THE RUSSIA-CHINA NEXUS: GEO-POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR USA AND INDIA

The Beginnings: Sinusoidal Relations which has come Full Circle

Russia-China relations have followed a sinusoidal curve and finally come full circle. USSR nurtured the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) from birth since 01 Oct 1949 (declared Republic on 01 Jan 1912, ending several millennia of imperial dynasties). Being ideological communist twins, USSR gave full diplomatic, economic, military and geo-political support to a grateful China. Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong signed the ‘Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, between the PRC and the USSR on February 14, 1950, which alsoformally recognized the PRC. Most importantly USSR was instrumental in providing technical support for nuclearisation and weaponisation making China the fifth recognized nuclear weapon state (NWS) in the world post its nuclear explosion on 16 Oct 1964.

Russia and China share a 4500 km long boundary and had their perceptional and historical differences over it. Theyfell apart due to doctrinal divergences that arose from their different interpretations and practical applications of Marxism–Leninism, which exacerbated relations, and they even fought a localised conflict due to differences over the international boundary in 1969, over the Ussuri River in Manchuria. During that period, China had staked claim to Vladivostok in Outer Manchuria which formed part of the last Chinese dynasty: Qing dynasty. China was even more visceral in its denunciation of the US-Soviet detente in the 1960s and 1970s. But Mao’s answer was not in staying away from both, but in leaning towards America. Although he fought a costly Korean War with the US in the early 1950s, Mao had no difficulty cosying up to Washington in 1971 to counter the perceived threat from Russia. He was merely following the old Chinese dictum of “aligning with the far to balance the near”. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, refused to extend the 1950 security treaty with Russia that expired in 1980. The disintegration of the USSR established the unipolar status of the USA, and henceforth Russia-China relations were dictated by their bilateral relations with USA. That is relevant even today and geo-politically the big Three form a triangular relationship. 

As part of USA-China rapprochement by President Nixon, the Americans put intensepressure on USSR in the 1980s, to normalise ties with Beijing. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in Dec 1991, Moscow’s first instinct was to become a part of the political West. But disappointed with the Western response, Russia turned to build a stronger partnership with China. 2021 also marks the 20th anniversary of the signing by China’s Jiang Zemin and Russia’s Vladimir Putin of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation (2001) between Russia and China, an agreement that facilitated the expansion of the scope of cooperation between the two neighbors.The ongoing “golden age” of partnership is marked by robust economic, energy, people-to-people, technology, military and diplomatic engagement. While inherent apprehensions and wariness persists both nations are trying to extend their cooperation even to areas hitherto perceived as Russia’s red-lines, i.e., the Arctic, Far East, and Central Asia and includes sophisticated weapons exports. 

Geo-Political Compulsions leading to their Bonhomie.

The West led by the US driving them to Proximity. Since President Joe Biden assumed office, it is becoming increasingly clear that the US policy toward Russia and China contains more elements of continuity with his predecessor Trump than elements of change. In fact, Biden has double-downed on a tough multi-front competition and confrontation with China much to her allies and a large part of the World’s dismay. The first US-China meeting post Trump at Anchorage, Alaska on March 18, 2021did not go well;it was contentious with a lot of acrimony and finger pointing against each other: in fact China held its own and even sermonised USA on its global role. As Shannon Tiezzi of The Diplomat later wrote “The fiery stance from China’s diplomats signals they are willing to return perceived disrespect with more disrespect.”[ii] Interestingly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Guilin city in Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in Southern China within a couple of days of Biden administrations first meeting (on 21 May 21: they refuted that there was any deliberate planning for the Lavrov’s two-day visit coming on the heels of a stormy US-China meeting). It is impossible not to compare the drastically different tones communicated between the two country pairings. “For us, China is a true strategic partner and like-minded friend. Our cooperation in the international arena will have a stabilizing effect on the global and regional situation,” Lavrov told Chinese media. “We want the architecture of international relations to be fair, democratic, capable of ensuring stability,” Lavrov added the next day. Their joint statement emphasized the centrality of the United Nations to the international system and called on states to “adhere to the principles of open, equal, and non-ideological multilateralism.”

