Are we Building Military Capabilities Right?

Lt Gen Anil Ahuja, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM, SM, VSM & BAR (Retd.) – Distinguished Fellow, VIF
Background

2025 is the `Year of Reforms’ for the Indian armed forces, and the endeavour is to `Transform for the Future.’ This entails maintaining operational readiness and building capacities and capabilities across multiple domains in which the future threats are likely to manifest. With the experience of `Operation Sindoor’ still fresh and with Rs 40,000 Crores available at hand for Emergency Procurements (EP),^[1] the Services are busy planning and procuring military hardware for capability development.

The Indian Navy, presently holding nearly 140 ships/ submarines, is planning to become a 200- warship and submarine Navy by 2035 to protect India’s vast maritime interests against collusive threats. The Navy presently has 55 warships under construction in Indian shipyards at an overall cost of Rs 99,500 Crores. It also has Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) approved AONs (Acceptance of Necessity- approvals) for another 74 ships, costing nearly 2.35 Lakh Crores.^[2]

The Indian Air Force (IAF), meanwhile, has recently (re) initiated a proposal to the Ministry of Defence for the acquisition of 114 Rafale fighter jets, at an estimated cost of Rs 2 Lakh Crores, to make up its depleting squadron strength.^[3] In fact, recent reports indicate the Air Force contending that `the 42 number may be very small’ and that there is an urgent requirement to increase the benchmark number substantially.^[4]

The Indian Army is concurrently looking at acquiring nearly 1800 Future Ready Combat Vehicles (FRCVs), incorporating human-machine teaming and integrated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.^[5] According to another report, the future tanks will incorporate drones with each Main Battle Tank (MBT) for real-time information (ISR) and with micro munition capability.^[6] Also, in an endeavour to improve Army Air Defence capability, information has been sought (RFI) about various versions of Low-Level Light Weight (LLLR ) Radars, including for drone detection.^[7]

Besides the procurement plans of each service, an endeavour is also being made to institutionally reform the `Defence Acquisition Procedure’ by updating policies and processes. An updated `Technology Perspective and Capability Road Map’ (TPCR) was released on September 04, 2025.^[8] This document is designed as an unclassified version of the 10-year Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP), indicating future requirements of the armed forces to the industry.^[9] In another step in that direction, the Defence Procurement Manual (DPM) – 2009, the base document for `Revenue Procurements’, is being replaced by DPM 2025. The document was approved by the Raksha Mantri (RM) on September 14, 2025.<sup>[10]</sup> It is also learnt that action is in hand to update the Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020, the base document for `Capital Acquisitions’.

A common intent running through all these efforts is to achieve self-reliance through innovation and indigenisation, promoting active participation of private players, MSMEs, start-ups, along with the well-established Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). Endeavour is also to improve `ease and speed of doing business. These are welcome initiatives in uncertain times of fraying strategic partnerships and India’s technical talent facing an uncertain future in the US over issues related to H1B visas.

Are we Doing it Right?

India, the fourth largest global spender on Defence,^[11] the second largest importer of arms,^[12] invests substantially on defence to build strong armed forces. It also endeavours to strengthen the indigenous defence industrial base and refine the acquisition system to get the best value for the money spent. The question, however, is whether India is doing it right? Are the results commensurate with the efforts, and is the sense of direction, right?

It would be in order to critically examine the current process and to make suggestions for further reforms, where required.

