Azerbaijan’s capture of Nagorno-Karabakh opens up challenges for India in the South Caucasus

As India refigures its foreign policy to a region now changed by Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, it almost certainly will have to seek out other, more stable avenues for its infrastructure ties given the potential of the INSTC project

BY: Maj Gen Jagatbir Singh

Wile the latest round of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, the long-disputed Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan, seems to have been over within hours of it having started ending with the Armenian population leaving their homeland, the reverberations will continue to resound. They had earlier faced a humanitarian catastrophe with the blocking of the Lachin Corridor.

The quick end can be attributed to a large degree by the unwillingness of Russia to get involved as it seems totally preoccupied by its commitments in Ukraine. However, the next fault line that seems to be emerging is Nakchivan, an enclave of Azerbaijan between Iran, Armenia and Turkey. Azerbaijan is demanding that Yerevan agree to the establishment of a corridor through Armenian territory that would connect Azerbaijan to Nakhchivan.ADVERTISEMENT

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The South Caucasus region which lies between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea comprising of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan has been the region which has been the crossroads of the Persian, Ottoman and Tsarist empires as also the intersection between the Christianity and Islam.

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This land connects Asia to Eurasia apart from its significant natural resources. The conflict and emerging outcomes have both global and regional implications. Countries such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and Israel also have deep interests in this region, but it is also significant as far as India is concerned.

India’s broad engagement in the region

India does not have a publicly articulated policy for the South Caucasus — unlike “Neighbourhood First”, “Act East” or “Central Asia Connect”. However, since establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, India’s ties with Armenia have steadily grown. India has a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with Armenia which was signed in 1995 further, the signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2019 has resulted in increased cooperation in trade, investment, defence and culture. Though, India’s provision of military assistance to Armenia has strained its relationship with Azerbaijan, Armenia extends its unequivocal support to India on Kashmir issue whereas Azerbaijan not only opposes but also promotes Pakistan’s narrative.You May LikePrepone Your Celebration with the stylish Škoda SlaviaŠkoda Auto IndiaBook Now  by Taboola Sponsored Links 

In the case of Azerbaijan, ONGC/OVL has made investments in an oilfield project in Azerbaijan and GAIL is exploring the possibilities of cooperation in LNG. Azerbaijan also falls on the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) route, connecting India with Russia through Central Asia. It can also connect India with Turkey and beyond through the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars passenger and freight rail link.

The conflict is essentially a conflict between two international principles viz., the principle of territorial integrity advocated by Azerbaijan and the principle of the right to self-determination invoked by Nagorno-Karabakh and supported by Armenia. When it comes to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, though India had talked of a mediated settlement between the two sides, However, it supported Armenia through arms sales and by condemning Azerbaijan’s aggression in the region. This was not without reason as Azerbaijan’s long-time association with Pakistan had turned the conflict into one of the world’s more obscure proxy wars.

Lately, India’s has enhanced its strategic partnership with Greece which was viewed as a direct challenge to Azerbaijan as Armenia is a traditional ally of Russia and Greece and strain in relations between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus dominate their relationship though both are part of NATO. The recent visit of the prime minister to Greece was part of a broader strategy to diversify its partnerships in the region. India’s strengthening ties with Armenia and Greece are aimed at countering the alliance formed by Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan by no longer relying solely on its traditional allies like Russia and Iran, instead seeking new alliances with countries that share its interests, such as Greece and Armenia.

India’s strategic approach of steadily building ties with Armenia, Greece and Iran reflect India’s increasing strategic interests in the Mediterranean region, which holds significant importance for its energy security due to its abundant oil and gas resources. Additionally, India aims to enhance its trade and investment relations with this region. This also serves as countering China’s expanding influence in the region.

India’s strengthening ties with Armenia and Greece have caused concern for Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, who have been working together to counter India’s influence in the Middle East and Central Asia

Region is crucial for India’s trade corridor

The South Caucasus region has also become key for India’s ambitions to build a transportation corridor linking it to Europe through the Iranian plateau, the International North-South Transportation Corridor, or INSTC.

As regards the INSTC, India needs a rail link to go from North Western Iran across the Southern Caucasus to either Russia or the Black Sea. In this regard, India (and Iran) have two options: one via Armenia’s Southern Syunik Province, and the other via the Caspian coast through Azerbaijan.

A key advantage of the INSTC is that it effectively outflanks Pakistan while accessing overland routes to Europe and Central Asia otherwise blocked. It also results in a closer relationship with Iran thereby countering Iran’s relationship with China and their Belt Road Initiative in the region.

In January 2023, at the Voice of the South Virtual Summit, Armenia’s Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan mentioned that Armenia is interested in “advancing cooperation within the framework of North-South connectivity, as well as the Persian Gulf-Black Sea international transport corridor,” adding that “Armenia considers India’s potential and prospective role for these projects as quite significant.”

