Six Months of War

ByAjay Singh

Netanyahu is coming under enormous pressure, both at home and abroad, by his handling of the war.

As the Gaza war enters its seventh month, Israel is no closer to attaining its military aims than it was when it began. Their offensive has nothing to show, except for the destruction of Gaza, around 33,000 civilian casualties, the displacement of over 1.7 million, a likely escalation of the war, increasing global isolation and a growing divide within Israel itself in the manner in which the war has been conducted and the direction in which it is headed.
Israeli forces have rampaged the way from Gaza cityइस शब्द का अर्थ जानिये in the north, then towards Khan Younis in the South, and now are poised for operations in the southernmost tip of Gaza—Rafah, where they claim three Hamas battalions and the remnants of the Hamas leadership have been hemmed in. An offensive to clear this last enclave will be merely a repeat of their actions earlier—an indiscriminate bludgeoning that will attain nothing tangible, but cause even higher casualties amongst the 1 million Gazans concentrated there. Even though Netanyahu has promised to go ahead with the Rafah offensive, world pressure and the fact that even the USA has called the impending offensive as “The crossing of a red line,” may hold their hand.

Netanyahu is coming under enormous pressure, both at home and abroad, by his handling of the war. The war has cost Israel $60 billion and economic growth has dropped from 6.5% to 2%, largely due to an unpopular general mobilization which has diverted 3,60,000 professionals for military duty. He needs to maintain his strongman image to keep the support of ultra nationalist coalition partners, but it is increasingly clear within Israel itself, that the war is not attaining its aims. The hostages have still not been brought home. Only two have been rescued, with many killed by Israeli troops in cases of mistaken identity. Around 104 were returned in a prisoner swap in January, and the best chance of getting back the remaining 130 hostages lies in a peace deal. Although peace talks, brokered by Qatar and Egypt, are ongoing in Cairo, they have been increasingly stymied. Israel insists on the return of hostages in exchange for resumption of humanitarian aid and a ceasefire. Hamas insist on a permanent truce, which will pave the way for talks towards a just solution of the Palestinian issue. They fear – rightly so – that if the hostages are returned for a temporary ceasefire, they would lose their only trump card and Israel could then resume its offensive after a brief ceasefire.

International pressure could eventually lead to a cessation of the firing in Gaza, but it will not alleviate the situation in any way. For one, the war is expanding more widely then was anticipated and could erupt elsewhere. An Israeli air strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, killed 7 members of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, including Major General Mohammed Reza Zahedi, the commander of its elite Quds Force. This attack – coming soon after another Israeli strike killed 44 Syrian soldiers in Damascus – has raised the stakes and got Iran directly into the fray. The presence of two US carrier groups and a bolstered troop presence has so far deterred a direct Iranian involvement, but this action may force Iran to act—perhaps by a retaliatory strike on Israeli or US embassies and consulates in the region. It is likely that Iran may up the ante by activating its trump card—the Hezbollah.

Missile attacks and clashes between Israeli forces and the Hezbollah take place almost on the daily basis on the Lebanon border, and any of these can just go out of hand. Israel does anticipate operations there, and has pulled out one brigade from northern Gaza to reinforce the Lebanon border. Israel may be tempted to take on the Hezbollah, after they eliminate Hamas—but should they attack Lebanon, they could bite off far more than they can chew. An isolated and divided Israel would be so weakened by a war on two fronts, which they are unlikely to win, that its long-term security could be jeopardized for years thereafter.
Neither side—nor the USA—really wants a wider war and even at this juncture, it may be staved off with just a flurry of missile strikes and counter strikes. But even if that is avoided, what of Gaza in the post conflict phase? Even if a truce or a ceasefire does come about, what will be the future of Gaza and its people? Israel may be forced to occupy for a while, (as they did from 1967 to 2006) but it will solve nothing. The Palestinian Authority and Fatah could be enticed into taking over the administration of Gaza (after all, the governed it till 2007 when they were forced out by Hamas). Or perhaps, a UN humanitarian and peacekeeping force could be deployed there to oversee reconstruction and maintain a fragile peace. But none of this will repair the devastation that has been wrought, or curb the resentment of its shattered people.

The only saving grace—if any—is that the Abraham Accord, which gave Israel recognition and acceptance in the Arab states, still holds. The Arab world has been muted in its response, but that might change if the war widens. Saudi Arabia too has been measured and is apparently still being wooed to enter into a security and economic agreement with Israel and USA after the war. This of course, is largely to counter balance the threat that Iran poses in the region. But, very subtly, the war has changed the geo-political equations in the Middle East. The USA had already ceded influence to China and Russia and is trying to regain that strategic space. But though it tries hard to prop up its only ally in the region, ties with Israel are fraying, and it will no longer be able to condone its actions. Iran is tilting even more strongly towards China and further provocation by USA and Israel could strengthen that embrace. It could also hasten their nuclear program and add another dimension to the volatility of the Middle East. US attention has been distracted by Ukraine and Gaza, and these wars have taken Western eyes away from the main threat in the Indo-Pacific. China could use this to advantage and fish in the troubled waters of the Middle East. Russia too has its interests in Syria, Iraq and Iran which it would like to maintain, in spite of its pre-occupation with Ukraine. All this could lead to a re-alignment of power equations, not just in the region but across the world.

As Israel’s longest war continues (less the 1947-48 War of Independence), Israel finds itself more isolated and insecure than ever before. The war could see Netanyahu finally leave and a more moderate leadership could come in place, which may be willing to discuss constructively with the Palestinian people. Israel may have to come to terms with the two-state solution. It is being increasingly touted by Russia, China, Saudi and the Arab states and even the USA has been propounding it far more strongly than ever before. If nothing else, talks could restart on granting greater autonomy to Gaza and the West Bank. Whether the two-state solution eventually materializes or not (after all, it has been proposed as the solution since 1978, only to be successfully stalled for five decades) Israel would still find itself in the situation where it has attained little or none of his military aims, and its security and position in the region is more endangered than ever before.

Ajay Singh is the international award-winning author of seven books and over 200 articles. His latest book, “Ukraine, Gaza, Taiwan…A World at War” was recently released.