On the Overall Sense of Direction

The recent experience of Op Sindoor (May 2025), the 2020 Eastern Ladakh standoff and the ongoing operations in Russia-Ukraine, and Israel-Gaza have prompted India’s defence planners to question themselves as to what kind of operations should the Indian armed forces be made ready for? For `all out,’ `limited,’ or `short and intense wars’ (from the perspective of geographic spread and duration); for `contact’ or `non-contact’ operations (from the perspective of mobilisation and physical employment of troops); `kinetic’ or `non-kinetic,’ primarily using `manned’ or `un-manned’ platforms (from the perspective of weapons used); Or as the Raksha Mantri (RM) stated recently, preparing to meet `invisible challenges’ emanating from unconventional threats.^[13]

While deliberating on the above, the dilemma is also of `affordably’ modernising and transforming the large-sized Indian armed forces. Should the limited defence budget be spent on: buying and sustaining modern variants of conventional weapon systems like tanks, Infantry combat vehicles, conventional artillery guns, manned 4th/5th generation fighter aircraft, manned surface ships and conventional/ nuclear powered submarines, OR direct resources to inducting emerging technologies and technology-enabled unmanned and autonomous platforms, loiter and precision munitions, net worked systems for multi domain operations? OR, focus largely on non-conventional domains of space, cyber, electronic, and cognitive warfare? And, while preparing to fight across multiple domains, what should be the India-suited inter-se weightage (percentage of financial resources) allotted to each domain for capability development (land, maritime, air, space, cyber, strategic capability, etc.)?

Such dilemmas should ideally be addressed through a `National Defence Strategy (NDS).’ In its absence (as is the case with India), the answer should emanate from the `Preamble’ to the Integrated Capability Development Plan (ICDP), which forms (should form) the very foundation of Defence Acquisitions. Sadly, post the `demise’ (discontinuation) of Long-Term Integrated Capability Development Plan (LTIPP 2012 – 2027) at the end of 12th Defence Plan, and since the advent of the concept of ICDP (October 2020), formulation of ICDP for the armed forces has remained a `work in progress’ (as per information available in the public domain).

So, while the Defence machinery strives (and spends) hard towards capability development, the fundamental questions related to the `chosen direction of capability development’ remain unanswered and `Integration’ remains elusive. Are we still `arming without aiming?’

The 2025 version of TPCR, superseding the 2018 edition, was released in early September. Designed to be an unclassified version of ICDP (erstwhile LTIPP), it is aimed at sharing with industry the Services’ nearly 15-year perspective on emerging combat technologies and their requirements for enhancing warfighting capabilities. It is designed to enable the private industry to step up R&D efforts, build production lines & assemblies to meet the requirements in a desired timeframe.

A perusal of this 138-page document indicates that it is largely a compilation of single-service requirements of conventional and technology-enabled platforms. Most requirements seem borne out of service–specific interpretation of its role and asset employment according to its own doctrinal perception of what the future wars would be and what role a particular service would perform. The visualised concept of operations seems largely unchanged, but for a sprinkling of some modern platforms and advanced systems.

A few significant service-specific requirements included in the TPCR are as follows:
Navy: Aircraft carrier with nuclear propulsion and Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS), 22 surface ships, 20 autonomous underwater vehicles, Close in weapon systems (Air Defence- quite like some held by Army and Air Force already) …
Army: 500 Scramjet-propelled Hypersonic missiles, 1800 next generation MBTs, 400 light tanks, 50,000 plus ATGMs, 70 HALE/MALE UAVs, 800 plus loitering munitions, AI-enabled network and more …
Air Force: 150+ Stealth UCAVs, 20 Stratospheric airships, 75 High Altitude Pseudo satellites (HAPS), 5 RF Sensor satellites, 350 plus MALE drones, 250+ anti-drone systems….

The TPCR – 2025 does contain a section on joint service requirements in segments of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) & Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), counter UAS systems, missiles and Directed Energy Weapons, munitions, CBRN equipment, EW and Communications, satellite-based applications, IT/ cyber security tools, etc.

While the requirements have been very diligently worked out by each service, it is difficult to discern the overall sense of direction, operational capabilities sought to be created and intra / inter service prioritisation.

A 15-20 year forecast of this nature, which entails extensive R&D, hiring suitable engineering manpower, and production-related investments by the industry, must be prioritised, time-lined, and budget supported with guaranteed acquisitions (indicating MOQs – minimum ordered quantities, to be acquired over an unspecified period, does not seem helpful enough).

