Gaza gameplan depends on unique factors

Fighting in densely built areas like Gaza calls for specific considerations. The asymmetry in military capability Israel enjoyed over Palestinians would not be at play.

By Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

The ongoing Israel-Hamas standoff is unpredictably stuck in the domain of military progression. By now, the world would have expected an Israeli blitzkrieg into Gaza and anywhere else from where threats emanated towards Israel. The Israel Defence Force (IDF) is yet to make up its mind on assessing the threats, its own capability to fight through Gaza and win, and what nature of victory over Hamas to look for. In addition, there is the whole issue of the 220-plus hostages to resolve. Geopolitical movement in West Asia is also frozen because much would depend on the manner in which military operations proceed.

Victory or defeat, without defining what they exactly mean in this context, would decide the eventual balance; we are nowhere near any such situation and are unlikely to be for quite some time. So, it is the progress and outcome of military operations which will create trigger points for all other activities. This is what needs more analysis because it is the domain least known publicly.

Israel commenced a campaign of indiscriminate bombing, though it claimed surgical air strikes on Hamas command centres, missile sites and logistics locations. Hamas had been smart and for long had housed all these in the basements of multi-storied buildings or in tunnels underground. Israel is not wrong when it says it is striking the war-waging facilities, but all these strikes are having greater collateral effects than affecting the actual targets. High-rise buildings are being reduced to rubble with no assurance that the Hamas facility targeted has actually been destroyed.

Any soldier who knows the concept of fighting in built areas (FIBUA) will vouch that it is the last form of warfare he would like to be involved in. In the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965, the Indian army, in the famous September 1 counteroffensive, reached the outskirts of Lahore with the Bata factory in sight. The leadership correctly opted to stop. FIBUA in Lahore would have been suicidal. It was the same in Jaffna in October 1987 but we did not have options then. FIBUA there cost us over 500 lives, with scores more wounded. Jaffna was not even half as densely built up as Gaza is. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam had its ammunition and landmines factories within and defended to the teeth. Hamas would not be any less.

So, is the IDF stalling a potential offensive into Gaza, an offensive that the political leadership has been talking about so vociferously and Joe Biden has been advising against? The IDF is used to functioning in an environment of serious existential challenges. However, the asymmetry it enjoyed in military capability and craftsmanship over all Arab armies and the Palestinians no longer exists. The hubris and confidence which existed in the mind also got neutralised by the Hamas strikes on October 7.

We need to recall that almost 1,300 Israelis and other citizens died in that rehearsed and remorseless strike. If that operation for conflict initiation took six months of preparation as has been assessed by some, then it seems obvious that Hamas may have also visualised the Israeli response on being surprised—a quick-fire entry into Gaza with all the conventional and modern means of warfighting. Hamas would be prepared with an advantage apart from having the 220-odd hostages. With the announcement of the deaths of 20 hostages due to Israeli shelling and bombing, Hamas would try and regain the moral high ground, something actually non-existent thus far in a war that has simply no ethics to speak of.

The IDF has announced a three-phase operation but it appears more like a concept paper than an operational plan. Phase 1 is all about airstrikes and some ground manoeuvres to destroy operatives and damage infrastructure to destroy Hamas. Phase 2 is to be of operations of reducing intensity while eliminating the remaining pockets of resistance. Phase 3 will be more of a mop-up operation, what in the Indian army we call reorganisation. The last phase will involve withdrawal so as to remove Israeli responsibility for the administration of Gaza. The concept of operations is a broad-brush operational instruction, leaving enough to be interpreted by those who have to execute it.

The initial gung-ho approach of getting North Gaza vacated and commencing a multi-pronged offensive with armour leading across a narrow frontage and the coastline providing flank security appears to be in doubt, though the shelling continues. Movement through the Gaza built-up area will create severe disadvantages for the IDF; it is difficult to assess how Hamas has prepared for this. At a guess, many strong points firing at short distances will exist and these would be equipped with all kinds of weapons possible, including short-range anti-tank weapons and drones.

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With the Israeli body count at 1,300 and rising, the disadvantage Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu suffers is that he cannot afford to sanction a military operation which will cause even more casualties for the IDF. Only an unconventional riposte with a low scope for casualties will be acceptable, but this won’t guarantee any outcomes of advantage.

If it is true that most of the advice to and planning of Hamas operations is ISIS-initiated, then it is unlikely that Iran will do more than just pay lip service in support for the sake of demonstrating competitive Islamic leadership. While it’s true that sectarian sentiments sometimes do not come in the way of Islamic unity, it is also a fact that ISIS involvement will not be tolerated by Iran, Syria, Iraq or entities such as Hezbollah. The northern border operations could thus be only demonstration.

Although indications have been given that Phase 2 has already commenced, there is a shrouded approach underway and the Israeli leadership is under pressure not to exert across the border beyond a level. With negotiations and third-party involvement, hostages could progressively get released. Israel will then perhaps rely on covert operations to take out the current Hamas leadership in Gaza or anywhere else. Conflict termination remains a challenge and the war could end up as interminable as the war in Ukraine. Geopolitics can only be assessed with the outcomes of all the analyses spelt out here.

(Views are personal.)

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (Retd)

Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps. Now Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir

(atahasnain@gmail.com)