of power, they do not want to let it go, not knowing when they would be so close to it again.

The author is a former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia ASEAN and the African Union. He tweets @AmbGurjitSingh. Views expressed are personal.

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