PLA’s Military Strategy and Guidance : A Historical Perspective by Lt Gen P R Shankar (R)

Published also in The Eurasian Times as an oped : US Military’s ‘Three Superiorities’ Hold China’s PLA At Bay; Shock On Himalayan Border Exposed Its Flaw

The national interests of a country provide the guidance for its military strategy. Invariably these interests are a derivative of  the core interests enshrined in its constitution duly blended with its environmental realities. The guidance is normally in the form of a national security document. In its absence it could be based on tradition, practice or  derived values. The  Peoples Liberation Army is different on this score. It is politically driven.  It functions on military guidance provided by the  Chinese Communist Party. The Party line about warfare and national defence issues is based on the  thoughts of Karl Marx, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and now Xi.  A fundamental fact, never to be forgotten,  is that PLA must reinforce the CCP’s political authority.  Further, the military guidance is individualistic and changes with each leader in power. Every leader who has ruled China has fashioned and shaped the PLA as per his world view. 

The first and foremost fact is that the PLA is short on history. It is not an army which can trace its lineage to the Middle Kingdom for its martial traditions. Its origin is directly related to the birth of the communist party. Secondly, between the teachings of the venerable Sun Tsu and Mao there is a lack of military tradition altogether. The second fact is that it is a task oriented force, which has had to respond to the dictates of each leader in power. The third fact is that the PLA has a significant role in keeping the CCP in power. Hence the political authority always endeavours to ensure that the party must control the gun. Resultantly, there is always an underlying tension between the party and the PLA which erupts from time to time in the form of purges and unceremonious sackings. Fourthly, the societal conditions under which PLA came into being have significantly changed. In fact, they are almost unrecognisable today from the days of the yore. A combination of all these factors makes the PLA an unique force to deal with. Notwithstanding all this, the PLA has grown to be a formidable force as China has risen. Hence one must understand the way it has evolved strategically over time rather than merely looking at the quantification of numbers or its organisational capabilities.  

The Main Strategy -Active Defence

Active Defence is China’s main military strategy.  It needs understanding.  Active Defence has meant different things at different points of time. In Mao’s time it connoted trading space for time, using guerrilla tactics and wearing an invader down. Deng Xiaoping’s concept of Active Defence meant keeping the enemy far away from  China’s coastline and centres of economic growth. It also meant protecting its offshore assets with stronger maritime and air forces. Jiang, Hu and Xi have expanded Active Defence to encompass space and cyber domains with an enhanced offensive intent and aggressive deterrent posture. As per one analysis ‘it is defensive at the strategic level of war but often offensive at the operational and tactical levels’. In its latest manifestation it appears to be an offensive at all levels as China tries to attain Xi Jinping’s China Dream. 

Mao’s People’s War – The First Strategy

Mao’s ‘People’s War’ was the concept with which the PLA was born and nurtured. After founding the PRC in 1949, this fundamental concept stayed till about 1978. ‘People’s War’ propounded use of military force  to liberate people from the unfair social circumstances and imperialist control which they were subject to. However Mao also used this concept to carry out his ill-fated reforms and purges. When China acquired nuclear capability in 1964 things started changing. In a first of reforms, Mao directed the PLA to prepare to fight ‘imminent war, major war and nuclear war’. The  Korean War experience and China’s nuclear capability ushered in the concept of  ‘People’s War Under Modern Conditions’.  This concept lasted till the late 1970s. In this period  ‘Active Defence’  focussed on winning early battles closer to China’s borders as also facilitating transition  to offensive operations a la Korean War. China’s newly acquired nuclear capability led to a concept of deterrence in which its  more powerful adversaries (USSR and USA) are prevented from crossing the nuclear threshold. 

Deng’s Philosophy – Local War Under Modern Conditions

Deng Xiaoping ushered in ‘reform and opening’ after Mao’s death in 1978. ‘National Defense’  was among the ‘four modernizations’ espoused by Deng. China’s military modernization drive began in earnest.  The war with Vietnam in 1979 convinced Deng that PLA needed deep rooted transformation. Since then, the effort has been to transform the infantry heavy PLA from a low-technology force with a continental outlook into a high-technology, networked force with an increasing emphasis on joint operations,  naval and air power projection. As part of these reforms, PLA was to become a modernized force that could prosecute combined arms operations with a unified command. It also had to develop enough deterrent capability so that the USA or USSR do not start a nuclear conflict. Lastly, China had to develop /procure high-tech weapons to be able to fight in a battlefield of the future under modernized conditions. This gave way to Deng’s concept of ‘Local War Under Modern Conditions’ in 1985. As per this concept  the emphasis of PLA operations  shifted to speed, mobility, and lethality rather than the protracted attrition of People’s War. This was also the period when China grew and the threat of it being invaded receded permanently. However the threat of great damage being inflicted on its economic centres grew. PLA modernisation started in real earnest in this period. However throughout this period, as PLA was being modernised to defend against external threats, its internal political role also grew. 

