Opinion: We rooted out militancy from Jammu in 2009. So why is it back again?
- August 14, 2024
- Posted by: Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
- Categories: India, Jammu & Kashmir
Pakistan began its proxy war campaign in Kashmir in 1989 and gradually felt the need to spread militancy and terrorism to Jammu to spread the Indian forces thin and motivate the Muslim population of this region to lend a shoulder.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)
None of what is happening in Jammu can be easily understood. A chain of terrorist attacks over the last two months in particular (and in the past two years in general) have seen the shift of focus of Pakistan’s proxy war from the Kashmir Valley to a zone in Jammu. This zone extends from Poonch to Kathua and runs along the mountain tracts of the Pir Panjal South to the Kishtwar range, and steps across towards the Shivaliks, northeast of Kathua.
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The likely purpose of the Pakistani deep state executing sponsored terror attacks in Jammu is to revive terrorism and antipathy against the Indian state in Kashmir. Pakistan began its proxy war campaign in Kashmir in 1989 and gradually felt the need to spread militancy and terrorism to Jammu to spread the Indian forces thin and motivate the Muslim population of this region to lend a shoulder.
However, it couldn’t sustain the campaign in Jammu with the same intensity as Kashmir. While there was no dearth of means and resources, popular support was low. The Pir Panjal range, with its heights, rocky terrain, and thick jungles helped create hideouts. Recall the Hilkaka area above Surankot where a huge operation by seven battalions was carried out in mid-2003, neutralising a large number of terrorists in Operation Sarp Vinash.
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Why Jammu and why now?
High-end militancy and terror lasted in the Jammu division from 1994 to about 2009. The Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990, was notified for the region only in 2001–11 years after Kashmir. Additional Army formations were brought and deployed here but de-inducted after peace was largely restored by 2009. Something that helped combat terror back then was the liberal arming of village defence committees, especially those in remote areas where the Army’s reach was limited.
But all these measures diluted over time as threats waned. So, when infiltration increased in Kashmir, three units of the Rashtriya Rifles were moved from here to the Valley in 2008. As an independent brigade under my command in Kashmir was moved out to Ladakh, I put up my hands in despair. Another RR unit was moved to the Valley in 2012 as a stopgap refill. In 2020, when the Chinese upped the ante at the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh, an RR Force HQ with two Sectors moved again — from Reasi to the new threat area.
Each time the Counter Terrorism (CT) grid was diluted, it eroded the intelligence grid and the integration achieved with the local people, the Line of Control formations, and the civil administration. It takes time to establish an effective grid with all these ingredients but moments to dismantle everything as units and formations move on.
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Was there anyone to blame for all this? None, whatsoever. Grids are always dynamic and resources in terms of troops are always at a premium. The Kashmir CT grid progressively strengthened while the one in Jammu got weaker. The latter became easier to infiltrate through. What made this region more lucrative to deep state-backed proxies was its distance from the IB and the LoC, with potential areas for terrorists to strike being shorter.
To understand how Jammu emerged as a “no war, no peace” zone, just remember a few things: The Kashmir Counter Insurgency (CI)/Counter Terrorism (CT) grid is much stronger and deeper. It’s much more difficult to infiltrate and strike in lucrative areas like Baramulla, Sopore, or Badgam. Secondly, Operation All Out launched in 2017 has reduced the strength of terrorists and neutralised much of the organisational infrastructure which oversaw domains such as terror financing, construction of safe houses, onboarding of local media, and a legal system for detained overground workers and terrorists.
The recent operations in Kulgam demonstrate how terrorists tend to spend longer at specific hideouts/safe houses when there is a shortage of these. Intelligence sources then have a field day in terms of ease of pick-ups and response by CT forces.
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An important issue was always the functioning of the Special Operations Group of the Jammu and Kashmir Police. In Kashmir, the integration with the RR had a longer history. In Jammu as well, a strong working relationship developed between the Army and the SOG. However, it did not go the Kashmir way due to the early dilution of the effectiveness of the CT and intelligence grids.
Pakistan has, of course, analysed the situation and understood that shifting focus to the Jammu division will force the redeployment of military resources from Kashmir. The resultant voids could then be exploited through the revival of militancy, separatism, and terrorism in the Valley. The ultimate aim is to spell alternative narratives in Jammu and Kashmir to the one on integration that forms the core of the Indian narrative after 2019.
What can be done?
India has been in the “no war, no peace” stance long enough to know that adversaries work overtime to turn situations around. No one has been caught napping. It’s just that our resources are stretched. Our casualties can be chalked up to basic tactical faults, which need quick rectification. Intelligence needs refurbishing with SOG and the RR looking at each other’s strengths. Terror networks in Jammu need to be as effectively neutralised, just like in Kashmir. Unit drills and sub-tactical operations need to be looked at for inherent faults. Movement of convoys, the first two minutes of contact with terrorists, large-scale operations to disturb the terrorist logistics, etc should all be revisited — along the lines of Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003. All recent operations must be mapped and analysed for lessons, to be widely shared.
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Terrorists live off the people. Therefore, a sound relationship with the people has to be established. It has always existed but needs reiteration. That is where the media can help, and the political community can play a legitimate role in developing a counter even more effectively than the army or police.
A question that’s often asked is: can we have the Assembly elections in September or even by the end of the year? From a messaging and national psyche angle, I would endorse going ahead. Additional troops are getting deployed and the grid will gain efficiency by the day. We do not have to await ideal conditions — in fact, the elections will themselves contribute to better conditions. In 2002, despite 1,650 incidents of terrorism, we efficiently conducted the Assembly election. Let us take inspiration from the past.
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The army and the police have always enjoyed a superb relationship. We need to draw advantage from this as much as we have done in the Valley. Lastly, we need to remember that one cannot suddenly switch focus from the Valley to Jammu. A balance has to remain. If strength has to be made up in voids in Jammu, then units need to be orientated to this environment; effectiveness comes if they are better trained.
Overall, I would argue that this is just a temporary setback. The security environment changed drastically for the better in Kashmir, but we may not have covered our flank as adequately as needed, due to the multiplicity of threats. Counter-terror situations mostly remain dynamic, especially if proxy interference is the norm by an adversary. In our case, we can never rest on our laurels because of the nature of our adversaries. The situation is already under retrieval. We have done this before on too many occasions. We will do it again, now and in the future.
(Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd) is the former General Officer Commanding of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps of the Indian Army. He is a prolific writer on all military matters, with a special focus on hybrid war, terrorism, Pakistan, China, and internal security. A graduate of Delhi’s St. Stephen’s College, he did his post-graduation from King’s College, London. Currently, he is the Chancellor of the Central University of Kashmir and a Member of the National Disaster Management Authority)
(Views expressed in this opinion piece are those of the author)