Israel into Gaza: The travails of urban hybrid war

A ground incursion into North Gaza is almost a certainty. Contingent upon the relative success of the IDF or Hamas, the future course will depend

Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

In response to the bloodiest attack in its 75-year history, Israel has vowed to destroy Hamas. Image Courtesy Reuters

The situation in the Israel-Hamas standoff is rapidly deteriorating, with Israel holding out the threat of an invasion of Gaza to weed out the last Hamas terrorist. Obviously, Israel is angry and has all the reason to be. One of the most dastardly and brutal terror attacks has been launched on its territory, and scores of innocents have been killed. No nation needs counsel of restraint when it is subjected to such an act because the human desire for retribution is strong. It is easy for the international community to advise restraint, but it is well known that the advice will rarely be respected or followed.

In the same breath, it must be stated that much of the world holds the current Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu responsible for taking Israel into this mess by shunning the more moderate elements of the Palestinian leadership and allowing Qatar’s financial backing to Hamas that has apparently enabled it and empowered it to undertake such conflict initiation.ADVERTISEMENT

Essentially, the world is facing one of the most complex situations it has ever encountered. Four major wars fought in these lands in the past were straightforward battles between standing or mobilised armies employing conventional military means and aiming primarily at the destruction of the adversary’s war machine and the capture of maximum territory to achieve victory. Somehow, despite Israel’s military victories in all the wars fought over the Palestine issue, none could be converted into a strategic victory to resolve the vexing and long-standing problem. In current times, conventional war is passe; it is hybrid warfare that rules. To achieve victory in hybrid situations and resolve a problem such as the one involving Palestine may well be considered something near impossible.

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Israel has achieved military victory several times, even by turning on its head any setback at the outset. However, a strategic victory that puts an end to conflict has been elusive. In the past, its conventional military victories against Egypt helped transform the Egyptian mindset, leading to the peace process and eventual stabilisation of relations. In hybrid mode, conflicts rarely lead to comprehensive victories. So, what could Hamas have imagined would be the end result of its initiation of conflict on 7 October this year? It perhaps wished to achieve something so big that an Israeli response would be inevitable. The more brutal the initiation, the more irrational could be the Israeli response, in the heat and anger of decision-making amidst the political embarrassment due to the severe setbacks. Perhaps Hamas placed its bets on this and the inevitable humanitarian situation that could be created, hoping that the international community would be constrained to force Israel to withhold retributive action. This constraint was never possible, and Hamas has badly miscalculated the stakes.

Lots of interest is being generated in the Indian media on how the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) will strategize towards the objectives of the operations they are about to launch. Israel would be seeking an aim for its operation. Please remember that no military operation starts without a stated aim, and from that aim, the objectives evolve. Even before we embark to discuss that we need to clarify the universal concepts of urban warfare as applicable here. In this particular case, it is urban warfare in a hybrid environment where terrorist elements are the adversaries.

If Israel decides to make ground incursions into the areas in North Gaza vacated by the population for the purpose of hunting down the Hamas leadership and destroying Hamas military wherewithal, it will be subjected to all the known and unknown travails of urban hybrid warfare. Urban settings as dense as Gaza require manpower-centric operations. Tanks and Infantry Combat Vehicles (ICVs) are effective in reducing resistance but are also extremely vulnerable to short-range anti-tank weapons, which Hamas has in abundance. To prevent this, attacking Israeli troops will use accompanying infantry subunits, which in turn are extremely vulnerable to mines, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and booby traps. The maze of underground tunnels that are reported to exist (commonly called the Gaza Metro) will in all probability have many concealed and camouflaged exits and entrances to enable small teams of Hamas elements to emerge for brief moments to target armoured vehicles and accompanying hardware. With no qualms about ethics or rules of war, Hamas may use human shields from within the local population.You May LikeDiya Needs Your Support To Live A Better Life. Please HelpKettoLearn More  by Taboola Sponsored Links 

In turn, Israel can also display disdain and use unrestricted artillery and rocketry to take out the targets. The long and short of the analysis is that this could be a long and solid slogging match, provided Hamas has prepared itself. From the methods used for the initiation of conflict, it appears that Hamas could be well prepared for an Israeli onslaught into the urban area of Gaza. Israel appears prepared for the long haul and is taking its time in initiating the ground incursions to prevent being surprised once again. However, it must be fully aware of the magnitude of casualties that it could suffer. A few years ago, similar incursions led to almost 66 Israeli soldiers being killed and many more wounded. For Israel’s size of population, these are monumental casualties, especially when it has already lost 1500 civilians and soldiers killed and injured.

The nearest similar Indian military experience of hybrid war in an urban setting is that of the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) in the intense phase of Operation Pawan in October–November 1987.The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), after reneging on their commitment to be disarmed, decided to contest the presence of the IPKF. The Indian Army chose to capture and occupy Jaffna city, an urban centre not as dense as Gaza. It commenced disastrously with a poorly conceived helicopter-borne (HB) operation to target the LTTE leadership in Jaffna. After sustaining heavy casualties in the HB operation, it advanced on multiple axes with an Infantry Brigade Group each. There were insufficient tanks and ICVs to lead all columns, and a few that were available suffered kills due to IEDs and rocket fire. There was limited artillery and very few maps. It thus became an infantry advance against a wily set of renegade terrorists who intimately knew the layout of Jaffna city.

The Indian Army suffered the loss of 500 soldiers killed in action before finally capturing Jaffna. It immediately set up an administration for the city to prevent a humanitarian situation but continued fighting the LTTE through small-scale responses to the strikes by LTTE terrorists. It took a division-sized force of approximately 20,000 troops plus Special Forces to handle Jaffna for two years after the intense phase.

The military aim of the IDF could be ‘to dismantle the Hamas capability to target Israel at will and render it ineffective’. Lots of inferences can be drawn from such an aim, which is definitely not the end of all potential aims. This may initiate many discussions on what should be the final aim and objectives of the IDF, and should that involve an occupation of Gaza.

The Israeli Army has Gaza well mapped out. It has all the weaponry for close-quarter combat, including ways of blasting the tunnels, but in all probability, Hamas too is well prepared and luring the Israeli Army. There will be extensive use of surveillance and armed drones since Iran is the nation that has developed them in plenty. Hamas may hold a segment of the civilian population within Gaza to project a humanitarian situation and pose a quandary for both Israel and the international community. Hamas may also have some hostages with it, which they may hold a little more professionally than what they earlier demonstrated. That could mean a problem for the IDF.

For Israel, the focus on the objective of killing the last terrorist may be unrealistic and may entail overkill in the aim. It would require Israel to hold Gaza with troops and thus suffer casualties. The million-strong population in North Gaza, which has been asked to vacate at any cost, will not be able to squeeze into the already cramped South Gaza and could spill into Israeli territory, where new enclaves could form, and Hamas elements could also sneak into these, creating an altogether new threat.

To avoid further humanitarian disaster and suffering, the international community should put an end to the bloodletting, but it may not be politically possible for Israel’s leadership to agree to this. A ground incursion into North Gaza is almost a certainty. Contingent upon the relative success of the IDF or Hamas, the future course will depend. Till then, no serious international effort towards peace is likely, and the Palestinian people, long the sufferers of strife, are likely to suffer even more.

The writer is a former GOC of the Army’s 15 Corps. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely that of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.

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