Biden strongly feels and has stated numerous times publicly and even in Congress that “at a time when democracy around the world is under siege, and authoritarian powers like China are on the rise, we have to prove democracy still works. That our government still works, and can deliver for the people”. In a statement from Capital Hill he added “In our first 100 days together, we have acted to restore the people’s faith in our democracy to deliver.”On Jun 21, he was even more specific, telling David Brooks of The New York Times, “We’re kind of at a place where the rest of the world is beginning to look to China” giving an impression that if urgent measures are not taken China might win.US allies in part out of traditional and historical ties with USA, and in part out of geo-political compulsions are warily going along with this alignment. Many strategic and security analysts are talking of an imminent ‘cold war’. This continuing turbulence has brought Russia and China closer, and to put it succinctly, ‘Russia and China are uneasy partners against a liberal democratic world’. Their compulsions are to combine mainly for economic and geo-pol gains, as their combination is larger than their individual values and they coalesce their strengths against common adversaries led by the USA. Security cooperation is slowly gathering steam due to geo-political necessity and proximity.It is fairly obvious, that Russia and China’s ongoing confrontation with the West appears to be a key determinant in pushing them closer to each other. While China is showing all the indications of a rising bipolar global entity, a robust partnership with Beijing is perceived as a strategic necessity for Moscow to tackle the Western pressure.

Personal equation reinforcing Geo-political Compulsions. The Russia-China relationship appears heavily driven by their two Presidents Putin and Xi Jinping, marked by personal bonhomie between them (met over 30 times since leading their nations).The underpinning of their shared objective of diluting what they perceive as American hegemony, also catalyses’ a growing convergence and mutual understanding in their foreign policy outlook, leading them to increasingly coordinate their positions at the global level. To illustrate, with Russia and China facing sustained Western (USA and her allies) containment pressure, the two countries have sought to provide support to each other’s core strategic concerns, particularly in their backyard, to include Crimea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, the Indo-Pacific, the COVID-19 pandemic origins, Huawei and Syria. They have also sought to co-opt countries like Iran, Pakistan, North Korea and few South American and African countries which have had a precarious relationship with the USA. A Russia-China tandem at the global level, therefore, appears increasingly to be the new normal.

Russia’s entente with China is also perhaps driven by its experience of having simultaneously fought two Cold Wars, with the US and China. It was marked by the US exploiting the fissures in Sino-Soviet ties to establish a historic relationship of harmony with Beijing, anchored in their shared animosity towards the USSR. It will not be wrong to state that USA is singularly responsible for providing security and a stable strategic and security and economic environment in Asia and the world since World War II, for China to reach its current global power status: Deng Xiao Ping and President Xi have admitted to the same.Therefore, having stable relations with at least one of the other two countries in this strategic triangle today appears to be a compelling rationale for Russia. This is particularly relevant at a time when the outlook of a Russia-US detente under the new Biden administration seems grim. A secure 4,500 km long China-Russia border frees Moscow and Beijing in tackling headlong the US challenge without the distraction of a potential challenger next door. Russia is also the weakest of the trio in terms of comprehensive national strength (CNP), and against this backdrop, it seems that Russia is seeking to build a strong interdependence with China to minimise any potential disruption of their bilateral ties in the future, thereby securing one flank: a hallmark of ‘realpolitik’.

Pandemic a propitious time to surge.         China sees itself as expanding irrevocably against a weakening USA,and a globe reeling under a pandemic which she herself has contained remarkably quickly and well (this has resulted in speculation on the origins of the Covid virus), and assuming its rightful position at the top of the global order more in terms of ‘When and not If’. Under Xi they have discarded their traditional reticence of previous Presidents and are forcefully exploiting their political, diplomatic, informational, military (PDIME) clout and seizing the initiative to stamp their authority on a world reeling under the Covid pandemic and resultant economic challenges. Seizing the uncertainty and inward focus of bigger powers and the West, China has launched what can be called an economic, diplomatic and military blitzkrieg to gain dominance in global affairs. Russia, the revisionist power, seeking to restore its strength and sphere of influence after the collapse of its historical empire thirty years ago has opportunistically joined in tandem.  Both countries are threatened more by internal democratic revolution than by either’s brand of authoritarianism. Russia’s arrest of Alexei Navalny and China’s imprisonment of Hong Kong democratic figures such as Jimmy Lai have been symbolic displays of resistance to the West’s promotion of liberal democracy abroad. So, it may be that after decades of the West over-estimating the robustness of the relationship of the two leading Communist powers in the second half of the twentieth century, the risk now is underestimating its combined strength under two such determined autocrats in the twenty-first century. 