In April 2023, Armenia hosted the first trilateral meeting with Indian and Iranian officials, to facilitate a Black Sea-Persian Gulf trade route that would allow Indian goods to be exported to the West through Georgian ports

Yet the developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict threaten the viability of the Zangezur including Turkey and Pakistan as well as Ankara’s expansionist pan-Turkic ambitions. corridor, an important corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Enclave, Nakhchivan. Recent comments by President Ilham Aliyev, of Azerbaijan, as well as Turkish President Erdogan’s speech at the UNGA, now suggest that the territorial viability of this corridor might be in question. Iran seems to have taken the threat to Syunik seriously enough to both reiterate Armenia’s control over the province which is internationally recognized and strengthen its troops in its northwestern border in response to the recent fighting.

Irrespective of whether conflict actually breaks out over the corridor, the fact remains that building a railway through a region that has the potential for conflict between Iran and Turkey, two of the largest militaries in the region, does not bode well for political stability in the long term.

Defence relationship

India’s support for Armenia shifted gears in 2022 with the provision of $250 million worth of arms and ammunition. The deal included significant export orders of Pinaka Multi-Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL), anti-tank missiles, rockets and ammunition to Armenia. In 2020, India also got a $43 million order to supply four Swathi weapon-locating radars to Armenia.

It was reported that this was the first time India has decided to export the Pinaka system to another country. Azerbaijan’s use of drones was a key reason why Armenia wanted the Pinaka system, since its “shoot and scoot” capability enables it to escape counter-battery fire.

India feels it can benefit from being an arms supplier to Armenia, filling a gap left by Russia’s strategic downsizing in the Caucasus due to its commitment in Ukraine.

In October 2022, Armenia’s Minister of Defence Suren Papikyan’s visited India and met the Defence Minister Rajnath Singh during the Defence Expo 2022.

In May this year, Armenia announced it was posting a military attaché to its embassy in New Delhi, tasked with deepening bilateral military cooperation. On 26 July Azerbaijan, summoned the Indian Ambassador and lodged a protest about India’s defence ties with Armenia saying that arming Armenia “at a time when Azerbaijan is negotiating a peace treaty with Armenia, the supply of deadly weapons by India opens the way to the militarization of Armenia and aggravates the situation, hindering the establishment of sustainable peace and security in the South Caucasus region.” The irony is that Baku continues to arm itself with Turkish and Israeli weapons for offensive purposes, but protests when Armenia takes a similar step to defend its borders.

Iran has played a crucial role. While Armenia is unable to purchase Iranian weapons due to fears of US and Western reactions, Tehran is facilitating the transit of weapons from India to Armenia.

On 23 September Armenia appointed a new Ambassador to India despite the ongoing chaos in Nagorno-Karabakh. The ambassador’s credentials, as both an Iran expert and as a regional diplomat in the South Caucasus, suggests the particular direction that Armenia wants to take bilateral relations.

An analysis from the Observer Research Foundation said; “India has overtly positioned itself on Armenia’s side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and has consequently opted to resist Azerbaijan and its backers including Turkey and Pakistan as well as Ankara’s expansionist pan-Turkic ambitions.”

Pakistan support for Azerbaijan

While Pakistan has been siding with Azerbaijan since the outbreak of the First Karabakh War in the early 1990s, India entered the picture as an arms provider to Armenia only after Yerevan’s defeat in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 with both now supplying arms to the principal combatants.

Pakistani support for Azerbaijan is intertwined with Islamabad’s close strategic relationship with Turkey, Baku’s primary patron. The Pakistani government was second after Turkey in recognising Azerbaijan’s independence following the Soviet collapse in 1991 and Islamabad has never acknowledged Armenia’s independence.

The Pakistani and Azerbaijani militaries have reportedly been conducting joint exercises since 2016 and maintain extensive strategic security contacts. According to some unconfirmed reports, Pakistani military advisers reportedly participated in the Second Karabakh War, providing tactical advice. Some observers also believe Islamabad may sell the JF-17 fighter jets to Azerbaijan. There are also reports that Pakistan may soon join Azerbaijan as a partner in a Turkish-led effort to develop a new-generation stealth fighter, dubbed Kaan.

Pakistan’s involvement is helping cement an Ankara-Baku-Islamabad alliance, informally dubbed the “Three Brothers”. The three countries all supposed democracies are predominantly Islamic. The fact that all three are engaged in territorial and ethnic conflicts also acts as a binding agent, encouraging them to assist each other strategically and diplomatically.

By supporting Azerbaijan militarily and diplomatically Pakistan has played a decisive role in stymying India’s policies in the South Caucasus. The strategy has its drawbacks as Pakistan is now linked with a country that is being condemned internationally due to its aggression.

Conclusion

While it seems difficult for India to publicly endorse Nagorno-Karabakh’s right for self-determination in view of the possible repercussions it can have for India as Pakistan may twist the support by making erroneous connections with Kashmir. India has done little to indicate support for Armenia, or even condemnation for Azerbaijan’s actions with the exception of the meeting of External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar with the Foreign Minister of Armenia, Ararat Mirzoyan in the UN General Assembly.

As India refigures its foreign policy to a region now changed by Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh, it almost certainly will have to seek out other, more stable avenues for its infrastructure ties given the potential of the INSTC project. It is not as if India lacks alternative options and maybe the IMEC could be a viable option. The world now needs to focus on the Zangezur corridor and Nakhchivan the two-time bombs that are now likely to get activated.

The author is a retired Major General of the Indian Army. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.