2021 ASEAN’s new realities

BY Ambassador Gurjit Singh

The 38^th and 39^th ASEAN summits convened on 26 October, under the chairmanship of Brunei. Due to the pandemic, the semi-annual summit was held in the virtual format – the third virtual meeting since 2020. In April 2021, a Leaders’ meeting was held physically in Jakarta, and not in Brunei, and therefore is not considered a regular summit.

ASEAN summits often tend to be routine affairs with long joint communiques. This one had 102 paragraphs![1] It was to be Brunei’s great moment – unfortunately curtailed due to the pandemic. Brunei last chaired ASEAN in 2013 and will next chair ASEAN a decade from now in 2031. In 2022 Cambodia will Chair ASEAN.

Under the Chairmanship of Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, Brunei’s theme for the summit was ‘We Care, We Prepare, We Prosper’[2]. The idea was to pursue family values to build a harmonious and resilient community with the people at its centre; Several resolutions under the socio-cultural community were passed to focus on this.

Given the context of an increasing power rivalry in the region, the Summit had some interesting characteristics.

First, it took place after the Quad, at its two summits, had made overtures to ASEAN.[3] The Quad separated the military component of its engagement and put forth greater functional engagement with ASEAN. Simultaneously, AUKUS was created, causing an ambivalence among ASEAN countries on how to deal with it,[4] especially as ASEAN is also marking the 30th anniversary of its partnership with China.[5]So, while this Summit achieved for ASEAN, a better centrality in the thinking of its partners, its geographical positioning is in a vortex of the Indo-Pacific region where competitive rivalry is increasing, and has left ASEAN perplexed on how to deal with it.

Second, this was the first time that ASEAN quasi-suspended a member state from attending the summit. Myanmar, which had a military coup in February 2021, was invited to a Leaders meeting in April, where their military leader Gen. Min Aung Hlaing participated. They agreed on a five-point consensus. Myanmar, having achieved ASEAN engagement, did not implement the agreement with ASEAN. An emergency ministerial meeting held a week before the summit, revoked the participation of Myanmar’s military leaders and its former political leadership. Instead, ASEAN decided to invite a non-political representative in the form of Myanmar’s permanent secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Chan Aye. The military regime declined that invitation, feeling it degraded Myanmar’s position at the Summit.

Thus, Myanmar was not present at the Summit.

This is the sternest action ASEAN has ever taken against a member state. Myanmar was told as part of the joint communique that while noninterference in internal affairs of a member state remained a principle of ASEAN, abiding by the other aspects of the ASEAN charter were equally important. ‘…the need to strike an appropriate balance to the application of ASEAN principles on the situation in Myanmar’ was mentioned in paragraph 102 of the Communique.[6] This made ASEAN look more serious than it has been before, showing that it could take cognizance of issues among its member states.

Third, ASEAN welcomed the ASEAN Trade in Services Agreement. It has resolved to expedite the process of ratification of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement, which still has only three ratifications. It needs approval from one more non-ASEAN state and three more ASEAN states to come into effect. The signatories are hopeful that RCEP will meet its deadline and come into force in January 2022.[7] Of interest to India was that ASEAN agreed that some of its Free Trade Agreements, including with India, would be reviewed for an upgrade. India has been seeking a review due to implementation flaws. ASEAN was slow to respond, but now appears have relented.

Now, ASEAN is seeking to expand its imprint. The Chairman’s Statement talks of greater interaction with other regional and international bodies. It has evolved to include organisation-to-organisation discussions with the EU and the OECD. It will expand engagement with the 96 non-ASEAN Ambassadors Accredited to ASEAN (NAAAs)[8]

The Summit approved the decision by the Leaders in April to start a dialogue partnership (DP) with the UK since it had left the EU after Brexit.[9] In effect, that decision breached the moratorium set by ASEAN to restrict the DPs to 10. Since they are now 11 DPs, ASEAN leaders asked their foreign ministers to review the moratorium on DPs, keeping in view the ASEAN Community Vision Post-2025[10] – which embodies the objective of increasing the ASEAN relationship with those who recognise ASEAN centrality, openness and inclusivity and its ASEAN outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

This will certainly open the gates for further DPs, though the capacity of the ASEAN Secretariat to service them remains in doubt. Norway, Pakistan, Switzerland and Turkey are already sectoral dialogue partners. Germany, France, Italy and Chile are in a separate category of development partners.[11] What is of concern to India is that Pakistan, which has remained outside the DP process, could be emboldened to seek an upgradation to achieve its long-cherished parity with India.

So, while ASEAN is expanding its vision and its statements, it must also take greater responsibility for its own growth and wellbeing. ASEAN needs to become an area where friendly countries find solace and stability, and not one where an aggressive power can have ASEAN turn its way, to the detriment of others.

Amb. Gurjit Singh is Former Ambassador of India to Germany and the African Union and the Chair of CII Task Force on Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC).

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References:

[1] Chairman’s Statement of the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, 27 October 2021 , Asean, https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-of-the-38th-and-39th-asean-summits/

[2] Brunei Darussalam, ASEAN21 Theme, https://asean2021.bn/asean-brunei-2021/theme

[3] Joint Statement from Quad Leaders, 24 September 2021, The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/24/joint-statement-from-quad-leaders/

[4] Gurjit Singh, The ASEAN disunity over AUKUS, ORF, 27 October 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-asean-disunity-over-aukus/

[5] Gurjit Singh, China and ASEAN at 30, Chanakya Forum, 3 October 2021, https://chanakyaforum.com/china-and-asean-at-30/

[6] Chairman’s Statement of the 38th and 39th ASEAN Summits, 27 October 2021 , Asean, https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-of-the-38th-and-39th-asean-summits/  para 102

[7] Gurjit Singh, China steps up its trade strategy in the Indo-Pacific, Hindu Business Line, 30 September 2021, https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/china-steps-up-its-trade-strategy-in-the-indo-pacific/article36760078.ece

[8] Op.cit note 1 para 91

[9] Chairman’s Statement on the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting, 24 April 2021, ASEAN, https://asean.org/chairmans-statement-on-the-asean-leaders-meeting-24-april-2021-and-five-point-consensus-2/

[10] Op.cit Note 1 para 90

[11] External Relations, Outward-Looking Community ❭, ASEAN, https://asean.org/our-communities/asean-political-security-community/outward-looking-community/external-relations/