World has to address China and Russia concurrently: many nations not ready to give up ties specially with China. Events post Covid, and growing convergence of Russia and China has clearly indicated that they need to be addressed and managed simultaneously by the democratic forces, as action/response to one adversary will shape the calculus of the other.  The challenges the two countries pose specially to USA are distinct, but the convergence of their interests and the complementarity of their capabilities: military and otherwisemake their combined challenge more broad based and powerful than the sum of their individual CNPs. China, in particular, is using its relationship with Russia to fill gaps in its military capabilities, accelerate its technological innovation, and complement its efforts to undermine US global leadership. Any effort to address either Russia or China’s destabilizing behaviour must now account for the two countries’ deepening partnership.Moscow and Beijing are already working hand in hand with each other responding to the US assertiveness. They are accomplishing it by using multiple domains; from solidarity voting in international organizations to coordinating national information strategies; working with like-minded countries across the globe; and exchanging best practices in preventing the West’s interference into their domestic affairs. Concurrently both nations are trying to re-energisetheir relations with nations which are traditional US allies like South Korea, Japan, UK, France, Germany and some Asian nations. Interestingly, especially when it comes to China due to its growing PDIME power and their own geo-political and economic necessities, many countries are not ready to totally align with US and her allies. ‘Strategic autonomy’ is dear to ALL nations, and for many, proximity to Beijing remains critical for their prosperity: South Korea, ASEAN and South Asian nations and even some African and South American nations.

Economic, Defence and Space Cooperation

Economic Cooperation. Putin’s statement in 2012 of ‘“catching the Chinese wind in our economic sail” aptly sums up the Russian thought process of the economy being a major factor in their rapprochement. Meanwhile, as part of this growing entente, China not only gets to tap Russia’s diplomatic heft and its military prowess but its abundant natural resources, which could help dilute China’s Malacca dilemma. Moreover, given Russia’s traditional influence in Central Asia, Russian acquiescence is likely key to China’s Silk Road Economic Belt’s (SREB) connectivity nodes to Europe which pass through the region. Similarly, Western sanctions which is targeting practically the entire Russian economy have contributed in undermining Russia’s economic growth. This has led Russia to seek alternative sources of trade, investment and technology. With China being one of the few countries capable of meeting Russia’s requirements and not be swayed by the West to contain Moscow, Russia appears to be increasingly leaning on China. Today, China occupies a central position in Russia’s economy.  It is also one of Russia’s key sources of investment, industrial equipment and technology, including 5G. 2020 saw sharp rise of over 100$ Bn bilateral trade, with specific plans to ratchet it up to 200$ Bn by 2024. 40 mn tons of crude and 4 bn cubic meters of LNG are piped annually after launch of China-Russia East natural gas ppl. Both countries are working assiduously with international institutions and multi-lateral trading partners to mitigate the effects of US and European sanctions and, ultimately, to reduce Washington’s centrality to the global economic system; a change that would reduce the efficacy of US economic tools. Russia frustrated at being stonewalled by Europe, EU, NATO and USA feels that its economic future with the West is eroding, and is increasingly turning to Asia specifically China. As financial stagnation and the risk of domestic instability mount, China WILL become an ever more important partner.

Defence partnership specially export/import of military equipment (hardware and software) with Beijing has emerged as a key pillar of this Russian calculus. This is one of the few areas where Russia holds a qualitative edge over China, particularly on strategic systems and operational capabilities. Export of sophisticated equipment, including the S-400, early warning systems and aircraft engines, is now a recurring theme in their bilateral ties. Notably, it appears that Russia has overcome its apprehensions of China’s intellectual property rights infringement of Russian technology.Within the last five years defence procurements have become a two-way street with Russia needing Chinese expertise in electronics and some hi-tech and disruptive technology domains like AI, data and quantum computing. Meanwhile, joint exercises in each other’s periphery, including the East and South China Seas, the Western Pacific, and the Black and the Baltic Seas, have become vital tools to project mutual support. In strengthening China’s defence capabilities, particularly air defence and early warning, the Russian interest could be premised on diverting the US attention from Russia’s western neighbourhood to the Asia-Pacific.