Jiang’s Guideline – Local War Under Modern Informatized Conditions 

The ‘networked precision strike’ capabilities of USA in the 1991 Gulf War constituted a ‘revolution in military affairs’. The Chinese realised that they were not prepared to deal with the warfighting capabilities which USA had displayed. It pushed them into further capability enhancement to expand  China’s air and maritime defensive perimeters. PLA thus initiated its  third set of reforms so that it could fight local wars under modern high tech conditions. They began equipping their Second Artillery, Army, Air Force and Navy with advanced weapons whilst downsizing troops.  In 1993,  Jiang issued strategic guidelines of ‘Local Wars Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions’. The guidelines postulated the principle of ‘three attacks, three defences’. The three attacks were attacking enemy stealth aircraft, cruise missiles, and helicopters. The three defences were against precision strikes, electronic warfare , and reconnaissance. In 1999, Jiang modified  ‘Local War Under Modern, High-Tech Conditions’ to ‘Local War Under Modern Informatized Conditions’. This was the start of the ‘informatisation of PLA. Jiang also promulgated  ‘The New Generation Operations Regulations’. These regulations mandated PLA to develop capabilities for joint campaigns in air, sea, space, land, and electromagnetic domains.

Hu’s Local Wars Under Informatized Conditions – System Destruction Warfare

Hu Jintao laid emphasis on concepts and capabilities to respond to threats from USA which was decidedly a technologically superior foe.  In 2004, in accordance with this thinking Hu promulgated the principles for ‘Local Wars Under Informatized Conditions .  In 2005, Hu made PLA think on a systems approach to warfare. As per this thought process, war is not  a contest between units, arms, services, or even specific weapons platforms, but is a fight between the operational systems of adversaries. The endgame was to destroy the operational system of the adversary. This was labelled as the systems destruction warfare. The ‘system-of-systems operations’  focuses on joint units with integrated command networks that enable key  strikes against the combat networks and systems of an advanced adversary.  In this mode of conflict, confrontation between  systems takes place beyond the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. Outer space , cyberspace, electromagnetic, and even psychological domains are part of the war space.  This was the start of multidomain operations as we know it today. 

Xi Jinping’s China Dream : Win Informatised Local Wars 

Xi Jinping  ‘China Dream’ is of a modern, strong, and prosperous country. Implicit in the China Dream is the ability to capture Taiwan militarily and ‘Rejuvenate’ the Chinese Nation. In 2017, Xi laid down three goals for the PLA – to achieve mechanization and networking by 2027, complete military modernization by 2035 and to have a “world-class” military by 2049. Xi has also initiated the most ambitious reform and reorganization of the PLA since the1950s. He has done this by introducing the theatre command system and by establishing  two additional forces ie the PLARF and PLASSF equivalent to the Army, Navy and Air Force. He has shifted focus to try and make China a great maritime nation. Simultaneously, he has also consolidated  his and the party’s hold over the PLA.

 In  2015 Xi gave directions for the PLA to develop capability to  win “Informatized Local Wars”.  In his thought process, information is both the domain in which war occurs and is also the  central means to fight wars. As per PLA ‘s new doctrine, war is now a confrontation between “information-based systems-of-systems”. Xi recognised the strength of USA in informational (electro- magnetic, space, cyber and cognitive) and maritime domains. Hence a major tenet of China’s  approach is to deny USA access to operating in areas that hold Chinese interests at risk. A guiding principle which underpins the PLA strategy is ‘Three Superiorities’. These are  superiority in three main domains—information, air, and maritime—with the information domain as the most important. The centrality of information as an instrument in prosecuting and winning wars is the issue to be noted. The PLASSF is the instrument which is expected to provide the PLA with information dominance.  As per Xi, his “fully modernized” force in 2035 should be capable of joint operations through information and other superiority which will enable the CCP to achieve its political objectives while controlling the scope and scale of conflict. A notable aspect of PLA thinking is that in the era of multidomain operations combat space is shrinking, but war space has expanded. 

Analysis

The historical perspective of China’s military strategy explains and guides the force structure,  capability enhancements  and operational thought processes of  PLA. The issue which is notable and apparent is that as China’s economy has risen so have the ambitions of the leadership and capabilities and PLA. However it is to be seen if this reverses in tune with China’s economic slowdown. A continued upsurge in PLA capability in the face of its downturn should set alarm bells off at some time in India if not elsewhere.  

Political guidance and military strategy of the PLA in the first three decades of China’s existence was based on military experience during combat operations against the United States, the Soviet Union, India, and Vietnam. In the four and a half decades since the Vietnam war, the PLA has not fought a war. Its strategy is based on others experience and is untested. Many aspects of the PLA strategy are largely theoretical. For example the centrality of information , utility of rockets and reliance on hi-tech is limited in battle. This was proven in the Ukraine and Israel conflicts. The performance of the PLA in Eastern Ladakh where they were clearly unnerved by India’s manoeuvre on the Kailash Range was also found severely wanting.  

The PLA is a dual tasked force. It is being heavily modernised to defend against external threats. However in the process it is getting more powerful politically. Resultantly, it poses a threat to the leadership. As a consequence, the Party leadership controls the gun by repetitive purges. The leadership of the PLA  appears shaky after so many purges and sackings. Hence their ability to execute the complicated strategy  as per its political masters is suspect in the absence of continued professional military leadership. 

In seventy years the PLA has gone from being a guerrilla force to a modern army with high tech systems. The pace of change is rather fast. Further this rapid change is happening when unforeseen societal and demographic changes are occurring in China. Overall there appears to be a mismatch between the ambitious political guidance, the high flown military strategy, lack of military leadership, corrupt practices and the actual ability to pull it off on ground. These are weaknesses which any discerning enemy will exploit.  

REFS :-

fhttps://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46808.pdfhttp://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4887928.html

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