It thus remains a moot question if we have the overall sense of direction and timing (i.e. duration over which to create capability) right?

A Possible Way Ahead

(This part may be read in conjunction with “The Dilemma of Future Capability Development of Indian Armed Forces” by the same author at https://www.vifindia.org/article/2025/july/28/The-Dilemma-of-Future-Capability-Development-of-Indian-Armed-Forces)

The recent experience of its own and the ongoing global conflicts suggest that India needs to prioritise building the undermentioned operational capabilities:

1. Robust integrated ISR capability, including underwater domain awareness, space-based surveillance and targeting capability (over and above the SBS-3 capabilities planned, which do not include targeting and communications).
2. Layered and integrated Air Defence to include Counter–UAS and missile defence capabilities (including for depth areas).
3. Integrated Command and control networks extending across the three services and multiple domains.
4. Long-range precision strike capability using the entire range of missiles, loiter and precision munitions, as well as conventional multi-barrel rocket launcher systems (MLRS), like improved versions of Pinaka, etc.
5. Cyber, Electronic Warfare and Cognitive Warfare Capability.
6. Development of AI capabilities related to target recognition, decision support, and autonomy.

Mission Sudarshan Chakra, announced by the Prime Minister on Independence Day 2025, is intended to protect important strategic targets (military and civil) by 2035.^[15] It is visualised to be the overarching, integrated national Air Defence umbrella (Ser (b) * above refers).^[16] This is one area where there is no scope for `single service capability development,’ as hitherto.

A fundamental change is recommended to the approach to Capability building of the armed forces. The future ICDP and TPCRs need to be made `Integrated Capability Centric,’ rather than being `service-specific,’ as is the practice now. Within the nationally accepted `operational priorities’, the acquisition requirements of each service and other associated agencies (ISRO Department of Atomic Energy, Cyber Agencies, etc.) must be identified and procured, ensuring synergy, compatibility, interoperability and avoiding overlaps.

Also, separate time-lined, multi-year budgets should be allotted to separate projects related to each field, rather than being allotted service-wise. With this centralised, domain–specific approach, relevant R&D organisations, academia, and industry could get plugged in to respective programmes. This will ensure a focused approach, regular mentoring, and work sharing.

The current system of `Make’ programmes, oriented towards indigenisation, though reviewed in the past, merits further refinement. Far too many projects are getting initiated under the `Make’ and even under iDEX / Aditi initiatives. These are only `loosely – related’ to the capabilities required on priority. Thus, while the talent gets identified and promoted till the `prototype’ stage, very few of these actually result in creating indigenous capability. An honest internal audit of the capability created through these programmes would suggest a course correction.

Conclusion

To conclude, some guiding thoughts which may be considered for focused capability development are as follows:

• The most important responsibility of higher defence and security leadership in the country is to define the nature of wars/conflicts for which the Indian armed forces need to be prepared and equipped.
• This would enable prioritising national defence-related capabilities to be created, which in turn should serve as the `guiding beacon’ for capability development by the services, related agencies, R&D organisations, industry, innovators, and academia. Absence of this fritters away national resources and efforts.
• A clear relationship between the `desired capability’ – `time over which to be created’ – and `financial allocation’ needs to be established. Defence budgets must shift from being mere `apportioning ‘ (13-15%) of the overall Union government expenditure.
• In the Defence sector, while operational and industrial capability development are interrelated, the former must be clearly prioritised over the latter.
• Distinctly different approaches need to be adopted for `immediate (short term) operational capabilities’ and `long term indigenous capability’ development. Mixing the two places unrealistic expectations of R&D, development, and production and dilutes operational readiness.

In the current unsettled global and regional geopolitical environment, India has to safeguard its national security and fulfil regional responsibilities as a `stand-alone’ power. Towards that end, a periodic review of the capability development efforts and results achieved is essential. This paper is an endeavour to support that effort.