Space Cooperation.  The West is also getting increasingly apprehensive with the close collaboration in a game changing domain; Space. Russia and China are moving increasingly closer, and have signed a memorandum of agreement to collaborate on lunar missions and to send a robotic mission to an asteroidcalled Kamo’oalewaby 2024, including the establishment of a research station in orbit or on the surface of the moon by 2030, setting the stage for a new space race with the United States and its partners. Russian officials have already signalled that they may pull out of the International Space Station (NASA) once the current agreement with its partners ends in 2024. The launch last year of SpaceX’s crew had already ended Russia’s exclusive role ferrying American astronauts into orbit. As a counter, NASA has its own plans to return astronauts to the moon, and one day, send them to Mars. They have established/recruited a group of nations under an agreement, called the Artemis Accords, governing space activities, including operations, experiments and extraction of natural resources. While NASA is leading the Artemis program, which includes sending the first woman and next man to the surface of the Moon in 2024, international partnerships will play a key role in achieving a sustainable and robust presence on the Moon later this decade while preparing to conduct a historic human mission to Mars. The founding member nations that have signed the Artemis Accords, in alphabetical order, are:-

• Australia
• Canada
• Italy
• Japan
• Luxembourg
• United Arab Emirates
• United Kingdom
• United States of America

Fault lines in China-Russia Relations.

In the emerging multi-polar world, all nations without exception are carrying out strategic balancing (building CNP by increasing internal, external and soft power) to retain/attain strategic space and meet their national aspirations. Two global powers geographically contiguous are bound to have geo-political and strategic challenges, and their relationship will have a varying mix of cooperation, competition, even confrontation and conflict if national interests are at stake. To reiterate, USSR and China have fallen out very significantly due to different interpretations and application of Marxist-leninist ideologically, and have fought a localized conflict in 1969 over the boundary issue.

Fault lines. The ups and downs in their relationship clearly highlights the geo-political, strategic and economic necessity of Russia to ensure bonhomie with China. Beneath the current warmth lies serious fault lines which could surface or be exploited by their adversaries. Interestingly Russia and China have had a role reversal with USA being the constant third party in the triangle. Till the early 2000s USSR/Russia was the other pole with China desperately wanting a multi-polar world, but now Chinahas emerged as a serious competitor to a perceived weakening USA, and under Xi Jinping a new belligerent, aggressive dragon appears to be aiming for the numerouno spot IN A HURRY. Historically, it is not in Russia’s DNA, given the country’s history, to be the junior partner in any relationship; China feels the same way and constantly reminds itself and the World that it is the centre of the Universe. Both countries have divergent world views, and both have national aspirations of dominating world affairs (under Putin, revanchist and nationalist Russia wants to regain its glory at all costs). Maintaining its own strategic autonomy is a key pillar of Russia’s goal to be counted as a pole in global affairs.A compelling rationale of this calculus would likely rest on diversifying ties beyond China. This could help dilute Russia’s growing dependence on China. India will remain a thorn between them; and a test of Russia’s autonomy. In fact, Pax Sinica, marked particularly by China’s growing footprints in Eurasia, could even undermine Russia’s comeback in this region. Post Covid, Russia would have taken note of China’s recent playbook of unilateralism, assertiveness and revanchism to get its way, notwithstanding the economic interdependence that Beijing shares with other nations. Against this backdrop, Russia’s Greater Eurasia project as well as its attempts to strengthen its position in the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO): organisations where China is not a member, appear to be a key Russian strategy to preserve its core strategic space. Russia has also sought to expand its engagements, without ruffling China’s feathers, with countries such as Japan, Philippines, Vietnam and Indonesia which has witnessed tensions in their bilateral ties with Beijing. Russia and China’s foreign policy outlook has not always been in sync.Continuing trends in improving vital trade links clearly indicate that both are not ready to give up on the West. Russia has the vital Nord Stream 2 pipeline from Siberia to Germany, France and UK. China too has signed a comprehensive trade deal with EU this year (which currently stands in suspended animation). This is evident in China being neutral on Crimea, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, with Russia following suit on the South China Sea dispute. The two countries also do not appear to be on the same page regarding Russia’s weapons exports to India.

Russia remains apprehensive of the disequilibrium in their bilateral ties which has led Moscow to accommodate Chinese intervention even in its core strategic space of Central Asia, the Arctic and the Far East. Notably, China’s historical grouse against the Tsarist takeover of Chinese territory under the “unequal treaties” runs deep. Similarly, a bipolar world order vis-à-vis a polycentric one would appear more suited to China, even though the latter is a long-cherished Russian goal.Latent competition appears to be embedded in Russia-China bilateral ties, as seen from the global weapons market, where China is increasingly seen as a competitor to Russia.

