India must be wary of China’s global security plan

Lt Gen SL Narasimhan (Retd)
Adjunct Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House

THE Global Security Initiative (GSI) is third in the Chinese series, after the Global Initiative on Data Security (GIDS) and the Global Development Initiative. It was announced by President Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum for Asia in April 2022. However, the roots of this initiative lie in Xi’s speech at the fourth summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) on May 21, 2014, wherein he outlined the concept of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security in Asia. He advocated a regional security architecture and indivisible security. Indivisible security, which originated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975, meant that the security of one nation is inseparable from that of other countries in its region.

When President Xi proposed the GSI, it contained six commitments: maintaining common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries; respecting purposes and principles of the UN Charter; peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries; maintaining security in traditional and non-traditional domains; and upholding indivisible security. Thus, there is continuity in China’s approach to security. The difference in the two articulations by Xi is that the earlier one was regional, while the GSI is global.

China’s foreign office mandarins explained the GSI soon after it was announced. It was followed by a concept paper on the initiative, then Foreign Minister Qin Gang’s speech at the Lanting Forum, titled ‘The Global Security Initiative: China’s Proposal for Solving Security Challenges’ on February 21 last year and Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s keynote address during the Munich Security Conference the same month. In the 10th Xiangshan Forum held in Beijing last October, Assistant Foreign Minister Nong Rong mentioned that more than 100 countries and international organisations had expressed support for the GSI, and it had been written into a large number of documents between China and them.

The concept paper proposed 20 priorities and mechanisms of cooperation and ‘suggestions’ for platforms. The priorities included measures in traditional and non-traditional security domains. The concept paper also suggested action plans.

China has claimed to have worked on four broad lines of action towards the implementation of the initiative. The first is active participation in and promotion of multilateral security cooperation. Under this, China’s contribution to UN peacekeeping, arms control and demining operations are cited. The second is China’s efforts at mediation between various countries and in conflict situations. The Saudi Arabia-Iran rapprochement, China’s positions on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Russia-Ukraine and Hamas-Israel conflicts are quoted as its contributions. The third is China’s action and cooperation in non-traditional security areas, such as counterterrorism, cybersecurity, food security and climate change. Under this, many initiatives by China are mentioned, including the GIDS and the Global Initiative on Artificial Intelligence Governance. The last line of action is China facilitating the improvement of international security dialogue and exchange platforms and mechanisms. The China-Horn of Africa Conference, the Middle East Security Forum, discussions under the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and CICA and other forums have been cited.

According to Nong Rong, Beijing is likely to focus on expanding international consensus on common security, forging an effective paradigm for international security cooperation, exploring peaceful solutions to hotspot issues and promoting the reform of the global security governance system so as to ensure the steady and long-term progress of the GSI. A GSI forum on the lines of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum may be in the offing. The Dragon may encourage partners in the GSI to carry out bilateral and multilateral discussions under multilateral mechanisms like the UN, BRICS and the SCO. China’s efforts in the Hamas-Israel and Russia-Ukraine conflicts are likely to continue. Beijing may also strive to use the GSI as a platform for advancing the reform of the global security governance system.

From the explanations of the GSI, a few things stand out. One, the initiative was highlighted as Xi’s vision by almost all of them. Two, the GSI is part of “building a community with a shared future”, an overarching concept under which all the initiatives that China has announced in quick succession fit in. Three, indivisible security was given importance. Four, China is looking for an alternative security architecture. Five, GSI complements GDI, which in turn subsumes the BRI. Lastly, it appears that China is keen on leveraging the United Nations system to her advantage.

The GSI, like other initiatives announced by China, is prescriptive, with Beijing assuming a superior role. And that fits into her centenary goal of becoming a global power by 2049. It also looks as if China is trying to justify some of its actions through this initiative. There are many dichotomies between what China is proposing in this initiative and what it is practising, for example, its actions along the line of actual control with India and in the South China Sea.

India should closely monitor the progress that China is making on this initiative, as this will have direct security concerns for it. Though China supports a multipolar world officially, indications are that it prefers to be the unipole. Also, it does not seem to be willing to accept a multipolar Asia. Therefore, its efforts towards the GSI will impinge on India’s efforts to become a major power. India needs to think of alternative initiative(s) to ensure its place in the international domain, as it has come up with the idea of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, which seems to be gaining momentum.

Views are personal