ASEAN’s response to the Gaza crisis

AUTHOR : GURJIT SINGH

Although ASEAN has issued a statement that seeks to end hostilities in Gaza, it has failed to arrive at a unified ASEAN consensus

The Hamas attacks on Israel on 7 October 2023 and the consequent reaction by Israel, which continues to date, have perplexed ASEAN and its members. All ASEAN countries do not have the same approach to Israel and Palestine. There is growing sympathy for the people of Gaza, who are suffering from Israeli action.

The Gaza response

After the Hamas attacks, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a five-paragraph statement on the crisis seeking an end to hostilities and the safety of ASEAN citizens who were taken hostage. The statement recognised the individual national statements of many of the countries but essentially said two things: First, they were concerned over the escalation of armed conflicts in the region; Second, the condemnation of the violence and a negotiated two-state solution was further expressed. The longer two paragraphs of the statement were around the harm caused to civilians, including people from ASEAN countries for whom ASEAN sought safety, security, and emergency assistance. ASEAN sought the international community’s support to initiate the process for long-term stability. If anything, this statement was essentially an appeal for help to protect ASEAN citizens and the rest of it was unimpeded optimism.

After the Hamas attacks, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued a five-paragraph statement on the crisis seeking an end to hostilities and the safety of ASEAN citizens who were taken hostage.

Thailand had 24 hostages and 32 citizens killed in the first attack. Their people were mainly farmhands and about 30,000 worked in Israel. with Hamas. The Philippines had about 30,000 workers in Israel and also had a hostage. Three Filipinos and a Cambodian student reportedly died. Amidst this, Indonesia opened a successful 100-bed hospital in Gaza with some volunteers, which was funded by Muhammadiyah and other civil society organisations since 2011. In November 2023, Israeli forces besieged it as a Hamas sanctuary and by December occupied it as their base.

In Indonesia, in November 2023, a local fatwa was issued against the United States (US) and Western brands which support Israel. Due to this, Western brands in Indonesia took a 25 percent hit. This action gathered 65 percent support in a survey in March 2024. 121 brands were named for a boycott leading local Mcdonald’s to exhibit Palestinian flags to indicate their Indonesian ownership. In Malaysia, the boycott extended to Singapore-based companies like Grab, the taxi app. Malaysia banned Israeli shipping from its ports. Yet, the Israeli defence industry participated in the Singapore Airshow in February 2024

When the crisis in Gaza renewed, Indonesia was going through an election campaign. Indonesia had sought NAM support for Palestine in 2021. The Islamic tinge to Jokowi’s foreign policy included steadfast support for Palestine and no contact with Israel. Malaysia follows a similar policy and during the period of this conflict. The Malaysian PM Anwar and his foreign minister are vocal in condemning Israel unequivocally and supporting Palestine. Prabowo, the leading presidential candidate in Indonesia, is expected to continue the support to Palestine.

The Malaysian PM Anwar and his foreign minister are vocal in condemning Israel unequivocally and supporting Palestine.

Brunei, which also does not have relations with Israel is more muted but seeks pre-1967 borders of Israel. However, a consensus within ASEAN is lacking. While all ASEAN countries are aghast at the way this conflict has turned out, with some of them having their nationals caught in Gaza or taken hostage, they are unable to see a common way out. In general, they all agree that a two-state solution with peaceful coexistence must return as a viable alternative. ASEAN defence ministers issued a statement in November 2023.

Although all ASEAN countries call for a return to peace and a two-state solution, there are differences of opinion mainly due to the Muslim angle, which has consistently brought the Israel-Palestinene issues to a head. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei bring the vicissitudes of the Global South into ASEAN on this issue. Everybody wonders what to do and how to proceed. The challenge is that ASEAN, despite over 55 years of cooperation, still cannot find ways to find a common position on the international crisis as was witnessed during the Ukraine crisis. This lack of consensus also prevents them from making any useful moves towards a solution.

This statement of 20 October was released at the same time as the ASEAN Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) statement on developments in Gaza. ASEAN held its first summit with GCC and realised the potential of that partnership, thus, did not postpone the dialogue despite the Gaza crisis. The five-paragraph statements were similar to ASEAN’s own in that it called for a durable ceasefire, protection of civilian’s release of hostages, a two-state solution with added support for the initiatives of Saudi Arabia, the European Union (EU), the Arab League, Egypt and Jordan to revive the Middle East peace process. This paragraph was a concession to the GCC because ASEAN by itself has no role in it.