Likelihood of China-Russia Military/Security Alliance. Russia has always been a formidable military power. Even today it enjoys the dubious distinction of holding the world’s largest nuclear stockpile. The Arms Control Organisation (which sources its inputs from most reliable sources including the American Association and SIPRI) estimates that Russia possesses 6,375nuclear weapons, while the United States has5800; Russia and the US each have 1,550 active deployed strategic nuclear warheads (as per the New START agreement).

As can be seen from the map above International Peace Research Institute estimates that China, Pakistan and India hold 320, 150 and 160 nuclear weapons as on 2020.

The December 2020 Russia-China joint aerial patrol over the contested East China Sea, viewed through the prism of Moscow’s support for Beijing’s core strategic concerns, has ignited a debate of the possibility of a looming, formal defence alliance between the two countries. This joint patrol, the second within a year, came shortly after President Vladimir Putin’s declaration at the Valdai Summit in October 2020 that the “idea” of a future alliance could not be ruled out.A security/military alliance framework is usually restrictive in nature, with negligible scope for flexibility. Russia would NOT be counting on China’s security guarantee to withstand any US onslaught. Russia’s ongoing massive military modernization programme, which includes its entire nuclear eco-system, appears to be aimed at ensuring deterrence against a perceived threat from the West. The importance of maintaining strategic autonomy against a backdrop of clear acknowledgement of China’s superior CNP and conventional military and economic superiority, makes a military alliance under these conditionsunlikely. Perhaps, the statements emanating from Putin were intended as a message to both foes (like the US) and friends (like India) alike to alter the course of confrontation or arrest the perceived drift in bilateral ties, respectively. The highly improbable scenario of USA and her allies carrying out a two-front attack on China and Russia, could be the only situation which could perhaps seal a Russia-China alliance.

USA: The Fulcrum of the Big Three  

USA has formally named China and Russia as two major threats in her National Security and Military Strategy (2017 and 2018 respectively) with China identified as a ‘peer competitor’. Biden has continued what Trump started and has surprised everybody by actually hardening US stand against both countries. While there is talk even within USA, of a weakening USA (economically, geo-politically and militarily), Russia and China for the near future, still calibrate their global relations pivoted around USA and her allies.  Biden has double-downed on stand-off with Russia and China,focusing on economic sanctions and containment. President Joe Biden’s first overseas trip put his diplomatic and negotiating philosophy on display, as he rallied traditional US democratic allies to confront new and old challenges. The Biden-Putin summit was never meant to thaw ties. However, mutual interests were recognized, even if mutual affection was missing. There was a reset, with both men staking out clear areas of disagreement, even as they pointed to smaller-scale areas where they could cooperate. There is promise of a more conventional US-Russia relationship after the erratic and confounding Trump era. Of the two leaders, Putin had a compulsion to carry back some takeaways back home. Internal dissensions, low popularity, distraught economy hit hard by sanctions, growing reliance and as some would say subservience to China being closely watched within and outside Russia makes it necessary for Putin/Russia to mend fences with USA and the West if possible, to maintain strategic autonomy and project herself as an independent and unaligned actor in a multipolar world. The US would seek out more ‘commons’ or atleast areas which Russia would prefer China be kept out off; like the Artic, CAR and even Iran. The USwould aim to raise questions among the Russian people and ruling elite about the wisdom of aligning too closely to China, in the hope that future leaders will chart a more neutral course.

Growing China-Russia Strategic Relationship: Impact on India

Except for the initial newly born idealistic period after independence of ‘Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai’, India and China have always had a competitive and confrontationist relationship, which gets exacerbated by an unresolved boundary issue which China keeps activating periodically to needle and contain India and which can only be resolved politically. Increasing and deepening collusivity between China and Pakistan in all domains, constant interference of China in South Asia, India’s strategic backyard, at India’s cost, has created instability in the region. The East Ladakh standoff amidst a raging Covid pandemic which ironically emanated from China has ensured that the already tenuous India-China relations has reached a nadir.

