Pak continues with its ‘Great Game’ in Afghanistan
- April 17, 2023
- Posted by: admin
- Categories: Afghanistan, Pakistan
Unfortunately, despite undeniable evidence of Rawalpindi-IS-K links, Washington appears to have swallowed the IS-K bait offered by the Pakistan army, hook, line and sinker.
THE PAST
When the Taliban seized Kabul in 2021, the then Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan declared that the people of Afghanistan had “broken the chains of slavery in the country”. His exuberance was understandable—for nearly a decade, Rawalpindi had invested heavily in the Taliban. Rawalpindi not only hosted the Taliban but also provided them with weapons and other warlike stores to fight the US-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, while masquerading as the United States’ most faithful ally in its “global war on terror”.
Rawalpindi succeeded in pulling off its strategy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds more because of Washington’s indifference rather than its own ability to keep this treachery under wraps. It is common knowledge that under pressure after the US’ post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan, Taliban founder and supreme leader Mullah Omar relocated the terrorist group’s leadership to Quetta in 2002, which thus got the “Quetta shura” [consultative council] moniker and its existence was well known to all.
Surprisingly, Washington took no notice of Rawalpindi’s humongous deceit and instead continued to humour Islamabad by continuing to provide it with military aid and funds. In 2016, Sartaj Aziz, who was adviser to Pakistan’s Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs, disclosed that Islamabad was hosting the Taliban, proudly claiming that “We have some influence over them because their leadership is in Pakistan and they get some medical facilities.” The irony is that even though Aziz made this statement on American soil, yet [once again], neither Washington nor the Pentagon took any notice of his damning revelation.
God [and Taliban’s Quetta shura] alone knows how many members of the US-led coalition force in Afghanistan have been killed or maimed during Taliban attacks planned by the Quetta shura and executed with weapons and munitions supplied to its fighters by the Pakistan army that could well have been procured from the grey market using funds provided by the US. While Washington’s stoic silence on Rawalpindi’s perfidy that took a heavy toll of human lives is appalling, President Donald J. Trump deserves due credit for having the gumption to call a spade a spade.
Readers may recall that on 2018 New Year Day, Trump had tweeted, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” However, Rawalpindi refused to take this explicit warning coming from the President of the US seriously and instead continued to patronise its “strategic asset”.
Six weeks before the Taliban seized Kabul, Pakistan’s Home Minister Sheikh Rashid not only admitted that Taliban families were living in suburbs of the capital city of Islamabad but even revealed that “Sometimes, the bodies of their soldiers are brought to the hospitals, and sometimes they come here for treatment.” The very thought of injured Taliban fighters returning to the battlefield after being treated in Pakistani hospitals and attacking coalition forces, though particularly galling, is a distinct possibility.
THE PRESENT
It was generally believed that with its protégés in the seat of power across the Durand Line, the decade old Afghanistan saga would end happily for Rawalpindi. However, this was not to be, and relations between Taliban and its benefactor aren’t as cordial as was largely expected—the root cause being continuing attacks by Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan [TTP] against Pakistani security forces, law enforcement agencies as well as civilians. Islamabad alleges that TTP is operating from Afghanistan, a charge that Kabul vehemently denies.
As TTP played a crucial role by fighting alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, a strong bond exists between the two. This is why despite Islamabad’s vociferous protestation, the Taliban still released TTP fighters jailed by the previous regimes. However, Pakistan’s own dealing with TTP in itself has been [to say the least], extremely suspicious. Right from agreeing to a ceasefire declared by TTP to entering into negotiations with this group despite the fact that it is responsible for killing nearly 150 students and staff members of Peshawar’s Army Public School in 2014, to dismissing burgeoning presence of TTP fighters in areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as “grossly exaggerated and misleading”, Rawalpindi’s soft pedalling is puzzling.
Why did Pakistan Army’s General Headquarters [GHQ] look the other way and thereby allow TTP to re-establish itself on Pakistani soil and emerge as a menacing force is really perplexing as it is tantamount to complicity. Some may consider this suggestion a bit too far-fetched, but then Pakistan army has a history of doing the unimaginable, and abandoning dead bodies of its soldiers killed in the 1999 Kargil War just to buttress its falsehood that the intruders were Kashmiri “freedom fighters” and not military personnel, is a case in point. Surprisingly, GHQ’s sinister game plan of resurrecting TTP has already started paying dividends.