ASEAN held its first summit with GCC and realised the potential of that partnership, thus, did not postpone the dialogue despite the Gaza crisis.

In March 2024, in a summit with Australia, ASEAN leaders continued to call for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, drawing focus to the dire humanitarian crisis and the attacks against civilians. The Australia-ASEAN Melbourne Declaration to mark the Golden Jubilee of their relations reiterated concern about refugees, humanitarian reconstruction, humanitarian access and protection of civilians.

However, on 27 October 2023, when the UN General Assembly adopted a Gaza resolution calling for an immediate and sustained humanitarian truce, of the 11 ASEAN members only nine voted for it. Cambodia was absent, while the Philippines abstained. Despite the common positions that ASEAN ministers continue to enunciate either on their own or with their partners, all 11 of them don’t vote together in the UN. Neither was their voting pattern consistent with their dialogue partners, particularly those which are among developed countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea and the like. Broadly speaking, the ASEAN countries are mostly following the Global South line with nuances.

Many countries in the Global South had quickly condemned Russia when it made incursions into Ukraine but now the scrutiny of the position of Israel and the West which is now no longer entirely in harmony also brings ASEAN tentativeness into play.

Recent statements by the Arab League, the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the BRICS show the shifting perspectives. Clarity is still missing. For instance, the vote in March 2024 on providing Palestine additional rights in the UN saw Singapore, which was pro-Israel, voting for Palestinians and later issued a statement of clarification as well.

The lack of ASEAN consensus

Naturally, the ASEAN countries would not have the same position on the Gaza crisis among themselves. Myanmar has the oldest relationship with Israel, having established diplomatic relations in 1953. Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam also have diplomatic relations with Israel, as do Singapore, Thailand, and Philippines. It is the predominantly Muslim countries of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei which do not recognize Israel and are vehemently pro-Palestine. The call for a just solution and the Palestine issue is a regular mantra in ASEAN documents. Timor Leste, the 11^th member of ASEAN, also had relations with Israel since 2002.

It is the predominantly Muslim countries of ASEAN, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei which do not recognize Israel and are vehemently pro-Palestine.

Over the last two decades, Israel made strides in its trade with ASEAN. Their agriculture, medical devices, and IT wares are in demand. Vietnam’s trade grew 18 percent in 2022 to US$2,23 billion. They signed an FTA in July 2023. Singapore trade in 2022 was US$3.14 billion. With Thailand, the trade is US$1.3 billion, the Philippines US$0.59 billion, Malaysia  US$85 million and Indonesia US$ 260 million.

Legal question of Israel’s occupation

Indonesia and Malaysia in March 2024 sought the intervention of the International Court of Justice to declare Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands illegal, removal of Israeli troops, and payment of reparations to Palestinians. These proceedings at the ICJ are different from the South African case before the ICJ, which relates directly to the 7 October attacks by Hamas and charges Israel with violating the Genocide Convention. Indonesian and Malaysian foreign ministers addressed the ICJ on the legal question of Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territories since 1967. They sought, ICJ’s pronouncement, that Israeli occupation is illegal as a whole and must be brought to an end. This will bring the ICJ to cross-check for the first time, the legal consequences of Israeli occupation since 1967 over larger territories than they previously had.

ASEAN’s dilemma

The Palestine issue is festering and since it has come to the forefront again, ASEAN members are challenged to take positions, keeping in view their national policies, which prevent a fulsome ASEAN consensus. Domestically, Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, don’t want the issue to radicalise the dominant Muslim communities, and therefore, have to keep undertaking certain actions to remain relevant. Internationally, ASEAN finds this another challenge to their centrality and importance, because like Ukraine, it is a crisis neither of their making nor their preference. They are still grappling with the issues of the South China Sea and Myanmar, from which attention gets deflected when crises like Gaza recur.

ASEAN finds this another challenge to their centrality and importance, because like Ukraine, it is a crisis neither of their making nor their preference.

ASEAN realises the limits of power of various international actors and the inability to influence regional conflicts. Thus, ASEAN faces a dilemma. To accept this transitional international order where it must find its own place because the tenets on which it was established and continued do not necessarily hold today. ASEAN would do well to create more cohesion in its views on how to deal with such regional crises, which have international ramifications.

Gurjit Singh has served as India’s ambassador to Germany Indonesia Ethiopia ASEAN and the African Union. He is the Chair of the CII Task Force on Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC).