Agnipath is the biggest military reform. China has done it since 1997

The military’s balance between manpower and technology must always be carefully calibrated to ensure an optimal mix, which is what the Agnipath scheme has embarked upon.

Ashok Kumar

The contrast between Indian and Chinese security architecture cannot be starker. China, a military and industrial behemoth, is ploughing ahead with multiple reforms in its military, while India’s only progressive reform in decades, the Agnipath scheme, is mired in inexhaustible controversies.

The scheme is entirely rational and well-thought-out, and only requires minor tweaks before implementation. It has the potential to revolutionise the ‘way of the warrior’ in Indian society by enhancing the qualities that make the Indian armed forces one of the most professional in the world. 

The mainstay of Agnipath, which has drawn the most criticism, is its selection criteria. According to this, a maximum of 25 per cent of the Agniveers—recruits under the scheme—will be absorbed into the regular forces. The remaining 75 per cent will return to the civilian fold, from where they could be recruited by state and central police forces, paramilitary forces, or by public and private organisations.

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For the scheme’s opponents, this was the final nail in the coffin. This is because the Indian armed forces have been traditionally viewed as an employment generator. However, Agnipath gives the military the flexibility to retain recruits best matching their future employment, while also reducing its overall age profile. The average age in the Indian armed forces is one of the highest at 32, against a global average of 26. 

Notwithstanding its holistic vision, which is the spread of military discipline, camaraderie, and self-reliance, Agnipath puts military modernisation in the front seat.

Comparison with China

Since it has become routine to compare India with China on all matters concerning national interest and power, a brief comparison on the causality between manpower and modernisation is necessary to cull out important lessons. 

Under President Xi Jinping, China has embarked on ambitious military reforms, which aim to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military by 2049. Since 2015, China has undertaken five major and several peripheral lines of reform. These include reducing the size of the PLA, creating a new command and control system, converting regional commands into theatre commands, and establishing supporting structures such as the Strategic Support Force (SSF), which has been further split into three new forces.

In September 2015, Xi announced a massive cut of 3 lakh personnel from the PLA. The intent was to move away from traditional land-based fighting strategies to an intelligentised form of warfare with an increasing use of autonomous systems. The reduction in forces also helped offset the cost of technology and its affiliated manpower.

Counterintuitively, the most important parameter in the progress of any technology through its S-curve growth trajectory is the quality of personnel. Military modernisation is a tug-of-war between technology and manpower. The former creates a prime mover advantage over the adversary, especially during a ‘countermeasure holiday’ (a short time window where no countermeasure has been devised for a technology).

Once the initial parleys are over, however, it is the manpower and industrial capacity of a state that takes it through the next stages, since every battle becomes attritional—the only difference is the time required for this conversion.

This see-saw between manpower and technology needs to be calibrated carefully and dynamically to ensure an optimal mix, which is what Agnipath, one of the most progressive reforms in the last 70 years, embarked upon. 

Also read: India’s strategy to counter China has answers to ending Russia-Ukraine war

Consistent reforms in PLA

The PLA has been consistently trimmed down since 1997, when a record 5 lakh personnel were reduced from the force. This was followed by a further 2 lakh reduction during the early 2000s. Known in the typically obtuse form of Chinese metaphors, two types of reforms have been implemented.

Under the ‘above-the-neck reforms’, the PLA has overhauled its structure, geographic alignment, and inter-service relationships to enable joint command and control of its forces while also downsizing significantly. It has also supplemented its missiles, naval surface combatants, autonomous systems, AI systems, and a wide variety of drones.

Simultaneously, ‘below-the-neck-reforms’ have been used to trim service headquarters, professionalise the officer corps, and introduce doctrinal and regulatory revisions for future joint operations.

The invisible, almost silvery thread connecting these two reforms is the idea of exponentially cutting down manpower and offsetting any manpower advantage of the adversary through massive non-contact technology-enabled warfare. China’s compulsory conscription, faux-militarisation of fishing fleets, coast guards, and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) ensure that there is an adequate reserve of militarily-trained manpower ready to be deployed at a moment’s notice. 

Through these comprehensive reforms, China aims to move beyond the policy of active defence to dominate the Indo-Pacific.

These long-term, consistent reforms have to be viewed against what the Indian political decision-makers and armed forces have to face on a daily basis. Political slugfests over employment opportunities and non-existent controversies regarding the alleged militarisation of Indian society have been accorded numero uno status while questions of national security have taken a back seat.

Also read: China hasn’t restored pre-April 2020 status quo. New Delhi’s muted response is also to blame

National security is paramount

The way the Agnipath scheme has been reviled threatens the national security apparatus. Bright, prospective candidates who can handle and operate sophisticated weapons systems and platforms are being discouraged from applying, forcing the Indian military to scrape the bottom of the barrel in terms of the quality of recruits.

The lax political debate portends a difficult time for India’s safety and territorial integrity unless serious measures are taken to stem this rot. The Indian military must publicly back this reform and focus on reduction in manpower as envisaged under the Agnipath scheme.

One cannot help being bemused by the naivete of the political opposition that focuses only on employment numbers curtailed by the Agnipath scheme. A careful balancing act has to be maintained between optimising the armed forces’ manpower and increasing their technological threshold. 

For India, the current emphasis needs to be on inducting emerging technologies, adopting doctrinal and organisational reforms, and curtailing the excessive manpower of its armed forces.

Maj Gen Ashok Kumar, VSM (Retd) is a Kargil war veteran and defence analyst. He tweets @chanakyaoracle. Views are personal.

(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)