General Ata Hasnain decodes the impact of Xi Jinping skipping G20 summit in Delhi

Gen Hasnain opined that China will still be represented by no less than its PM; it will say what it has to and object to the very same issues but all that happening with Xi’s presence would have sent a different message

Written By: Neha Bhan

After weeks of speculation, China has finally confirmed that President Xi Jinping will not attend the G20 summit scheduled to begin on September 9 in New Delhi, India. Instead, China will be represented by Premier Li Qiang. As the current president of the G20 summit, India is hosting this annual gathering of the influential group on September 9 and 10.

Xi’s decision to skip the G20 summit holds significance, as the Chinese president has never missed a G20 summit until now. It also coincides with the ongoing tensions between India and China at the LAC. In light of this context, News9 spoke to Lt Gen Ata Hasnain to understand why Xi did not attend the meeting and its potential impact on the relations between the two countries.

General, what do you make out of Xi skipping the G20 summit? Can it simply be seen as a petty attempt to derail India’s triumph on the world stage with a successful G20 summit?

It is deliberate of course. I do think most of us did not expect him to come to India for the G20 Summit. His policy towards India has been one of utter confusion and a very marked lack of ‘thinking through’. I continue to go by my old assessment that China is unsure whether India is a friend, competitor, adversary or partner.

China perceives that by resolving the disputed boundaries with India, it will open up options for India to aspire for much more. That is why it likes to keep everything in the grey zone. In the backdrop of this policy, one cannot see Xi Jinping giving PM Narendra Modi any strategic advantage by contributing to the success of the G20 meeting.

I am sure most nations will term this petty-mindedness. With attempted cartographic invasion through the publishing of maps showing Indian territories as belonging to China, that too just a few days before the Summit, one should not have expected more. What Mr Xi’s advisors probably did not tell him is that ‘surprise’ remains a prime principle of war. He could have won accolades for himself and displayed a sense of maturity had he decided to come, and surprise everyone. China will still be represented by no less than its PM; it will say what it has to and object to the very same issues but all that happening with Xi’s presence would have sent a different message.

What does it mean for India-China relations and most importantly for the LAC standoff? Does it not show that China is not serious about resolving the long-standing issue?

China has never been serious about resolving the LAC issue. As per Article 10 of the 1996 border agreement, both sides agreed to the exchange of maps to help clarify the alignment of the LAC. 2002 was the last time any attempt at the exchange of maps was made. Thereafter there have only been attempts at what is commonly referred to as ‘salami slicing’.

Most strategic analysts agree that China prefers to keep all this ambiguous so that India is forced to give higher priority to her continental borders in the north as against the zones of maritime interest in the Indian Ocean, through which China’s vulnerable sea lines of communication (SLsOC) run. These SLsOC are China’s economic lifeline, transporting tons of energy to the manufacturing zones on the East Coast in the Shenzen area. They also carry thousands of containers of finished goods to trading destinations

By removing threats to our northern borders China fears that it would give India far too much leeway and flexibility which could affect Chinese maritime interests. The LAC-related issues therefore help to keep the Sino-Indian standoff in a state of activation and give India fewer options.

You have previously written about China’s confused foreign policy approach to India. How should New Delhi react to this hot and cold approach in the long term? What can India realistically hope for in its engagements with China?

Neither has India ever sought war nor is it in its interest either. The paradox is that China too cannot be certain that it can achieve anything against India by going to war. The factor of winnability of wars remains unpredictable; especially now, after Ukraine. China believes that this grey zone approach is to its advantage as it creates a dilemma for India regarding the strategy that it should follow. We in India also believe the same about China.

India must ensure that its deployments of troops and surveillance capabilities must discount any further transgressions of the PLA. A quid pro quo (QPQ) strategy must always be ready for all sectors should any of our territory be transgressed. Beyond this, our negotiations must continue as much as our overall military modernisation, including space and nuclear programs. The asymmetry that we have allowed to develop between the military capabilities of both nations must be reduced as much as possible. It should be clear that if pushed against the wall India has the will to secure its interests and the international community by and large would back it.

India should aim to develop comprehensively and close the development gap as much as it can over the next few years. Through its engagements with China, it should be made clear that the two countries can mutually benefit to a great extent through technical cooperation.

China aside, should India see Moscow’s rumoured coordination with Beijing in regard to skipping out on G20 as a concerning sign for its bilateral ties with Russia?

Russia has been India’s steadfast friend for long. As a result of the dynamics of the emerging world order after the Coronavirus pandemic, Russia has been largely isolated from the mainstream and the sanctions are affecting it too. India’s support through the purchase of energy from Russia has helped stabilise the Russian economy. President Putin’s potential absence from the Summit was expected, as he did not attend the last G20 Summit in Bali or the BRICS Summit in South Africa. He may not have come due to fear of a coup de tat in Moscow, in his absence. Yevgeny Prigozhin’s death has raised a spectre of fear in Russia.

The Russians would like to cooperate as much as possible with China. They know that India is walking a fine line and does not have much scope for flexibility. The presence of Putin in New Delhi without the presence of Xi Jinping would not have the desired effect either and Russia would be isolated. India should pursue its relations independently with both nations. They are all partners in SCO, RIC and BRICS where group and mutual interests can both be discussed and progressed separately.

It is a difficult call for India to maintain its strategic autonomy with the pulls and pressures from the US, and the Sino-Russian combine. It has thus far done so, quite adroitly. Russian military equipment and spares plus ammunition for India is still a criticality and we can ill afford to cut Russia out of our supply chains. The relationship must therefore rest on an even keel.