First and foremost, India does not, and cannot, view this as a zero-sum game and has sought to engage both China and Russia bilaterally,and multi-laterally through a raft of organisations such as the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.A special mention of the Russia-India-China grouping (RIC) – at first sight the RIC looks like an unlikely grouping, given the rivalry between India and China, but what seems to be binding the grouping is the strong relationship that Russia and China have developed on one hand, and on the other, the time-tested close ties between India and Russia. Moscow serves as a bridge of sorts between New Delhi and Moscow and also helps Russia to offset China’s gravitational pull. However, the interlinked geo-political developments currently gripping the World specially Indo-Pacific, have somewhat complicated the India-Russia strategic partnership. These include Russia’s confrontation with the West, a more robust India-US partnership, Russia’s entente with China and tensions in the India-China relationship, and shifting priorities in arms procurement.Interestingly, in my opinion, given the relative imbalance of power between the three, more than India, Russia often sees India as a means of balancing China.Over the years, Russia has been a key constant in India’s strategic calculus. Moscow had played a vital role in not only strengthening India’s comprehensive national power but also balancing external actors who had sought to undermine India’s national security. No Indian can forget the Soviet Pacific armada steaming into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 War as one of the hallmarks of their strategic partnership.

Both Russia and India have been compelled to recalibrate their ties with each other based on the quadrilateral geo-political equations with USA and China. Recent events have often challenged the decades long traditional friendly equation between Russia and India. Russia appears to be increasingly batting for China at the global level, the most notable being in the Indo-Pacific. On Afghanistan, a Russia-China-Pakistan troika too has gained traction.

As such, questions have been raised on Russia’s traditional unconditional support to India. Needless to say, the recent India-China border standoff put Russia in a difficult position, and nobody was surprised when Russia refrained from taking sides except to ask for both nations to resolve the issue amicably. However, a silver lining is Russia agreeing to expedite weapons exports to India (notably the S 400 mobile, surface to air missile defence system), despite perceived opposition from China, during Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow in the middle of the Galwan crisis, which underscores Moscow’s red lines of maintaining (and demonstrating) strategic autonomy; specially when it comes to India and its arms exports. Deft diplomacy, is therefore, needed to firewall the India-Russia bilateral relationship from their growing engagements with other powers.It would be correct to assume that India and Russia share similar views on the rise of a hegemon in their respective neighbourhoods, and while the exclusivity of the past has dissipated, the trust and comfort of working with each other remains strong. The Chinese-Russian relationship is not impermeable, and the US and India should not shy away from proactive measures to exploit its fissures. Some important geo-political and strategic pointers for India are bulletedbelow:-

• The fluidity, turbulence and instability of bilateral and multi-lateral relations between nations is now a characteristic of the emerging ‘World Order’. More than ever before, India must remember and take heart from the truism that ‘there are only permanent interests’ with everything else being transient, implying India can always seek to improve its relations with nations, specially old friends like Russia.
• India must constantly assess any important changes in the way the US, Russia and China relate to each other in the near and medium-term.
• India has finally broken out of its reservations and hesitation in aligning with nations, and still maintain strategic autonomy based on issues/events, like its new-found strategic alliance with USA.
• India has also intensified its efforts to engage EU collectively, and European powers bilaterally, especially France, Germany, and UK (PM Johnson is initiating more positive moves vis a vis India). Concurrently India is also expanding its ties with Asian middle powers like Japan, Korea and Australia and re-energising and pro-actively maneuvering its ‘Look East’ policy.
• An analysis of India’s growing CNP, and diplomatic and soft power (including India’s substantial global role in vaccine diplomacy), suggests that barring China and Pakistan being exceptions, Indian has grown favourably in the eyes of the comity of nations which should be strategically exploited. 

Chinese and Russian Perception of Quad.                  

