Lt Gen Hasnain explains dynamics of escalation in accidental strategic scenarios

By: Syed Ata Hasnain

Both India and Pakistan are aware of the importance of protocols when it comes to nuclear weapons

Highlights

1. The missile episode had the potential of a huge escalation, stretching into the nuclear environment.
2. India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon powers, and it is important that such incidents are avoided.
3. Given the current relations between the two countries, such inadvertent happenings carry grave risks.

In the midst of the Ukraine crisis, when higher nuclear temperatures are being witnessed and missiles are piercing the air space of Europe, no one could have imagined that something extremely dangerous could also take place in the Indian subcontinent. An accidental launch of a cruise missile, probably under testing but mercifully without a warhead of any kind, led to it landing at a location called Mian Channu, in Khanewal district, 124 kilometers away in Pakistan. Knowing the state of Indo-Pak relations, the event had the potential of a huge escalation, stretching into the nuclear environment.

The event occurred on 9 Mar 2022 and Pakistan’s Director General Inter Services Public Relations(ISPR) wing went public to announce that an unidentified flying platform had been detected in Pakistan’s air space flying at a height of approximately 40,000 feet. The statement read – “On March 9, at 6:43pm, a high-speed flying object was picked up inside the Indian territory by the Air Defence Operations Centre of the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). From its initial course, the object suddenly maneuvered towards Pakistani territory and violated Pakistan’s airspace, ultimately falling near Mian Channu at 6:50pm”.

It was helpful that he went on to say “It was a supersonic flying object, most probably a missile, but it was certainly unarmed”. Mian Chanu is 240 kilometers from Sargodha which is a hub of Pakistan’s strategic resources. A day and a half later, the Government of India, after an initial probe, regretted the incident and ordered a detailed inquiry. The well-worded statement read: “On March 9, 2022, in the course of routine maintenance, a technical malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile. It is learnt that the missile landed in an area of Pakistan. The government has taken serious view and ordered a high-level court of inquiry.”

The Ministry of Defence further said while the incident was “deeply regrettable, it is also a matter of relief that there has been no loss of life due to the accident”. Efforts to try and sensationalize the incident were just picking up when the Government of India’s statement put an end to the speculation, exemplifying the necessity of transparency, timeliness and full perception of sensitivity of such incidents.

Known India-baiter Zaid Hamid in Pakistan had commenced a campaign on social media alleging that the missile was nuclear armed. Hamid claimed that the nuclear missile launch was India’s plan to test and evaluate Pakistan’s entire nuclear doctrine and validate their response.

It’s not important at this stage to go into the details of the accidental firing per se, pending a detailed investigation which India’s technical agencies will no doubt carry out. To assuage public curiosity, it may be sufficient to know that the flying object which landed in Pakistan was a Brahmos missile with a range of 400 kilometers which appeared to have got accidently launched while some technical checks were being performed. The Pakistani statement claimed that Pakistan had monitored and tracked the missile from Sirsa to the point of impact in its territory.

That of course is highly plausible because monitoring flying platforms within and up to an optimum range in adversary territory is a norm of security all over the world. In the context of India and Pakistan this becomes even more important since the two nations possess nuclear weapons and the various means to launch these.

Both nations are aware of the importance of protocols when it comes to nuclear weapons. They are sensitive to the possibility of a pre-emptive strike using nuclear weapons. This despite the fact that the world over it is a well-known norm that nuclear weapons are not weapons for war fighting, but rather for deterrence. India has a doctrine of ‘No First Use’, relating to its nuclear forces which remains in existence despite many discussions and utterances which have taken place over the last few years about the need to do away with this doctrine.

Pakistan has no ‘hold back’ doctrine and is known to profess the first use of tactical nuclear weapons to halt the advance of any Indian ground-based force launched across the international border. Targeting even its concentration in our territory is not beyond Pakistan’s propensity to remain trigger happy regarding the nuclear trigger. In many ways, Pakistan uses irrational behavior as a weapon by itself.

Thus, unpredictability rules the nuclear environment in a potential Indo-Pak standoff. Both sides are highly suspicious of each other’s intent because of the prevailing environment. While a ceasefire at the LoC has successfully held for the last one year and more, there is no predictability about the possibility of a one-off event occurring which may raise tensions in the overall strategic environment of the Indian subcontinent. Recalling Pulwama and the subsequent events, there is no guarantee where the escalation will reach.

However, there is also the possibility of unpredictable events which rapidly enhance the ante and lead to a sudden move from a ‘No War No Peace’ situation to one of rapid build-up of tension in which every flying object will be viewed with suspicion. The scenario is particularly one of concern in the Indo-Pak context because the assessed response time to detect and neutralize an incoming platform is presumed to be about seven minutes. In the case of the US, the Russian missile threat gives a window of approximately 25 minutes.

However, the decision making to launch a response is obviously far less than the flight time of such platforms. While the nuclear missile threat to the US receded considerably after the Cold War, there has been no dilution of readiness protocols. This applies equally to the Indo-Pak context where the nuclear threat is perceived independent of the prevailing strategic environment which anyway is dynamic in nature.

It is well known that there have been many unpublicized incidents of accidents in connection with strategic systems wherever they exist around the world. That is also one of the reasons why pre-warning of all launches is given to potential parties which have strategic interest in such events; and to adversaries of course. However, an accidental launch is bereft of any such warning since accidents do not occur by intent.
Accidents become even more lethal in terms of their potential spinoff contingent upon the prevailing environment between nations. The current tension in Europe over the Ukraine war has witnessed the Russian leadership mention the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons. While these statements may be for psychological messaging more than anything else, none can take such threats lightly.

Fortunately, tensions between India and Pakistan are at a lower end in the current environment. However, there is no political engagement between the two nations and not even a semi-formal Track 2 dialogue. There is an informal Track 2 dialogue which includes the nuclear domain and comprises some strategic experts, scientists and diplomats but this is more academic in content.

The Indo-Pak strategic environment is dynamic and can rapidly deteriorate based upon unpredictable threats. If accidents involving delivery platforms were to occur in sync with one of these low marks in the environment, the possibility of something far more serious could become much higher.

The current incident has been handled maturely by both sides. No unnecessary provocation despite an awkward political environment which is prevailing and developing in Pakistan. India’s quick admission of the mistake and expression of regret was indeed most timely. However, this calls for an engagement beyond the political domain for greater clarity.

Pakistan’s demand for a joint probe into the incident is obviously beyond scope of acceptance from the Indian side, given the nature of equipment and the command-and-control systems involved. A quick and yet comprehensive probe with an unclassified incident report could always be shared, but a classified part too will need to be prepared and discussed with the prime stakeholders in India’s strategic set up.

(The author is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army)