Looking Beyond Operation “Sindoor”

Deepak Sinha

Tackling the Challenge of Conventional War in the Sub Continent

The pre-emptive punitive strikes by elements of the IAF and Army against terrorist camps and infrastructure at nine locations, some deep within Pakistan and POK, on the first day of Operation Sindoor, has been in many ways our military’s coming of age, in its first real brush with conventional warfare in the 21^stCentury.

It must have certainly come as a rude awakening to our frontline warriors because, till now, the impact of modern technology has mostly been in the ambit of lecture halls and theoretical discussions, or at best, to showcase capabilities to VIPs. Watching drone swarms and robotic dogs or MULE (Multi Utility Legged Equipment), to use their correct nomenclature, in demonstrations is one thing, to integrate them into operational doctrines, organisations, tactics and in manoeuvres, quite another. How far had we got with the latter till now is anyone’s guess, but certainly not where we needed to be.

Unquestionably, the strikes of 10^th May on the PAF air bases were accurate and effective and rendered them, at least temporarily, hors-de-combat. Thus, forcing them to approach us, maybe through the Americans, for an immediate cessation of hostilities, that continues to hold to this day. Notwithstanding how events played out, much of what transpired surprisingly continues to remain in the realm of speculation, leading one to believe that, especially for the IAF, it was indeed “a close-run thing”, as the Iron Duke had remarked after the Battle of Waterloo.

One wonders did we really agree to the cessation of firing because we had achieved our aims, as claimed, or simply because we didn’t have the wherewithal to continue, especially if there was serious escalation? Whatever be the reason, it is now clear that another 24-48 hours of similar strikes would not have allowed the Pakistani establishment to hide behind the false narrative they continue to propagate so effectively, and instead made clear to its citizens the adverse consequences of their military’s support for terror groups. By our actions, or rather lack of it, we have allowed their military to once again get away with lies that have coalesced popular support in their favour, the very reason for which they had conceived and undertaken the Pahalgam outrage.

It is an indisputable fact that our Air Force and Navy have always been cognisant of the critical role that ‘state of the art’ weapons systems and platforms play in any engagement with near-peer adversaries. It is another matter that lack of political vision or understanding of security issues, an inefficient DRDO and even more defunct DPSU’s, along with an lengthy and complicated procurement process have together conspired to ensure that our military remains perennially short of modern weaponry.

They have always had to fight with what they have, making up for their disadvantages with bare courage and sacrifice. In the present instance, the IAF leadership and air crews displayed remarkable resolve, courage and flexibility with their ability to think out of the box under pressure and come up with innovative tactics that allowed them to successfully target Pakistani air bases with no losses. None of this could have been achieved as effectively as it was, without the limited ‘state of the art’ platforms and weapon systems they had at their disposal.

It would also be quite fair to say that having seen the quality of the weapons and equipment of Chinese origin fielded by the PAF, we are now in a position to extrapolate as to the capabilities that the PLAAF, PLAN and the PLARF are likely to possess. Detailed assessments and analysis will allow us to appropriately reorganise, relocate and reequip ourselves so that we can effectively counter them. In this context the Indian Army, however, has a far more difficult job at hand, if it is to optimise the integration and utilisation of available technology to its advantage to match Chinese capabilities.

This time around there has been a fair amount of speculation that China provided critical assistance with its own equipment and manpower to enhance the PAF’s operational capabilities. That certainly bodes ill for the future and we should be fully prepared to tackle a situation in which both China and Pakistan will be working in tandem the next time around. It is imperative for the Army to urgently clear the decks and focus on its primary task, that of defence of the realm. It should insist on handing over all rear area security and counter insurgency operations to the local police, PMF and the CAPF. As a matter of fact it is time that, like in the United States, we too must have a law that prevents the military from being deployed for domestic tasks except in dire emergencies.

Such a change in emphasis and consolidation of the military would indeed be transformative. Relief from its counter insurgency role would allow us to disband the Rashtriya Rifles, resulting in tremendous savings in manpower. This can then be redeployed more optimally for countering the challenges posed by the PLA. For example, utilised for the raising of a third Mountain Strike Corps or additional amphibious and SOF elements if needed.

Another aspect that is equally important is that the end of British colonial rule led to the rise of a united India along the Westphalian model. The debilitating impact of Partition, Pakistan’s land grab of POK in 1948 and its continuing efforts, the loss of the Aksai Chin, that led to the border war with China in 1962, also became deeply ingrained in the collective Indian psyche. This forged a strong belief that the unity of India should not be put at risk again, and it forced governments to focus on protecting our sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal cohesion. This implied that any loss of territory, however temporary, would have grave political repercussions for the party in power.

Thus, our political leadership tacitly expects the military to be so deployed as to be able to defend every inch of territory, regardless of terrain or tactical considerations. This has meant that our forces along the LOC are deployed in a linear fashion with troops deployed in a manner as to ensure that all territory is constantly covered by observation and fire. Not only has this meant that many of our posts are located in tactically unviable or indefensible positions, but has also necessitated the deployment of additional forces. Furthermore, it has also curtailed the freedom of action of military commanders in the tactical and operational realm.

However, now there are sufficient reasons for trashing existing guidelines and expectations that require the Army to defend every inch of territory as that would allow us to hold compact defences with lesser manpower. For one, irrespective of the stated position on the issue of Kashmir, following the Kargil Conflict of 1999, the LOC is now seen as both the de facto and de jure IB by the international community. In the circumstances capture of territory along the LOC will be frowned upon and have adverse repercussions.

Secondly, our positions have been greatly strengthened with the construction of the fence along the LOC, the addition of enhanced surveillance capabilities and the ability to accurately target and dominate by fire, areas that are ahead of our defences. This last task has been greatly helped with the induction of loitering munitions, such as Kamikaze Drones. Lastly, because of the Government’s recent adoption of a far more muscular and proactive deterrent policy towards Pakistan, the Army will find it easier to engage and neutralise any attempt by Pakistani troops to occupy/enter any areas on our side of the LOC.

In the final analysis China, with the help of Pakistan, is intent on ensuring that our sphere of influence remains restricted to the Sub-Continent and we cease to aspire to a greater and more influential role in the world. Pakistan by itself, with its attempts at nuclear blackmail having been called out, no longer truly poses a conventional threat. It will continue to snipe at us, as it has been doing over the past three decades, but with increasing ineffectiveness, if we play our cards right.

Aggressive diplomacy with the covert use of force can ensure that the Pakistani military remains tied up in knots in quelling internal disturbances and preventing further partition of the State for the next decade or two. The only course available to us to prevent Chinese interference with our development is to focus on building up credible military capabilities, including forces capable of undertaking deep offensive operations into Tibet. Geography gives us a great advantage in the region, given our interior lines of communications, as Tibet remains difficult terrain with long lines of communication and a hostile population for the Chinese. One can be sure the PLA is well aware of its vulnerabilities and will act in a manner that does not require it to divert resources away from its ultimate prize, the taking of Taiwan.