China and Russia view the Quad through the prism of security and see no other role, and are therefore quite apprehensive about its resurgence and activities. They are worried that Quad is getting firmly institutionalised, and it could become an Asian NATO with opportunistic countries jumping in.China also perceives that one of the main agendas of the Quad is to counter the BRI and slow/stall China’s inexorable growth. The recent warning to Bangladesh (12 May 21) by MrLi Jiming the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh surprised the world apart from ruffling Bangladeshi feathers, by an uncharacteristically aggressive statement. It warned Bangladesh that China-Bangladesh bilateral relations would be “substantially damaged”, if Bangladesh joined the Quad. Beijing has been openly critical of the Quad as an “exclusive clique” reminiscent of “cold war politics” being led by the US in an attempt to contain China. The Quad agenda is driven by the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) which not only ropes in Japan, India and Australia, but also intends to woo other countries, including ASEAN members, and South Asian countries such as Nepal and Sri Lanka. China feels that Quad does not respect the global multilateral international system with the UN at the core, but promotes a US-centered world order, which naturally impacts Russia. Therefore, if Bangladesh joins the Quad, it will be taken advantage of by India, the US and others. While Moscow has been more circumspect in her views (some speculate that Russia may even be keeping her options open regarding Quad), she too is worried about the geo-political upheaval the grouping may cause in the Indo-Pacific which most experts feel is now the central and most happening region of the World. All Quad members have been emphasising that ‘it’s an informal, essentially multilateral mechanism that right now convenes like-minded democracies, to coordinate in the Indo-Pacific and fundamentally to push forward the goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific region”. Beijing is deeply unsettled that a “Quad plus South Asian and other Indo-Pacific nations” would challenge China’s strategic outreach and act as a catalyst for a new trend in the region by effectively enabling the Quad’s expansion. While South Asia with an enlarging strategic influence, is not critical to China to dominate IOR and the Indo-Pacific, China’s warning to Bangladesh is clearly a signal that China is now confidently asserting her global role, and is sending a strong message that she will not take kindly to any nation joining an adversarial camp, and there will be a price to pay!

Indian Perspective of Quad. The geo-political-economic advantages of having a friendly, aligned Bangladesh and other SAARC nations as fellow members of ‘Quad Plus’ is obvious and is not being elaborated upon. The security dividend will be significant. India and other IOR littorals (like Sri Lanka, and Maldives) can jointly exploit the opportunities generated from the steady restructuring of regional and global trade and investment relationships, reducing dependence on China. A stable neighbourhood and strengthening of South Asian ties reinforced by common cause of Quad, reinforces internal stability, and catalyses ‘India’s Look and Act East’ policy with all nations being huge beneficiaries. China is too intertwined with the global countries economically, and too powerful for any nation to openly oppose it. For India too, the Quad is fundamentally a forum for diplomatic and economic cooperation, for orchestrating coordination in the production of global public goods, and to create a collective entity that could strengthen the larger rules-based order. For India, perhaps more than for any other Quad country, the idea of treating the Quad as a military alliance is currently fraught with risk. Indo-Pacific region that is free in particular of Chinese hegemony is the key takeaway for India, but it will not use the Quad mechanism as an instrument for the military confrontation of China.A revanchist Russia under Putin under the current geo-political Indo-Pacific environment may play coy and ‘run with the hare and hunt with the wolves’, to gain maximum benefits. For India, it will certainly be a diplomatic and geo-political coup of sorts if she induces Russia to participate with other countries in the Indo-Pacific mainly as part of Quad. India has been largely successful in managing the past flux in great power politics; it is even better positioned today to deal with potential changes among the great powers, thanks to the size of the Indian economy (it is the sixth-largest in the world), and a more broad-based foreign policy.

Conclusion

The world order is in flux, with an increased focus on the emerging fractious US-China relations with a high probability of it leading to a ‘new cold war; emerging geo-political primacy of the Indo-Pacific region; world reeling under a pandemic exacerbating economic, security and strategic balance; and an aggressive, assertive China which sees it as an opportunity to stamp its authority and bipolar status in the world stage.President Biden and the West continue with their confrontationist policies against their perceived non-democratic adversaries mainly China and Russia, driving them closer to each other. There is an undeniable triangular equation between US-China-Russia which in turn shapes global geo-political movements. Naturally, it has a direct impact on India, and she needs to manoeuvre deftly to manage, balance and exploit the triangular equation to her geo-political advantage. India has done admirably so far and since there are ‘only permanent interests’ India needs to stay ahead of the geo-political loop by playing her own ‘great game’. These are very interesting times and it remains to be seen how events pan out, and how soon India will be reckoned as a power to join the current ‘Big Three’ and become an important balancing pivot of a new ‘Quadrilateral’.

CERTIFICATE

The paper is author’s individual scholastic articulation. The author   certifies that the article is original in content, unpublished and it has not been submitted for publication / web upload elsewhere and that the facts and figures quoted are duly referenced, as needed and are believed to be correct. The paper does not necessarily represent the views of the CENJOWS.  

Disclaimer:  Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of CENJOWS.