Abraham Accords need a Palestinian course correction

Four years into the Abraham Accords, the devastating conflict in Gaza reveals a painful truth: Ignoring the Palestinian issue doesn’t eliminate it, it makes it explode. A course correction is urgently needed

September 15, 2020, was, in many ways, a controversial yet unique day in the history of the Middle East or West Asia. On this day, the US Administration engineered the so-called Abraham Accords, normalising ties between Israel and the Arab states of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which were later expanded to include Morocco and Sudan. The then US President Donald Trump’s major positive contribution to his foreign policy was this initiative, aimed at ensuring Israeli security, even as he abandoned many multilateral initiatives, including the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran, which destabilised the region. The results of this destabilisation are being felt today as the Israel-Hamas war continues into its 12th month with no winners, and West Asia on the boil.

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Trump had claimed, “We’re here this afternoon to change the course of history. After decades of division and conflict, we mark the dawn of a new Middle East.”

The Biden Administration attempted to expand the Accords, particularly by trying to woo the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which, along with other Arab countries, had developed a more practical and pragmatic approach towards ties with Israel. A certain “Palestinian fatigue” had set in across the Arab world, as the over 75-year-old, or even a century-old, unresolved Palestinian issue continued to fester in a low-key manner, threatening to erupt at any time.

Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner also attempted to resolve the Palestinian issue through his ‘Deal of the Century’. The problem was that, being a business tycoon, he approached the issue as a deal-maker, ignoring its emotional and equitable dimensions. Mere economic and financial incentives could not have resolved the issue without a Palestinian state that could live side by side in peace with Israel. The fate of that deal was sealed before it was even unveiled.

Even the UAE and Bahrain had at least overtly predicated the normalization, subject to the Palestinian issue being resolved, and a halt to settlements and encroachments on Palestinian land in the West Bank. This understanding was breached even before the ink on the agreement was dry and continues to be violated. While the Palestinian Authority had found a modus vivendi with the Israeli state, Hamas in Gaza maintained its militant posture. In 2021, a war broke out with Israel, and another conflict occurred in October 2024, unexpectedly for the powerful Israeli security establishment.

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However, the news of the impending normalisation of ties between Riyadh and Tel Aviv came as a bolt from the blue for the Palestinians, especially Hamas, which does not recognise the state of Israel and wants it deleted from the map. The Saudi-Israeli rapprochement would have jeopardised the Palestinian dream of being the custodian of the two holy mosques, a leader of the Sunni Islamic world, and the biggest power in the region. Hence, derailing it was a major objective for the militant Hamas. The unprecedented October 7 terror attacks against Israel ensued, killing 1,139 innocent Israelis, taking over 250 hostages, and injuring many others, while also busting the myth of the invincibility of Mossad, Shin Bet, and the IDF, as well as the hawkish approach of the ultra-right-wing government of PM Benjamin Netanyahu. The result, response, and retribution were as expected from the Israeli state: the ‘mowing of the grass’ approach with carpet bombing, aimed at destroying Hamas once and for all, while teaching a lesson to the Gazans, who have been almost razed to the ground.

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Over 40,000 Gazans have been killed and nearly 100,000 injured in the conflict, with over a million displaced. It remains unclear if the loss of much of their militant leadership has taught Hamas any lessons. The war continues, with every chance of escalation, as Iran and its major proxies—Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Kataib Hezbollah—mount pressure on Israel and the world by directly engaging in the conflict in support of Hamas.

Israel has also suffered significantly, both economically and in terms of military prestige. Its leadership faces accusations of genocide by many countries at the International Court of Justice, and there are calls for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue arrest warrants for PM Benjamin Netanyahu, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, and Hamas leaders. US bifocal diplomacy has led to a crisis of confidence as its influence over regional powers wanes, while the escalation of the war remains a stark reality.

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Before this war, the collaborative matrix between Israel and several Arab countries—except Sudan, which is going through a civil war—was increasingly becoming robust, with high-level exchanges and the opening of diplomatic missions. Trade, technology, tourism, sports diplomacy, and security cooperation were all on the upswing. Despite the ground realities of war, Israel’s bilateral trade has grown significantly with all three countries. Compared to the same period in 2023, bilateral trade with Bahrain in the first seven months of 2024 was up over 900 per cent, with the UAE by 4 per cent, and with Morocco by 56 per cent, according to the Abraham Accords Peace Institute. Although flights have been suspended, no signatory has recalled its diplomats. Jordan, which has a peace treaty with Israel, recalled its ambassador, while Turkey has suspended trade, recalled its ambassador, and President Erdogan, during his recent meeting with Egyptian President Sisi, called for an ‘Islamic Alliance’ against Israel. The new reformist Iranian President’s hands were tied with the killing of Hamas leader Esmail Haniyeh in Tehran, and he has been forced to expand the war’s contours, even through proxies. The situation remains volatile, which does not bode well for institutionalised cooperation between Israel and the Arab world in the short term.

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The I2U2 (Israel, India, UAE, and USA), the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, signed on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Delhi), and the IUSU (India, USA, Saudi Arabia, and UAE), along with the ongoing regional rapprochement, have come under stress. The Arab street has been mobilised, and the Palestinian issue has resurfaced, slowing the further intensification of engagement and cooperation with the Jewish state. Calls for ending the war, achieving a quick ceasefire, releasing the remaining hostages, and establishing a Palestinian state with a two-state solution have become louder, with preconditions set for the post-war scenario.

Although ongoing levels of cooperation are unlikely to stop altogether, its overt expansion is now in question. Perhaps the only positive outcome of this war could be a renewed push towards resolving the Palestinian issue, which might transform the Abraham Accords into a genuine platform for regional cooperation.

The author is the former Indian Ambassador to Jordan, Libya and Malta and is currently a Distinguished Fellow with Vivekananda International Foundation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.