Navigating diplomacy: Kenya’s President Ruto set sail for enhanced maritime cooperation with India in maiden visit

The joint statement and the joint vision statement on maritime security both raised the idea of defence cooperation to a new level and momentum

The first visit by the new Kenyan President, William Ruto, to India is significant in many aspects. With the joint communique and the India-Kenya Joint Vision Statement on Maritime Cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region – “BAHARI”, the inclusion of Kenya into India’s SAGAR and Indo-Pacific policy seems to be moving ahead. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the original three members of the East African Community, all have the imprint of the Indian military in their training establishments. In Uganda, a military training team still exists.

Among them, Kenya is the most reticent in engaging India in defence matters. For most of its history, Kenya aligned with the West. During the Ukraine and Israel crises, it voted with the Western bloc, but economically in the last two decades, Kenya has rapidly moved closer to China.ADVERTISEMENT

Now, Kenya is gently balancing itself strategically vis-a-vis China’s tight economic embrace. Under Ruto, there is some reconsideration. While there is no major anti-Chinese thrust in the statement with India, it is like dealing with an ASEAN country, which will hedge its strategic bets by showing signs of autonomy but continue a close economic partnership with China. Kenya is showing signs of that effort.

Kenya is not a buyer of Indian weaponry or defence equipment, unlike Mozambique or Tanzania. Neither is it openly accepting of India’s Indo-Pacific policy like Tanzania. However, its army chief, Lt Gen Peter Njiru, participated in the Chiefs conclave alongside Afindex 2023. A Kenyan defence contingent participated in the event in March 2023. General Njiru spoke about training, capacity building, knowledge and skills enhancement so that African militaries can face the security challenges they are now confronted with. Both sides agreed to expand training with the deputation of Indian experts. What would be the main areas of cooperation under this vision statement that India and Kenya could now look at?

The MOU between Goa and Kenya Shipyards could open the path to assist Kenya in developing its boat building, repair and maintenance capacities. Concerning maritime cooperation, India and Kenya are both charter members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association and both want to pursue it. Kenya has never chaired IORA, and given its rising stature, should be encouraged to do so after India’s term concludes in 2027. India and Kenya would increase their maritime domain awareness cooperation. India’s IFC-IOR for collective security in the Indian Ocean region will engage with Kenya’s maritime agencies. This needs clarity on the Kenyan side because good ideas like this can often get mired in a lack of clear responsibility. Similarly, with sharing white shipping information, another area has been agreed upon. Kenya must agree to participate in future exercises in India, including in the next edition of the Milan exercise in 2024 where both aircraft carriers are likely to be deployed.

India and Kenya have both been victims of international terrorism and share antipathy towards such activities. They agreed to cooperate, including to deter terrorist proxies from committing cross-border terrorism. While India has suffered from Pakistan, Kenya has Somalia-based groups as its scourge. A bilateral cooperation framework to enable the respective security institutions to cooperate on matters related to terrorism and transnational organized crime is on the anvil. This is important as the coast around Mombasa has often been used by drug syndicates, including those from the Indian subcontinent, to flourish when pressure on them in the southern corridor increases.You May LikeShe Might Lose Her Life Due To Blood Disorder. Please Help!KettoLearn More  by Taboola Sponsored Links 

Kenya has always been apprehensive about criticising Pakistan in any way because their tea exports have a very large dependence on the Pakistani market. This is, of course, a consequence of the nature of India-Pakistan relations. Given Kenya’s small export base, it remains important to note. Pakistani-affiliated syndicates do operate in the underbelly of Kenya. Arshad Sharif, an anti-government Pakistani journalist, was killed in Kenya last year. Two Indian media men, Zulfiqar Khan and Mohamed Kidwai, are missing in Kenya for a year.

The joint statement and the joint vision statement on maritime security both raised the idea of defence cooperation to a new level and momentum. This is important. Kenya is among the stable countries in Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa where Ethiopia, Sudan and South Sudan suffered from internal problems and instability in recent years. Kenyan stability and its core role as a leading economy of the East African Community (EAC) give it an important role that makes the EAC attractive to others. Earlier, Rwanda and Burundi had joined the EAC, and South Sudan joined when it became independent in 2011. Now, the largest Central African country, the DR Congo, which has a port on the Atlantic Ocean, has joined the EAC, with Somalia being the latest inclusion. The success of the EAC’s economic partnership depends on a secure and stable environment. Since many of these countries are IOR hinterland, it is in India’s interest to work with them because these are also India’s growing markets for trade and investment.

Kenya has finally agreed to borrow more heavily from India and the line of credit for $250 million was announced. This is mainly for the agriculture sector. There has been no push to acquire Indian defence equipment even though a line of credit will be available. This will take time and persuasion.

Missing from the joint statements is much enthusiasm about the African Union or the East African Community. There is gratitude to India for including the AU in the G20. Kenyan enthusiasm for this is muted, as how that will help Kenya remains fuzzy to them. From the Indian side, there is a continued avoidance of dealing with regional economic communities, which means no mention of the EAC, the COMESA, and the IGAD for the Horn of Africa.

To enhance maritime security and defence cooperation, Kenya would continue to include institutional participation in IORA. Cooperation under the Djibouti Code of Conduct and the Jeddah amendment to deal with nontraditional threats, supporting HADR and the blue economy is envisaged.

Providing training and capacity building, particularly for nontraditional threats to Kenyan defence forces, may bring Kenya more significantly into sharing India’s SAGAR and Indo-Pacific strategies.

The writer is a former ambassador to Germany, Indonesia, Ethiopia, ASEAN and the African Union. He tweets @AmbGurjitSingh. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.

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