Review of Siachen policy needs to keep Sino-Pak threat in perspective

By: Syed Ata Hasnain

Highlights

General Naravane indicated that India is not averse to the demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier

However, the pre-condition is that Pakistan accepts the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL)

The Army Chief’s statement has created some inquisitiveness on whether this is a new Indian line of thinking on Siachen

General Manoj Naravane, in his Army Day media interaction, indicated that India is not averse to the demilitarisation of the Siachen Glacier but the pre-condition is that Pakistan accepts the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and signs on the dotted line before any kind of disengagement takes place.

Among informed circles, the Army Chief’s statement has created some inquisitiveness on whether this is a new Indian line of thinking on Siachen. For them, it is all the more interesting because not far from Siachen towards the east is the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, in the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) area. There the PLA is not budging from its stated stance of the problem being a legacy one.

It is not putting an end to the denial of access to the patrolling points for Indian patrols in the Depsang area; something the Indian side has been looking to in the various rounds of talks between the Indian and PLA military commanders in Ladakh. There is much confusion regarding the linkages between DBO, Depsang, and Siachen. It deserves some background information to discern what exactly is happening.

In 1949 when the Ceasefire Line (CFL) was being demarcated after the First Indo Pak War, the process went on up to the map point NJ 9842 in the Ladakh region. But the CFL was required to be demarcated up to the glaciated region. The area to the north of this point being heavily glaciated it was felt that it could not be demarcated by physical visits due to constraints. Therefore, it was cursorily decided that the CFL beyond NJ 9842 would follow the line –” North to the Glaciers”. These four words came back to haunt India many years later.

In 1972 when the same was being converted to the Line of Control (LoC) we once again failed to have an accurate delineation. This time with experience and the Chinese threats having developed not far from the glacier area in DBO, we should have insisted on proper alignment; although Pakistan would have tried its best to leave the area in nebulous status. In 1978 it was discovered that Pakistan was showing the area west of the line NJ 9842 – Karakoram Pass as its territory thus laying claim over the full Siachen Glacier; something earlier quite uncertain.

There were international mountaineering expeditions visiting the area under the permission of Pakistan. Six years of claims and counterclaims could not produce a solution and both sides were unable to come to a decision on how to delineate the LoC in this area. Finally on 13 Apr 1984, on getting reliable intelligence of a potential Pakistani attempt to occupy the glacier, the Indian Army launched Operation Meghdoot, pre-empted the Pakistanis, and gave adequate security and depth by also occupying the Saltoro Range with heights of up to 22000 feet towards the south and west.

The Pakistan Army, beaten to the glacier by six days, was left red-faced. Two things resulted from this military embarrassment. First the Pakistan Army, and in turn, Pakistan refused to publicly acknowledge the loss of Siachen; a stance which has remained true till this day. Second, it also commenced a disinformation campaign to mislead its public, nation, and the world in general that it was in reality in occupation of the glacier.

The truth was that Pakistan was left holding territory logistically quite easily manageable but nowhere in proximity to the glacier. It could not even get a glimpse of the Siachen Glacier which lay on the other side of the Saltoro Range. From 1984 to 2003 it attempted many times to evict the Indian Army from the Saltoro Range and obtain a toehold.

Efforts to find a solution were made even as brawls on the Saltoro continued with frequent assaults by the Pakistani SSG. The sticky issue during the three efforts to find a solution; in 1989, 1992, and 2006, was the Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL). What needs to be known and always kept in focus is that it is the Indian Army that occupies the Saltoro Range and therefore it’s occupation is the alignment which is the LoC on the ground.

For any steps to declare the Siachen Glacier area as a demilitarised zone, Pakistan will have to recognize this line as the AGPL and also mark the positions to which the two sides will move to create the demilitarised zone. Once this map is made public after they have signed on the ‘dotted line’ the Pakistan Army and the government will have to admit that the position they hold today has never been even close to Siachen; something they have been unwilling to do all these years. This is the reason why the talks failed each time.

Of course, it will also need considerable political courage on the part of the Indian Government to take a decision to vacate Siachen, given the current state of relations with Pakistan, and very importantly with China. Yet, one cannot discount that testing of waters is always possible. In 2013 some retired members of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Foreign Service did make a mention during a certain dialogue that they would not be averse to demilitarisation. The same was then ignored and never followed up by either side.

The Chinese angle has to be understood on the map. Theoretically, if the Pakistan Army is in occupation of Siachen the Indian Army would be left holding the wedge of territory in DBO and may not be able to remain in occupation of the Nubra Valley itself. A Pakistan-China contiguous link up at Karakoram Pass and south of it would be entirely possible making the holding of DBO untenable. With a detailed map explanation, it is possible to prove that the Indian hold over Nubra-Eastern Ladakh would itself become a challenge, forcing India to pull back to the Ladakh Range for the defense of Leh. That would mean just one mountain range to defend the capital city of the area we hold. That is not something that inspires confidence in me.

A ceasefire was declared along the entire LoC on 26 Nov 2003. In the case of Siachen, it has been held with almost negligible violations proving that both sides wish for peace. However, there exists a huge trust deficit between India and Pakistan and indeed between India and China. Pakistan created a a serious doubt in the Indian mind with the sneaking occupation of winter vacated heights in 1999 leading to the brief Kargil War in which 527 Indian soldiers sacrificed their lives. It’s a truism that all senior Indian Army officers, especially those like me who have had the opportunity to serve at Siachen sector, fear that if a demilitarised zone is created and both the Saltoro Range and the Siachen Glacier are vacated by the Indian Army a repeat of Kargil could always take place. In that eventuality our going back and recapturing the glacier and the Saltoro would cost us many more lives than Kargil; that is if we succeed at all, given the terrain advantage with the side which occupies the Saltoro invariably has.

The nation reportedly spends something above Rupees 1500 Crores per year when there is no exchange of firing taking place. No doubt we spend more because we occupy the higher ground. Almost 890 lives have been lost defending Siachen and Saltoro. It’s a legitimate question that people ask; whether it is all really worth it. So, if General Naravane has flagged the issue it’s probably crossed his mind too and that of his advisers. Army Chiefs are not known to do loud thinking in routine media conferences; they just review the year gone by and contemplate a few challenges for the future.

The elephant in the room is China and the good General minced no words while speaking his mind about it. But what crossed his mind talking about an issue not raked up for long will remain an interesting legacy of the media event. Unless of course, there is more to come.

(The author is a retired Lieutenant General of the Indian Army)