From being a sponsor of terrorism, Pakistan is once again being looked upon as its hapless “victim”. During his Pakistan visit in December last year, US Central Command [CENTCOM] commander, General Michael E. Kurilla said, “We are concerned by the threats posed by Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan to Pakistani security and stability. During my visit to the GHQ, we discussed opportunities to address this threat.”
This assurance indicates a turning point in US-Pakistan relations and holds the promise of another joint war on terror, which in turn translates into an influx of military and financial aid from the US—something that Pakistan desperately needs today.
THE FUTURE
Being an old hand in the subterfuge game, Rawalpindi has wisely decided against putting all its eggs in the TTP “basket” by covertly sponsoring Islamic State Khorasan [IS-K] terrorist group in Afghanistan. This gives it two advantages: firstly, since IS and the ruling Taliban are sworn enemies engaged in a bloody turf war in Afghanistan, Rawalpindi can effectively use IS to put pressure on Kabul.
Secondly, since TTP has no pan-Islamic ambitions, GHQ knows that while the TTP bogey may evince international interest, it most certainly won’t serve as a “cash-cow”. On the other hand, any potential IS threat will find several serious takers and due to its location, this would once again make Pakistan an “indispensable” ally in the “war on terror” and attract aid and funding.
Hence, Kabul’s accusation that the Pakistan army is using IS-K for the targeted killing of Taliban leaders is definitely plausible. Furthermore, by leaking its defence ministry’s secret memo giving out specific location of IS-K training camps on Pakistan soil along with details of terrorists being trained there, the Taliban has explicitly exposed Rawalpindi’s dirty game.
A former IS-K founding member, Sheikh Abdul Rahim Muslimdost, who defected to the Afghan Taliban recently, disclosed that besides IS central from Syria, Pakistan too was funding this terrorist group and in 2015 the Pakistan-based terrorist group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba fighting in Kashmir has given Rs 50 lakh to IS-K.
Some may contend that the allegations of the Pakistan army sponsoring IS-K made by Kabul and the renegade IS-K leader could well be motivated and this argument certainly has merit. However, a report titled “The Islamic State-Khorasan: Capacities and Future Prospects”, posted on the Government of Canada’s official website [https://www.canada.ca/en.html] reveals that: “Some sources within the Taliban allege that the IS-K [sic] pays cash to the Haqqani Network for its support, including help in organising terrorist attacks in Kabul.”
“The IS-K’s military council signalled a major shift in its geopolitical positioning when it selected Aslam Faruqi (nom de guerre) as its governor in May 2017. Faruqi was an advocate of appeasement with Pakistan, in exchange for being granted a safe haven by the Pakistani authorities.”
“Undoubtedly, the relationship with the Pakistani authorities has allowed the IS-K to become more resilient.”
“Since May 2017, the IS-K has carried out only occasional attacks in Pakistan, usually against non-state targets, and there have been a few small waves of repression by security agencies against the IS-K as well. This suggests that either both sides constantly are trying to renegotiate the terms of the agreement or that its implementation is a matter of dispute.”
“… the IS-K has been able to move its main base from Afghan territory, where it was vulnerable to US air strikes, to the Tirah Valley in the tribal areas of Pakistan. It is also able to maintain several training camps in various locations throughout the tribal areas.”
“The understanding reached with Pakistan means that the IS-K is only really militarily active in Afghanistan.”
Unfortunately, despite undeniable evidence of Rawalpindi-IS-K links, Washington appears to have swallowed the IS-K bait offered by the Pakistan army, hook, line and sinker. This is evident from US CENTCOM chief Gen Kurilla’s statement made during the recent US Senate Armed Forces Committee Hearing, of how IS-K “can do an external operation against US or Western interests abroad in under six months, with little to no warning.”
The stage thus seems set for another joint war on terror against IS-K by the US and Pakistan. Rawalpindi continues to play the “great game” in Afghanistan with remarkable finesse by claiming to be targeting terrorists of “all colour and hue,” while providing safe havens to IS-K terrorists. And with Washington being conned yet once again, isn’t it time for the US to revisit President Abraham Lincoln’s view that “you cannot fool all of the people all of the time”?
Col Nilesh Kunwar (Veteran) is a former Indian Army officer.