China’s message to FS Vikram Misri—deepen thaw & stay away from Trump

China appears impatient and sensitive to the prospect that India might have the appetite for only a shallow thaw that could be easily reversed or adjusted.
Sidharth Raimedhi

Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s recent China visit projects growing normalcy in India-China relations amid an ongoing political thaw since the 21 October agreement. However, lurking behind the visit is a new signal from Beijing to New Delhi: Take steps to deepen the thaw and do not revert to an opportunistic balancing game between China and Trump’s America.

The subtle warning is based on Beijing’s anxieties related to Trump 2.0 and its evolving reading of India as a power with fewer bargaining chips. Notably, the visit has also followed the eruption of a slew of ‘irritants’ testing the thaw in recent months.

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From the Indian perspective, these include:

1. Reports of continuing ‘breakneck’ strategic infrastructure construction in sensitive areas such as Pangong Tso, Depsang, and Yangtse in the Eastern sector. This defies India’s expectation of disengagement gradually leading to de-escalation and de-induction.
2. Serious security and environmental concerns in India following China’s unilateral declaration to begin construction of a mega-dam near the Indian border.
3. China’s recent announcement to establish two new administrative counties in Aksai Chin, an area claimed by India but controlled by China. This has sparked anticipation of greater consolidation, increased funding, and the development of border villages in the region.
4. Reports of disruptions in Indian high-tech supply chains owing to fresh export controls imposed by Beijing. This casts doubt on Indian hopes of the thaw resulting in improved economic ties and dividends.

From the Chinese perspective, the irritants include:

1. India’s decision to discuss its concerns over the mega-dam with outgoing NSA Jake Sullivan in December 2024.
2. India’s enthusiastic participation in the Quad Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Washington DC following Trump’s inauguration.

China senses opportunity

Misri’s visit occurred during a very sensitive period, throwing up signs that China is expressing its ‘impatience’ toward India’s hesitant approach to the ongoing political thaw in relations. Beijing seems to have perceived a key opportunity to establish a more lasting foundation for cooperation with India, thereby preventing it from resorting (or reverting) to stronger ties with Trump’s America. The US president’s first term in office, after all, saw great cooperation and progress in ties.

“Interactions and cooperation between countries should be based on equality and mutual benefit, which requires India to treat its neighbor with a pragmatic, positive and responsible attitude, instead of an opportunistic diplomatic approach of ‘talking to China when needed, while suppressing China on other occasions’,” wrote a Chinese analyst.

Hu Zhiyong, a professor from the Zhejiang International Studies University, put it more bluntly: “The Indian side needs to make efforts to respond with more goodwill.”

Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi’s remarks to Misri, emphasising the need to avoid mutual suspicion, alienation, and depletion, allude to the same concern. Notably, the above-stated mutuals differ in emphasis from the three mutuals laid down by Indian external affairs minister S Jaishankar as the basis of improved India-China relations: respect, sensitivity, and interest.

Beijing’s confidence is even more notable, given that India has chosen to emphasise positive aspects of the relationship despite having strong reasons to be dissatisfied with China’s actions, especially at the LAC. The official readouts following Misri’s visit avoided any mention of the LAC or future plans toward full de-escalation and de-induction. Clearly, China wants India to opt out of both security competition as well as meaningful strategic partnerships and adopt a much lower profile.

Given this backdrop, the Indian strategic community has become more sceptical of the ongoing thaw in relations. This concern is arguably only deepened by the growing tendency of Chinese analysts to blame Indian think tanks for colouring India-China relations negatively.

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An impatient neighbour

Based on a comparative reading of the statements made by the two sides, the Indian Express rightly noted that “Delhi’s statement is more nuanced and cautious, while Beijing has a more optimistic assessment of the talks.” For reasons pertaining to India’s core foreign policy doctrines (read strategic autonomy), it is understandably focused on slow and cautious improvements. Maintaining options and leverages, after all, has been a core axiom of Indian foreign policy since Independence.

China appears impatient and sensitive to the prospect that India might have the appetite for only a shallow thaw that could be easily reversed or adjusted based on changing circumstances.

Importantly, Chinese analysts now view the India-US strategic relationship as one that has been floundering, leading to Indian doubts about its utility in balancing asymmetries vis-à-vis China. If this is true, the Trump administration’s seeming unpredictability can hardly reassure the Indian strategic elite.

This analysis, combined with an uncharitable assessment of India’s present economic and military state of affairs, has led China to believe that it can gradually nudge New Delhi toward a fundamental reset in its foreign ties. However, such unbridled hopes could be dangerous. They could lead Beijing toward an increasingly impatient and intransigent approach to India’s relations with strategic partners.

Beijing is also signalling that it will not respond positively if India chooses to cooperate with the Trump administration in “ganging up against China”. The ongoing thaw in relations now appears burdened by China’s over-expectations, which does not suit India’s interests. Notably, despite the pressure, New Delhi has not indicated that it will go along with Beijing’s view of how relations should advance.

India’s statements from the visit have been careful, measured, and matter-of-fact. It will likely hold on to its ability to leverage relations with other powers in order to get better terms from China.

The US has historically struggled to have a strong influence on Indian foreign policy choices (mostly in relation to Russia). There are good reasons to believe that China, despite its present optimism, may also witness a similar uphill (and largely unsuccessful) battle. Even as India may not seek strong China-focused cooperation with the Trump administration in the coming years, it will be reluctant to allow Beijing a veto over its foreign policy choices.

In this context, it is worth recalling Jaishankar’s analysis in February 2024. Warning against Beijing’s ‘mind games’ toward keeping India-China relations strictly bilateral, he said, “If there are other factors out there in the world which can be harnessed by me to get better terms on an equilibrium, then why should I forgo that right?”

A more sober analysis would suggest to China that it needs to appreciate the growing trend toward normalisation of ties with India and accept the development for what it is—not what it could turn into. This is all the more pertinent, given the Indian Army Chief’s statement that a “degree of standoff” still remains at the LAC.

Sidharth Raimedhi is a Fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defense Research (CSDR), a New Delhi-based think tank. He tweets @SRaimedhi.