Indian Army’s high officer casualty rate: Is it a worry?

Indian Army officers are least hesitant to face the first bullets and are confident of their training and ability to take full control under fire, perhaps one of the most challenging actions in the military profession.

The Army’s basic command-to-troops ratio for conventional combat is based upon the organisation at the unit and sub-unit levels of the Infantry, the branch which is involved in frontline operations.

To command 36 men of a platoon there is one officer. On a rough count, 20 officers are authorised to a unit of 850 soldiers making a ratio of 1:42.5. However, the sabre units which carry out most of the counter-terrorist operations in J&K are from the Rashtriya Rifles (RR); the strength of each unit is 1,100 soldiers. Although authorised almost 25 officers, these units are mostly manned by 15 due to a shortage of officers in the Army, thus making a ratio of 1:73. Yet when it comes to casualties, although there is no reliable data available, the ratio of officer fatal casualties in the RR, Infantry, Para SF and other units, and those injured in operations is much higher than the ratio of strength; almost the highest anywhere in the world.

Difference in operations

There is nothing mathematical about this as operations of this kind demand very close supervision. They are fleeting, with contact with terrorists occurring briefly before they try to make a break to escape. Terrorists rarely stay rooted to the ground to fight it out with the Army because the longer they are in contact the greater the chances and opportunities for the Army to proceed with its drills and prevent the terrorists from getting away. The nature of most search and destroy or intelligence-driven, point-specific operations of the Army is such that the first two minutes of the contact makes the difference.

In conventional operations the enemy attempts to defend territory and paces out the firing through effective fire control, thus limiting ammunition expenditure. Not so in the case of the terrorists. They attempt to bring down a heavy volume of fire right at the outset, cause maximum casualties and have little concern for fire control or ammunition conservation.

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In view of the above, the success or failure of a contact against terrorists, which occurs as a result of a search and destroy or intelligence-based mission, depends largely on the early part of the encounter. The Army’s conventional operational contact drills are much more sequential and time is not of such consequence unlike the dynamic and fleeting nature of operations in counter insurgency/counter terrorist (CI/CT) operations. The necessity of officers being well up in the order of march in a search and destroy operation can hardly be over-emphasised. Intelligence-based operations are also mostly driven by the intelligence gained by the same officers who usually lead the operations. Their presence ensures timely decision making and quick regaining of command and control once the contact takes place.

Displaying courage

The human tendency, especially of those who are new to such operations, is to hit the ground and get behind cover; that anyway is the academy teaching too. How quickly can the troops then carry out manoeuvres under fire depends largely on the presence of junior leaders well up. Indian Army officers are least hesitant to face the first bullets and are confident of their training and ability to take full control under fire, perhaps one of the most challenging actions in the military profession. The ability to give directions while keeping oneself and the troops protected is not something ordinary human beings can execute unless trained, confident and fearless.

Terrorists are also aware of this tendency on the part of our officers and they attempt to identify them in the rank and file to specifically target them. Officers who have been deployed in an area for a long time do get identified by their persistent presence in operations; well known to sources, local rural folk, terrorists and over ground workers (OGWs), thus making them vulnerable.

Optimising efforts

There are often allegations that junior officers tend to take risks and expose themselves often for the sake of winning decorations. This is an overstatement. Our officers realise that the optimising of all efforts finally brings positive results when they provide both directional and ‘follow me’ leadership to their troops. A well trained sub unit is always effective but to ensure fail-safe results in an environment where demand on decision making could be in split seconds, the presence of an officer at the hotspot makes a huge difference.

The Indian Army’s higher formations do give advisories for more balance in the presence of officers in the execution of operations but obviously much depends on the personality, dash and verve of our tactical leaders. They all optimally train their sub units but also realise that the troops always look towards officer leadership, which in the case of the Indian Army can never be found wanting.